March 13, 2015

State Senator Mark Leno 455 Golden Gate Avenue #14800 San Francisco, CA 94102

Re: SB 178 - SUPPORT CalECPA.

Dear Senator Leno:

The undersigned are legal scholars from throughout the United States who teach and write extensively about criminal procedure, information privacy law, cyber law and related fields. We write in support of SB 178, which clarifies that California law requires that government entities obtain a warrant to access the electronic communications data we store on our cell phones and with our service providers, including read and unread emails, to-from data, and location information. By establishing a warrant requirement, this law will both protect the rights of Californians and provide needed clarity in this fast-evolving area of law.

Under SB 178, government entities must obtain a warrant, subject to limited exceptions, before they may compel the disclosure of electronic communication information from service providers or obtain such information directly from electronic devices. That requirement ensures that a neutral magistrate first finds probable cause before government agents conduct intrusive investigations into our private lives. Without a warrant requirement, Californians must generally rely on law enforcement discretion for the privacy and security of their electronic data. Judicial oversight, however, helps ensure that law enforcement agents do not acquire, store, and potentially share more revealing electronic information than they need to investigate crimes and secure public safety. Only the protections of the warrant requirement can assure Californians that their use of essential modern technologies is free from unjustified government surveillance.¹

SB 178 codifies existing California constitutional principles. The California Supreme Court established decades ago in *People v. Blair* (1979) that law enforcement agents' collection of information sufficient to furnish a person's "virtual current biography," such as a record of telephone numbers dialed, intrudes on reasonable expectations of privacy. In *Blair*, the Court granted a motion to suppress a list of telephone numbers and explained the need, under California law, for "a judicial determination that law enforcement officials were entitled thereto." SB 178's warrant requirement applies *Blair* to the electronic equivalent of dialed telephone numbers, as well as information about the sender, recipients, contents, format, location, and time of communications, all of which easily furnish a virtual current biography. In addition, government access to electronic communications, location data and metadata implicate rights of free expression and free association, which the California constitution clearly protects. *White v. Davis* (1975).

Federal courts have required a warrant for some of the information SB 178 covers. In *United States v. Warshak* (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit held that law enforcement agents must obtain a warrant based on probable cause when they compel a service provider to disclose the contents of emails it stores. The *Warshak* court recognized that "email requires strong protection under the Fourth Amendment; otherwise the Fourth Amendment would prove an ineffective guardian of private communication, an essential purpose it has long been recognized to serve." By requiring a warrant for access to email content, SB 178 codifies not only *Warshak* but the practices of Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and other major providers.

¹ SB 178's reporting requirements also help ensure that practices remain within defensible limits.

The Supreme Court itself has held that law enforcement agents must either obtain a warrant to search a cell phone or establish exigent circumstances, just as SB 178 requires. This past summer, in *United States v. Riley* (2014), the Court rejected the government's request to extend the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement to cell phone searches. The Court refused to apply to cell phone searches the precedents established for the searches of purses and wallets because "that would be like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon." Recognizing that cell phones' storage capacity and multi-functionality mean they contain "the privacies of life," the *Riley* Court required law enforcement agents to "get a warrant" for cell phone searches. SB 178 codifies *Riley*.

SB 178's protection for location data also finds support in recent Supreme Court decisions. In *United States v. Jones* (2012), five concurring justices found that law enforcement agents intruded on reasonable expectations of privacy when they used a GPS tracking device to obtain several weeks of location data. The *Jones* justices recognized a privacy interest in location data even though it revealed the suspect's location out of doors and not inside a home. The *Jones* investigation involved acquisition of real-time data, but the *Riley* Court later recognized privacy interests in stored location data; "[h]istoric location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct someone's specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building."²

Despite strong support for SB 178 in existing law, its passage will bring needed clarity for all those affected, including law enforcement. For example, legal uncertainty persists about the treatment of location data obtained from cell phone providers, despite the *Jones* decision. Congress has not updated the federal electronic surveillance laws that are nearing their 30th birthday. Those laws have been justifiably criticized for being more complex and convoluted than the tax laws and for being particularly a mess regarding location data. At the same time, government lawyers argue that under Fourth Amendment precedents from the 1970s, people forfeit privacy in information, such as location data, stored with third parties. While the Supreme Court has not extended those precedents to modern communications technologies and its recent decisions suggest it may not,³ the Court has not yet joined the California Supreme Court in rejecting the third party rule's application to electronic communications and metadata.

Because of the persisting legal uncertainty, Californians have good reason to worry that the information SB 178 covers is inadequately protected. High technology companies cannot assure their customers that they comply with law enforcement requests for user information under a set of rules that is both sensible and privacy-protective. The impressive coalition of companies and industry groups that support SB 178 suggests that SB 178's provisions are just that.

SB 178 incorporates into California statutory law legally sound provisions that are essential to ensuring that Californians may take advantage of innovations in communications technologies without sacrificing their constitutionally protected rights to privacy, free expression and free association.

² Further supporting SB 178's uniform protection of historic and real-time location data, AT&T recently told the Eleventh Circuit that law enforcement agents have requested that it continuously forward to them real time location data, stored just long enough to be considered historical, presumably so that they may acquire it under a lesser standard. *See* AT&T Amicus Brief in *United States v. Davis*, available at https://www.eff.org/document/att-davis-en-banc-amicus-brief.

³ Justice Sotomayor explicitly disapproved of using the third party rule in cases involving new communications technologies in her concurrence in *Jones*.

Signed,4

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