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AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation

13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
14 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

15 In re:

16 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
17 TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS  
LITIGATION

MDL Dkt. No. 06-1791-VRW

**MOTION OF SPECIALLY APPEARING  
DEFENDANTS AT&T INC. AND  
BELLSOUTH CORPORATION TO  
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT  
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL  
JURISDICTION**

[Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)]

Date: May 14, 2009  
Time: 2:30 p.m.  
Courtroom: 6, 17th Floor  
Judge: Hon. Vaughn R. Walker

23 This Document Relates To:

24 *McMurray v. Verizon Communications, Inc., et*  
25 *al.*, No. 09-cv-0131-VRW

- Filed concurrently:
1. Declaration of Thomas Koch
  2. Declaration of James Lacy
  3. Proposed Order
  4. Telecommunications Carrier Defendants'  
Motion to Dismiss
    - a. Proposed Order

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**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS**

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Thursday, May 14, 2009 at 2:30 p.m., before the Honorable Vaughn R. Walker, United States District Chief Judge, in Courtroom 6, 17<sup>th</sup> Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, Specially Appearing Defendants AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation will move and hereby do move to dismiss the Complaint (Dkt. 1) for lack of personal jurisdiction.

This motion is made on the grounds that AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation are holding companies that do not provide telecommunications services at all, much less do business in the State of New York; that they have not been alleged to have taken any action with respect to the claims at issue here; and so there is no basis for personal jurisdiction over them. This motion is based on this notice of motion and motion, the memorandum that follows, the declarations of Thomas Koch and James Lacy filed herewith, all pleadings and records on file in this action, and any other arguments and evidence presented to this Court at or before the hearing on this motion.

AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation also have joined in the motion to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), which is being filed concurrently.

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**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

**ISSUE TO BE DECIDED**

Whether a federal district court in California hearing a case transferred from the Southern District of New York pursuant to the multidistrict litigation (MDL) procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1407 has personal jurisdiction over AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation, given that those entities are holding companies that do not do business or have a presence in New York, and the Complaint contains no factual allegations that either AT&T Inc. or BellSouth Corporation was involved in the conduct challenged by the Complaint.

**INTRODUCTION**

Plaintiffs have neither alleged nor established any basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation, nor could they have done so. AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation are holding companies that neither make nor sell goods or services to New York residents or, indeed, to anyone at all. AT&T Inc. is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Texas and has no offices or employees in New York. BellSouth Corporation is incorporated and headquartered in Georgia, and it too has no offices or employees in New York. Moreover, no factual allegations tie either AT&T Inc. or BellSouth Corporation to any of the activities underlying the claims asserted in the Complaint. *See* Compl., *McMurray v. Verizon Commc'ns.* (No. 09-0131) (Dkt. 1, Attach. No. 2). Indeed, the Complaint does not allege that any of the defendants did anything at all. The claims against these defendants should be dismissed.

**ARGUMENT**

**I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT AND CANNOT ESTABLISH PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER AT&T INC. OR BELLSOUTH CORPORATION.**

Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. *Doe v. Unocal Corp.*, 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). In a case transferred by the JPML for pretrial purposes, the transferee court – i.e., this Court – may exercise personal jurisdiction only to the same degree that the transferor court could

1 have done. *See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 818 F.2d 145, 163 (2d Cir. 1987)  
2 (“Following a transfer [under 28 U.S.C. § 1407], the transferee judge has all the jurisdiction  
3 and powers over pretrial proceedings in the actions transferred to him that the transferor  
4 judge would have had in the absence of transfer.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); *In re*  
5 *FMC Corp. Patent Litig.*, 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (per curiam); *Maricopa*  
6 *County v. American Petrofina, Inc.*, 322 F. Supp. 467, 469 (N.D. Cal. 1971); 15 Charles  
7 Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edwin H. Cooper, *Federal Practice and Procedure*  
8 § 3867 (2008).<sup>1</sup> Here, the Complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the  
9 Southern District of New York, *see* Compl., and subsequently transferred to this Court by  
10 the JPML, *see In re National Security Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., McMurray v.*  
11 *Verizon Commc’ns* (MDL No. 1791) (Dkt. 1, Attach. No. 5). Accordingly, personal juris-  
12 diction in this case is governed by the law of the State of New York. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P.  
13 4(k)(1)(a) (federal court may exercise jurisdiction over any defendant “who is subject to the  
14 jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is lo-  
15 cated”).

16 **A. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish General Jurisdiction Over Defendants.**

17 Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. *See generally Helicopteros*  
18 *Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall*, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984). In New York, general juris-  
19 diction is governed by C.P.L.R. § 301. *See Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor*,  
20 425 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2005). “Under section 301, an entity is amenable to jurisdiction  
21 in New York if it is ‘doing business’ in New York so as to establish its presence in the state.  
22 A foreign corporation is said to be ‘doing business’ in New York if it engages in a continu-  
23 ous and systematic course of conduct in New York.” *Mareno v. Rowe*, 910 F.2d 1043,  
24 1046 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); *see also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.*, 226  
25 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (the non-resident corporation must be “do[ing] business in New

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27 <sup>1</sup> *See also In re Dynamic Random Access Memory*, No. C 02-1486, 2005 WL 2988715, at  
28 \*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2005); *In re Heritage Bond Litig.*, MDL No. 02-ML-1475, 2004 WL  
5639773, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2004).

1 York not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity”  
2 (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The New York courts, in applying the pragmatic test  
3 for section 301 jurisdiction, have focused upon factors including: the existence of an office  
4 in New York; the solicitation of business in the state; the presence of bank accounts and  
5 other property in the state; and the presence of employees of the foreign defendant in the  
6 state.” *Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd.*, 763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing  
7 *Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.*, 19 N.Y.2d 533, 537 (1967) and *Bryant v.*  
8 *Finnish National Airline*, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 430-31 (1965)).

9 1. This standard is not remotely satisfied as to AT&T Inc. AT&T Inc. has no  
10 relevant contacts with New York, much less the requisite contacts under C.P.L.R. § 301.  
11 AT&T Inc. is a holding company incorporated in Delaware, with its principal place of  
12 business in Dallas, Texas. *See* Declaration of Thomas Koch in Support of the Motion of  
13 Specially Appearing Defendants AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation To Dismiss  
14 Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (“Koch Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-4. It provides  
15 no telecommunications services or Internet services to the public, and does not itself make  
16 or sell any products or services. *Id.* ¶ 5. It has no physical network or telecommunications  
17 assets other than stock in its subsidiaries, some of which offer telecommunications services.  
18 *Id.* AT&T Inc. does not own or operate the AT&T brand and logo, or the AT&T brand  
19 website. *Id.* ¶¶ 13-15. Each of its affiliated subsidiaries that does business has its own  
20 separate corporate, partnership or limited liability company identity and structure. *Id.* ¶ 6.

21 Specifically with regard to New York, AT&T Inc.’s contacts do not rise to the level  
22 of continuous and systematic contacts such that New York jurisdiction can be established.  
23 AT&T Inc. itself has not registered or otherwise qualified to do business in the State of  
24 New York, and thus did not appoint an agent for service of process in New York for that  
25 purpose. *Id.* ¶ 11. It does not have an office or mailing address in New York, and does not  
26 own or lease any real property in New York. *Id.* ¶ 8. It has no employees in New York.  
27 *Id.* ¶ 7. It does not insure any property or risk in New York. ¶ 9. It does not pay income,  
28 property or use taxes to the State of New York. *Id.* ¶ 10. It does not manufacture any



1 product of any kind or provide any service of any nature that could find its way through the  
2 stream of commerce into the State of New York. *Id.* ¶ 12. In short, it has not availed itself  
3 of the privilege of doing business in the State of New York.

4 2. The same is true of BellSouth Corporation. Like AT&T Inc., BellSouth  
5 Corporation is a holding company that conducts no business of its own and has no assets  
6 other than stock in its subsidiaries. *See* Declaration of James Lacy in Support of the Motion  
7 of Specially Appearing Defendants AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation To Dismiss  
8 Plaintiffs' Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction ("Lacy Decl.") ¶¶ 3-4. BellSouth  
9 Corporation is incorporated in Georgia, and its principal place of business is in Atlanta,  
10 Georgia. *Id.* ¶ 3. BellSouth Corporation is a holding company owning stock in its  
11 subsidiaries, some of which offer telecommunications services, but BellSouth Corporation  
12 itself does not own the telecommunications or Internet network and assets operated by its  
13 subsidiaries. *Id.* ¶ 4. Each of its affiliated subsidiaries that does business has its own  
14 separate corporate, partnership or limited liability company identity and structure. *Id.* ¶ 5.

15 For these same reasons, BellSouth Corporation's contacts with New York are mani-  
16 festly insufficient to subject it to general jurisdiction. It never has been registered or other-  
17 wise qualified to do business in the State of New York, and did not appoint an agent for  
18 service of process in New York for such purpose. *Id.* ¶ 9. It does not have an office or  
19 mailing address in New York, and does not own or lease any real property in New York.  
20 *Id.* ¶ 6. It has no employees in New York. *Id.* It does not insure any property or risk in  
21 New York. ¶ 7. It does not pay income, property or use taxes to the State of New York. *Id.*  
22 ¶ 8. It does not manufacture any product of any kind or provide any service of any nature  
23 that could find its way through the stream of commerce into the State of New York. *Id.*  
24 ¶ 10. Like AT&T Inc., it has not availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the  
25 State of New York.

26 In short, "none of the factors indicative of presence [under § 301] have been demon-  
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28

1 strated.” *Mareno*, 910 F.2d at 1046.<sup>2</sup>

2 **B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Specific Jurisdiction Over Defendants.**

3 Specific jurisdiction may exist in a particular case as a result of the “relationship  
4 among the defendant, the forum and the litigation.” *Helicopteros*, 466 U.S. at 414. In New  
5 York, specific jurisdiction is governed by the long-arm statute, which permits jurisdiction  
6 over a given cause of action when, with respect to that claim, a non-resident:

- 7 1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to sup-  
8 ply goods or services in the state; or
- 9 2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action  
10 for defamation of character arising from the act; or
- 11 3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or  
12 property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defama-  
13 tion of character arising from the act, if he  
14 (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persis-  
15 tent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods  
16 used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or  
17 (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences  
18 in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or interna-  
19 tional commerce; or
- 20 4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.

21 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302. The “overriding criterion” for determining whether a non-domiciliary  
22 defendant has “the minimal contacts required to sustain jurisdiction under the provisions of  
23 [§ 302(a)(1)],” is whether the defendant ““purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-  
24 ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its  
25

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26 <sup>2</sup> Because the statutory test for general jurisdiction is not met, the Court need not undertake  
27 a separate analysis under the Due Process Clause. *See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King*, 126  
28 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) (if New York law does not confer personal jurisdiction, the court  
“do[es] not address the issue of due process”); *see also Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler  
Gonzalez & Rodriguez*, 305 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2002). In any event, it is plain that the  
constitutional minimum is not satisfied. Under the familiar standard, “If the defendant’s  
activities in the forum are substantial, continuous and systematic, general jurisdiction is  
available ....” *Unocal*, 248 F.3d at 923. “The standard for establishing general jurisdiction  
is ‘fairly high’ and requires that the defendant’s contacts be of the sort that approximate  
physical presence.” *Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc.*, 223 F.3d 1082, 1086  
(9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). To establish the minimum contacts necessary to support  
general jurisdiction, plaintiffs must establish that defendants have “continuous and system-  
atic” contacts with New York tantamount to doing business within the state. *Helicopteros*,  
466 U.S. at 416. For all of the reasons set forth above, this standard is not satisfied. AT&T  
Inc. and BellSouth Corporation have no meaningful contacts with the State of New York,  
much less “continuous and systematic” ones. *Id.*

1 laws.” *McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp.*, 20 N.Y.2d 377, 382 (1967) (quoting  
 2 *Hanson v. Denckla*, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); *Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz*, 489 F.3d 542, 548  
 3 (2d Cir. 2007).

4 Neither AT&T Inc. nor BellSouth Corporation remotely meets this standard. As an  
 5 initial matter, plaintiffs have not alleged *any* action by *any* of the defendants, much less the  
 6 necessary transaction of business, commission of a tort, or conduct with respect to real  
 7 property. As explained in greater detail in the concurrently filed motion to dismiss the  
 8 Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the Complaint alleges only actions by the  
 9 Congress and the Attorney General. *See, e.g.*, Compl. ¶ 11 (“The Act, as signed into law by  
 10 the President on or about July 9, 2008, purports to mandate dismissal of all such pending  
 11 actions.”); *id.* ¶ 12 (“Section 802(a) of the Act requires dismissal of the Pending  
 12 Actions . . . .”); *id.* ¶ 13 (“upon presentation of a certification by the Attorney General”); *id.*  
 13 ¶ 20 (“By mandating dismissal of the Pending Actions, the Act immunizes the  
 14 telecommunications carriers for such prior damages without compensation to plaintiffs and  
 15 without adjudication of their claims, a taking of property . . . .”). It does not allege any  
 16 action by AT&T Inc. or BellSouth Corporation (or any other defendant), much less does it  
 17 allege such action in the State of New York. Nor could it have – for all of the reasons set  
 18 forth above, these holding companies have not and do not take any actions that could  
 19 subject them to specific jurisdiction in New York. *Supra* at 3-4; *see generally* Koch Decl.;  
 20 Lacy Decl. Accordingly, dismissal is required. *See generally Bank Brussels Lambert*, 305  
 21 F.3d at 125 (for § 302(a)(2) to apply, plaintiff must at least “state a colorable cause of  
 22 action”); *National Tel. Directory Consultants, Inc. v. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g. Corp.*, 25  
 23 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding the plaintiff’s assertions “too speculative  
 24 and conclusory to confer jurisdiction” under § 302(a)(3)).<sup>3</sup>

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26 <sup>3</sup> As with general jurisdiction, because the statutory test for specific jurisdiction is not met,  
 27 the Court need not undertake a separate analysis under the Due Process Clause. *See Ben-*  
 28 *susan Rest. Corp.*, 126 F.3d at 27; *supra* note 2. In any event, it is plain that the constitu-  
 tional minimum is not satisfied. “Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over  
 (continued...)

1 **CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint should be dismissed as against Specially  
3 Appearing Defendants AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation.

4 Respectfully submitted,

5 Dated: March 16, 2009

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AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 (...continued)

23 an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there,” the Due Process Clause re-  
24 quires that the defendant have “fair warning” that a particular activity may subject it to the  
25 jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 472  
26 (1985). This “fair warning” requirement is satisfied only if the defendant has “purposefully  
27 directed” its activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged inju-  
28 ries that “arise out of or relate to” those activities. *Id.*; *see also Unocal*, 248 F.3d at 923  
 (“The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction within the  
 forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of con-  
 ducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,”  
 the claim must “arise[] out of or result[] from the defendant’s forum-related activities,” and  
 the “[e]xercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For  
 all the reasons set forth above, this standard is not satisfied here. AT&T Inc. and BellSouth  
 Corporation have not “purposefully directed” any activities at residents of New York, *Bur-*  
*ger King*, 471 U.S. at 472, nor have plaintiffs alleged otherwise.

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**DECLARATION PURSUANT TO GENERAL ORDER 45, § X.B**

I, Marc H. Axelbaum, hereby declare pursuant to General Order 45, § X.B, that I have obtained the concurrence in the filing of this document from the signatory listed above.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing declaration is true and correct.

Executed on March 16, 2009, at San Francisco, California.

By: /s/ Marc H. Axelbaum  
Marc H. Axelbaum

Attorney for Specially Appearing Defendants AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation