E076778

COURT OF APPEAL - STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1 FOURTH DISTRICT 2 APPELLATE DIVISION 3 Appeal from Superior Court of the State of California 4 for the County of San Bernarding 5 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, 6 COURT OF APPEAL FOURTH DISTR 7 VS. Case No. CIVDS1930054 E#076778 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF 8 CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN 9 BERNARDINO, ET AL., 10 Defendants-Respondents.) 11 12 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL 13 14 BEFORE HON. DWIGHT W. MOORE, JUDGE DEPARTMENT S-19 15 SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA 16 1/15/21 17 APPEARANCES: 18 FOR APPELLANT: AARON DAVID MACKEY Attorney at Law 19 Electronic Frontier Foundation 815 Eddy Street 20 San Francisco, CA 94109 21 MICHAEL TEMPLE RISHER Attorney at Law 22 Law Office of Michael T. Risher 2081 Center Street 23 #154 Berkeley, CA 94704 24 REPORTED BY: 25 CARRIE LANE, CSR 8882 Official Reporter 26 Vol. 1 of 1 Pages 1 through 40

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SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA; FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 2021 1 2 P.M. SESSION DEPARTMENT S19 3 HON. DWIGHT W. MOORE, JUDGE MICHAEL RISHER, Attorney at Law, on behalf of 4 Plaintiff; MARK RUMOLD, Attorney at Law, on 5 6 behalf of E.F.F.; MARK VOS, Deputy District Attorney of San Bernardino County representing 7 8 the People of the State of California; JAMES SECORD, Deputy District Attorney of San 9 10 Bernardino County representing the People of 11 the State of california; CHRISTINE MASONEK, Deputy District Attorney of San Bernardino 12 13 County representing the People of the State of California; MILES KOWALSKI, County Counsel 14 15 representing the San Bernardino County; J. STEPHEN PASCOVER, Attorney at Law, 16 17 representing San Bernardino Superior Court, 18 all appearing telephonically.) 19 (Carrie Lane, Official Reporter, CSR 8882) 20 --000--THE COURT: First of all, everybody, I am in 21 chambers. I have with me Gail Fry, a newsperson. 22 23 MS. FRY: The Black Voice News. THE COURT: I also have my court reporter 24 present. They are the only people present in chambers 25 26 with me. We are masked and distanced.

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So who is on the phone? Let's take roll. Who is
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     on the phone?
             MR. RISHER: Michael Risher for the Plaintiff.
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              MR. RUMOLD: Mark Rumold for E.F.F.
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             THE COURT: Last name for Mr. Rumold? Spelling?
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              MR. RUMOLD: Yes. Rumold, r-u-m-o-l-d.
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              MS. FRY: And first name Mark?
              THE COURT: First name Mark.
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             Okay. Mr. Vos, you are on the phone?
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              MR. VOS: I am on Blue Jeans.
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              THE COURT: Yep. That is --
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             MR. VOS: From the District Attorney's office.
              THE COURT: Who else from the District Attorney's
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     office?
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              MR. SECORD: James Secord.
              THE COURT: S-e-c-o-r-d.
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              Unless you've changed your name.
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              MR. SECORD: Not this week.
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              THE COURT: And anyone else from the D.A.'s
     office?
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              MS. MASONEK: Christine Masonek.
             THE COURT: Ms. Masonek, good afternoon.
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              MS. MASONEK: Good afternoon.
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              THE COURT: You too, Jim.
              County Counsel -- do we have somebody from County
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     Counsel on?
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MR. KOWALSKI: Yes, your Honor. Deputy County 1 2 Counsel Miles Kowalski. THE COURT: Miles Kowalski. The typical 3 spelling; right? 4 5 MR. KOWALSKI: Yes. THE COURT: And is Steve Pascover on the phone? 6 7 MR. PASCOVER: I am, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. That is court attorney 8 9 Stephen Pascover, p-a-s-c-o-v-e-r. 10 MR. PASCOVER: That's right. Thank you. THE COURT: Is there anybody that I have missed? 11 12 Well, I guess not. 13 THE COURT REPORTER: Your Honor, can you ask them, when they speak, to please identify themselves? 14 15 THE COURT: Request from my court reporter, if you speak, before you say anything tell us who it is that 16 17 is speaking. Every time speak loudly, clearly, distinctly, and slowly enough that her fingers don't catch 18 fire. We've had a problem with that already today with a 19 previous hearing with a lawyer who talks way too fast. 20 So let's kick this off. I'm kind of shouting 21 because my court reporter is some distance behind me. I 22 wish I could move this around somewhere. Okay. So 23 anyhow, we are here on an underlying -- I'm sorry. I've 24 got paper all over my desk -- the underlying request from 25 the Electronic Frontier Foundation --26

Well, for the record, this is Electronic Frontier Foundation, Petitioner, versus Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Bernardino, Respondent; County of San Bernardino and San Bernardino County District Attorney's Office, real parties in interest; Case Number CIVDS1930054. And this started off with a verified petition to unseal court records filed October 8, 2019.

Mr. Risher, am I correct so far?

MR. RISHER: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Now, we have had -- and I am not going to recite them because I don't know the dates off the top of my head. But we have had at least two or three joint telephone conferences through the pendency of this matter. And as a result of those conferences and agreements that were reached, the People stipulated to unseal portions. There are, I believe, eight warrants that are being contested here. There are eight warrants that E.F.F. seems to have fully unsealed released to E.F.F. and released to the public.

Am I correct, Mr. Risher?

MR. RISHER: Almost. Warrants have been released. What we are asking for now are additional materials related to those warrants.

THE COURT: I was getting to that. Along the way, we had reached stipulations where some portions by stipulation of the parties have been released to

Petitioner; correct?

MR. VOS: Mr. Vos here. May I say that I never stipulated -- the District Attorney never stipulated to their release. We made it clear that we were simply not objecting to the release of the warrants and the sealing orders.

THE COURT: I could have sworn I saw a stipulation. Ultimately, I think that distinction -- although a real distinction is probably not germane to where we are now -- parts of each warrant were, in fact, released to E.F.F. That is a correct statement, is it not?

MR. VOS: Mark Vos. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Was that Mr. Risher that wanted to say something?

MR. RISHER: No.

THE COURT: I don't hear lawyers say that often enough. Thank you, counsel.

So the premise was portions not including Hobbs' affidavits of those contested warrants were, in fact, released. There was some thought that that might satisfy E.F.F. and they might not ask for anything further.

However, it turned out that did not suffice for E.F.F. E.F.F. wishes to obtain each of the warrants now in its entirety, i.e., the previously undisclosed portions of each to which the People in the most strenuous terms

possibly object. Fair statement? 1 MR. VOS: Mark Vos. Yes. 2 MR. RISHER: Michael Risher. Yes. 3 THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Kowalski, you're 4 back there being pretty quiet. But if you've got 5 something to say, feel free to chime in. 6 MR. KOWALSKI: Thank you, your Honor. The County 7 does join in the objections of the D.A.'s office. 8 THE COURT: All right. So that brings us to 9 where we are today. The District Attorney's office has 10 most recently filed on November 10 a reply regarding 11 motion for judgment on the pleadings. Before that, there 12 was a pleading -- I'm trying to get these in some kind of 13 sequence. 14 15 Before that on October 20 of 2020, the D.A. filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a brief and 16 opposition on the unsealing, request of judicial notice of 17 four pending criminal cases, and a declaration from Ms. 18 Masonek under seal. Mr. Risher filed on October 8 an, I 19 think, updated verified petition to unseal the records. 20 That is 2019. Sorry. 21

Mr. Risher, did you file any additional paperwork seeking the Hobbs portions? Or has that simply been -- or is that request still based on your original petition?

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MR. RISHER: This is Michael Risher. The request is based on our initial petition. The only pleading we

filed that I think is in addition to that that is relevant here is we did file, I believe, November 6 -- that's the date on the paper -- a memorandum in support of the motion to unseal and an opposition for the motion for judgment on the pleading. That is a single document. We've only filed our initial petition in that single brief.

THE COURT: Hang on. Well, I have a -- no. I have the order unsealing that which was released. That is dated August. That was approved as to form only by real parties in interest.

Mr. Risher, I am not finding a pleading from you from November 6. I am not suggesting for a moment you didn't file it.

MR. RISHER: I think I filed it -- it has been a awhile. But I think I filed it and also emailed it. And then the government filed a reply to it in addition to their October 27 letter.

THE COURT: That is a sequence of events that makes perfect sense. It might have gotten stuck in a confidential envelope. Hang on a sec. I just thought of something. I've been coming into the office working on this. And since I obtained all of the sealed warrants, I have had a bunch of documents locked in my desk that I forgot about until this minute. Perhaps it's there. Hang on.

MR. KOWALSKI: This is Miles Kowalski. I can

confirm I received the documents on November 6. 1 2 MR. VOS: Mark Vos. I also have it. 3 Do you, your Honor, have our letter of October 27? 4 THE COURT: That doesn't ring any bells. The 5 only letters I am aware of were from E.F.F. to the Court I 6 think before this pleading was even initially filed. 7 Wait. Wait. I found the November 9. Declaration of 8 Michael Risher in support of Plaintiff's motion to unseal; 9 10 correct? MR. RISHER: Well, there should also be an 11 12 attachment --THE COURT: This is Mr. Risher speaking; correct? 13 MR. RISHER: Yes. Michael Risher speaking. 14 THE COURT: What I have found is two documents 15 filed November 9 -- a declaration of Risher in support to 16 unseal and memorandum in support of motion to unseal and 17 opposition for motion of judgment on pleadings. 18 19 MR. RISHER: Yes. Michael Risher. And that is 20 what we filed. THE COURT: I have everything. I have reviewed 21 everything that is in the file. The file is -- and this 22 is my fault -- not a masterpiece of organization. Let's 23 24 just be charitable and say that. 25 MR. VOS: Your Honor, by saying you have everything -- this is Mark Vos by the way for the D.A. --26

does that include our October 27 letter?

THE COURT: A letter from October 27. Yes.

MR. VOS: Okay.

THE COURT: Yes. You asked for my indulgence. I am a pretty indulgent guy. All right. Despite my obvious lack of total organization as evidenced by this conversation, I have in fact read everything.

This is your motion, Mr. Risher. Is there anything else that you haven't put into writing already, anything new, anything additional that you wish to bring to the Court's attention?

MR. RISHER: This is Michael Risher. Just one thing. In the government's reply, it brings up for the first time the presumption under Evidence Code 664. And I will just say that I think that is irrelevant. The government has the burden to show that sealing is justified. The government has the burden to show that sealing continues to be justified. Sealing was initially justified for the first 10 days under Penal Code 1534. There is no presumption of any sort that sealing continues to be justified.

Everything else I've put in the papers. It's the government's burden. We are not aware of all of the evidence that it has. So I would like to reply to the government's argument if it has any.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Risher.

Mr. Vos, anything to add to what you've already 1 said? 2 3 MR. VOS: No. Just a micro brief response to Mr. Risher that we do not believe that we, the government, 4 have the burden to keep -- to have to persistently justify 5 sealing when the warrant materials are sealed under Hobbs 6 and also like statutes such as Evidence Code 1040 through 7 8 Evidence Code 1042. 9 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Vos. 10 Mr. Kowalski, do you have anything to add? 11 MR. KOWALSKI: No, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Well, my understanding is 12 the basic premise here is a set of rules existed prior to 13 2016 that essentially permitted the Court to seal a 14 warrant and affidavit, and they would remain sealed in 15 perpetuity unless and until some judge made an order to 16 17 the contrary. However, in 2016, Penal Code Section -- oh, God. 18 I don't have the number in front of me. It's the one with 19 the (g) subsection. Somebody want to refresh my 20 recollection? 21 22 MR. KOWALSKI: Miles Kowalski. It's 638.52(q). THE COURT: That's it. Thank you, Mr. Kowalski. 23 24 That code section was amended creating a new -essentially vitiating the prior sealed in perpetuity 25

arrangements and instead instituting --

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That number again, Mr. Kowalski?

MR. KOWALSKI: 638.52.

THE COURT: -- instituting a requirement that the order that the Court must order the order under the StingRay provisions, the cell phone simulator -- if it is a cell phone simulator warrant, it must be sealed for the duration of the period of the warrant. There has been an order that it be disclosed to -- by the phone company to the ultimate customer and that that order for good cause could be extended.

Now, I did something that I don't see in the pleadings that anybody else has done. I went back to the source and went back to Assembly Bill 1924, Chapter 511, statutes of 2016 and read the Legislative Counsel's Digest about this statute.

From my reading of the earlier version of the statute, it didn't say anything about making that warrant public at any point. The Legislative Counsel's Digest talks about this specific -- this is a specific law that enacted the amended -- the amended 638.52(g) and said "This bill would instead require an order or extension order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device, directed the order be sealed until the order including any extension expires, and would require that the order or extension direct that the person owning or leasing the line to which

the pen register or trap and trace device is attached not disclose the existence of the pen register or trap, etc., etc., to any other person. This bill would require a government entity that obtained information pursuant to an order for pen register or trap and trace device to notify the intended targets of the order within 30 days after the termination of the order or a delay is allowed for good cause."

That focus is entirely, in my view, on how the legislature orders law enforcement to ultimately disclose to the person whose phone was trapped and traced or otherwise detected. And I don't see that this law, that this change in the law, in fact, changes anything in pre-existing law inasmuch as it relates to disclosing information to the public.

Mr. Risher, your thoughts.

MR. RISHER: Yes. This is Michael Risher. A few thoughts. First of all, what we are dealing with here is not pen register, trap and trace orders. That is why we focused in our November 11 memorandum on the requirements for search warrants because those are two different breeds of animals. Search warrants are governed not by the .522 statute but by 1534 and Hobbs which has always required that these materials be open 10 days after issuance assuming that they have been served.

So I don't actually know that the change in the

law is relevant to these particular records. If it were, 1 if these were trap and trace, then we would be in a 2 slightly different place. But it still wouldn't matter 3 because the orders here consistent with the statute, or 4 maybe consistent with the older statute, say that these 5 materials shall be sealed until further order of the 6 Court. 7 The current version of the pen register and trap and trace statute doesn't require and, in my mind, doesn't 9 10 permit perpetual sealing --THE COURT: Counsel, give me a specific cite to 11 that code section. 12 MR. RISHER: I'm sorry. Which code section? 13 THE COURT: The one that you are referring to 14 right now about specifically trap or trace. Excuse me. 15 Specifically the cell phone simulator. 16 MR. RISHER: The cell phone stimulators are 17 governed -- I'm sorry. It's going to take me a moment --18 but are specifically governed by the rules relating to 19 search warrants. I don't have that statute right in front 20 of me. 21 22 THE COURT: Well, search warrants would be 1534 23 et seq. Agreed? 24 MR. RISHER: Yes. 25 THE COURT: All right.

MR. RISHER: And so that's what we are relying on

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here. And the statute that covers these types of warrants specifically says that all of the rules relating to search warrants apply to these equally. I think that is 1546.2. But I don't have it right in front of me.

So I mean, these are warrants. They say so.

They are issued under 1534 et seq. They are covered by

Section 1534. And even if -- and I think the plain

language now of the trap and trace statute also requires

that those orders be either unsealed or, if any sealing

continues after they are executed, that sealing has to be

justified by the Rules of Court. But in any case, we are

dealing with the Statute 1534 which unambiguously requires

unsealing 10 days after issuance of executed warrants.

THE COURT: 1534 makes no reference whatever to Hobbs. Are you suggesting that the Hobbs rules fall before 1534?

MR. RISHER: 1534 has been around for a very long time. I tried to figure out how long. I couldn't. And Hobbs, in fact, is an interpretation of 1534. The reason that we have the Hobbs is because 1534 requires that these be made public after they are executed. And Hobbs says, well, even though that is what the statute says, we are going to harmonize that with the Evidence Code protections for confidential informants. And the way we will do that is that all material -- presumptively the search warrants must be made public. We say that repeatedly. We quoted

that a half a dozen times, and our brief is saying that -except to the extent that would reveal material that is
covered by the confidential informant privilege. And so
Hobbs is putting aside its second step which is a due
process step. Hobbs is an interpretation of 1534 and
stands for the proposition that search warrants are public
documents unless there is some other provision of the
Evidence Code or some other statute that makes them
sealable.

And that is our argument here. They are -- anything that cannot be sealed under some specific provision of either Hobbs or the factors in the Jackson case has to be released.

THE COURT: All right. I certainly agree that Hobbs remains good law. And up until this petition, I have never seen an argument raised based on the longstanding language of 1534 that, once something has been sealed, it needs to be rereviewed and resealed and the sealing extended. You haven't cited any case authority for that. I think your interpretation of the language here really flies in the face of the underlying intentions of Hobbs.

Now, I am in a very constrained position in talking about the sealed affidavits. There was a request to accept the sealed affidavit of Ms. Masonek. Inasmuch as that has not been disclosed to the petition --

Is that correct, Mr. Vos?

MR. VOS: That is correct.

THE COURT: Inasmuch as they have had no chance to review or cross-examine it, I am not going to accept that petition -- I mean that declaration. However, I have independently -- and just for the record if it is not clear already, I was a D.A. for 26 years, 18 of which I was a supervisor. I have been a judge for a bit over 13 years. For a period of 7 long grueling painful uninterrupted months in the year 2020 working from home, I did nothing but search warrants all day, five days a week, 8:00 to 5:00. My personal record was 63 warrants in one day. I believe I probably reviewed more warrants than any other judge in this county. I'm sure that's why they gave this case to me. That was not a plea for sympathy although it probably sure sounded like one. Maybe a little.

But so I did not review -- excuse me. I'm not accepting into the record Ms. Masonek's declaration.

However, I have personally read all of these warrants and all of the appended affidavits. It appears to me that there has been historically a clear presumption that some information simply should never get out. In the Rules of Intelligence -- I'll fess up. I'm a John le Carre fan.

But in the Rule of Intelligence, they talk about sources and methods. And anybody who in any way reveals sources

or methods is creating a danger for somebody.

And in the world of the types of cases involved in these warrants that -- I believe it is a five defendant homicide case that Ms. Masonek has prosecuted and continues to prosecute as well as the two other cases unrelated to that combined case -- I'm not at liberty to disclose what's in those affidavits. I'm not at liberty to disclose what's in Ms. Masonek's affidavit. But I'm satisfied that there is nothing in any of those affidavits -- in the Hobbs' declarations and those affidavits -- that should be released now or ever.

I suppose somewhere a far turn down the road when everybody in the case has passed away, the need for secrecy and the march of technological process might obviate that comment but at least not for a very long time.

I am not finding in any of the authorities that have been cited to me -- and certainly no case law has been cited to me -- any authority for the proposition that I can now create a new precedent and order that these warrants which have been reviewed by a judge or sealed by a judge are subject to publication or a continuing review process to justify nonpublication. You just haven't shown that to me, counsel.

Mr. Vos, anything you would like to add?

MR. VOS: Only a question. Does this mean that

the Court is finding that the warrants the Court has reviewed have been sealed according to a compelling state interest and that there is no less restrictive means to further that interest?

But in fact, yes, that is my conclusion. There is nothing about these that can be partially released. The warrants are -- not the warrants. The affidavits, the Hobbs' declarations, are a case unto themselves that releasing any portion of it begins to give somebody an opportunity to begin to unwind the confidential information that is contained therein. And there is a compelling state interest both with regard to protecting confidential informant identity, if that is an issue in any of the cases, and in projecting sources of methods which is unquestionably an issue in all of these.

Mr. Risher.

MR. RISHER: A couple thoughts. This is Michael Risher. I mean, first, I don't think we can call these Hobbs' affidavits because the affidavit at issue in Hobbs or the material issue in Hobbs was simply an attachment to the affidavit that contained the sensitive information. And that is all that the Court is allowed to remain sealed.

I mean, what we should be seeing in these cases and what we are seeing certainly in Alameda County -- it's

been a while since I've looked at a bunch of warrants from there. But this is what I used to see -- is that if the investigating officer requesting the warrants offers certain information needed to be sealed under Hobbs, they would submit that as a separate attachment or at least as a part of the warrant that could easily be separated from the remainder of the materials which, under the unambiguous language of Section 1534, is to be made public and --

THE COURT: Counsel.

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MR. RISHER: I appreciate there is going to be confidential material and sensitive material in these affidavits. But I really find it difficult to believe that information -- for example, that they are investigating a 187 versus a 211 -- that the name of the investigating agency, that the general description of the qualifications of the affiance, that the request for or the description of what they are asking the phone companies to do, that all of that can be so sensitive as to marriage, keeping it from the public under the constitutional requirements that court records be public, the specific statutory requirements that search warrant materials be made public after the warrant is executed. And the Rules of Court cover that. I haven't seen them. Maybe I'm -- I don't know what is in them and that is what is causing my inability to comprehend that. But it just

seems difficult to believe.

THE COURT: Well, you are operating blindfolded with one hand tied behind your back. I recognize that. And quite frankly, the vast majority of warrants that I have reviewed in my day have been structured in the matter that you've described. This is the affidavit. Probable cause sometimes will be two paragraphs and then "See attached Hobbs' declaration." And what is sealed is a Hobbs' declaration. That is the typical format that I have seen employed in this county.

But what I've also seen is that every agency in this county -- that is, the largest county in the contiguous 48 -- so we've got a lot of agencies. And even with agencies, detectives on different desks have different warrant formats. So we have lots of formats, and not all of them comply with what I've just said.

However, in a situation where the police are doing phone investigations, they are doing trap and trace information, the mere fact of a phone number that they are looking at, even that if it becomes public, provides information to the counter-intelligence agencies working for the defendant. I'm getting carried away with myself. But I think you know what I mean.

The mere fact that the police wanted to do a trap on this particular phone number is going to start the wheels turning to figure out "Why are they doing this

number? How did they find it out? Is there a leak? Who is the leak? What is the leak? Is there some new technic?" There is a lot of stuff law enforcement is doing pursuant to search warrants that I think are far from common knowledge among the public. And I think there is a compelling state interest in keeping that as a state of affairs.

Don't you agree with Mr. Vos?

MR. VOS: Yes, your Honor.

Well, I have something on a different subject when you are done on this issue.

THE COURT: Well, I am kind of done on this issue. So what have you got?

MR. VOS: I would just invite the Court to address our argument about standing.

First, I wanted to clarify that, when I argued in the District Attorney's briefs that we believe E.F.F. and other members of the public don't have standing under Rules of Court 2.550 and 2.551, we didn't mean to imply they can't approach the Court and petition for unsealing and disclosure.

What we meant was, once the Court after having received such a request from the public and not a criminal -- not affected criminal party, once the Court received that request and deemed that those warrants have been sealed under Hobbs and 1040 and 1041 and 1042 of the

Evidence Code, the matter should there end, that regular lay members of the public even under the most recent statutes do not have standing to pursue it any further.

THE COURT: Well, you understand that, as a single Judge in a Superior Court, nothing that I say in this case has any precedential value other than in this case. I don't think I am in a position to make a ruling along the lines of what you suggest although I do agree with you that what you are suggesting is correct.

I don't feel that I have the jurisdiction to make that kind of a finding in this issue. I think I am limited to this case where they have requested certain records be unsealed, and I don't think I'm in a position to make an order as to standing that exceeds the scope of this case. So I'm reluctant to do what you are suggesting. Although as a matter of law, I do agree with your analysis.

Mr. Kowalski, you have been remarkably silent for a man of your profession which the Court very much appreciates. Do you have anything to add to this?

MR. KOWALSKI: Not me, your Honor. I know when not to chime in.

THE COURT: Parenthetically, years ago we had a Judge Campbell in the courthouse. The Victorville courthouse was named after him. He had what he called the rule of Hudson case because Tommy Hudson was a lawyer

years ago in the West End who really never knew when to stop talking. And he snatched defeat from the jaws of victory more than once. And so the rules in a Hudson's case is "Hey. You're ahead. Stop." And I think you have just recognized the continuing existence of the rule of Hudson case.

Mr. Risher, I am at this point intending to simply deny your petition and make an additional finding that, if I'm wrong and you -- because in my interpretation of these statutes -- well, my interpretation of the statutes is different from your interpretation of the statutes. And at this level, I'm wearing a dress and you're not, and I'm right and you're wrong at least until an appellate court says otherwise.

But at this point, I do intend to rule against you as the law does not permit the remedy that you seek. I will go beyond that and say I have reviewed each and every warrant. Were I to be found wrong in my evaluation of the law and were an appellate court to say "No, Judge Moore. You were wrong. These things should be made public unless you have reviewed them and found a compelling reason not to release them," as to that matter, I say I have reviewed the warrants and, as to each warrant, I have found a compelling public interest that there is no lesser remedy available other than to keep these documents sealed, those documents being those

portions in each warrant that you have not already received.

That is what I am intending to rule. But before I do, Mr. Risher, last chance at the Judge.

MR. RISHER: Well, it doesn't sound like I fall into the rule of Hudson in this case.

THE COURT: No. Probably you don't.

MR. RISHER: There is a case that we've discussed in our petition, the Marriage of Nichols or Nicholas, 186 Cal App.4th, 1566. At Page 1574 the Court says "We reject Nichols' efforts to treat sealing orders as if they were sealed caskets rather than presumptively open court records." And the rest of the case is kind of a discussion of why, in fact, there is a continuing duty for courts to evaluate the necessity of the Court unsealing orders and, when they are not necessary because of the passage of time for change of circumstances, it release those records to the extent it is possible to do so without impinging on serious interests.

And so I am not in the position to say what is in these. As I've said, it seems difficult to believe that at least part of those records can be released. But what I am in a position to say is that, yes, in fact, the Court does have a duty to, upon request of the public, look at these records and see whether they still need to be sealed. With that, I will pipe down.

THE COURT: I profess no expertise in family law.

This, in fact, is the only civil case that I have dealt

with -- say with a few adoptions -- since 1981. My entire

career as a D.A. and as a judge has been exclusively

criminal law.

I find a decision about sealing records in a civil case, a family law case where people are either talking about support issues or community property issues, I find the consequences and mistakes of a disclosure in that kind of a situation would be far, far afield from a disclosure in a murder investigation, in a multi-defendant murder investigation, in a gang case where in fact -- I'm not referring to these cases in specific because I don't want to talk in specifics. But people die in criminal cases if the wrong information falls into the wrong hands. We've seen it. I have seen people prosecuted for retaliation murders.

So I do not find language in a civil case where the consequences of a bad decision to release evidence are, in my view, significantly less than the consequences of a bad decision would be in this case.

So Mr. Vos or Mr. Kowalski, anything else you want to add?

MR. VOS: Mark Vos. That is it for the District Attorney.

MR. KOWALSKI: Miles Kowalski. Nothing from the

County. Thank you.

THE COURT: Then, gentlemen, at this point I am going to rule as I indicated I intended to. The petition is denied. I am denying the request to unseal the specified court records. I'm not going to list them all. They are listed in the moving papers. So I am denying the petition as to all.

I am finding that the law does not provide for the kind of release that Petitioner seeks. Beyond that, I am finding that, even if such a release would under some circumstances be authorized, I am finding that under the circumstances of these specific warrants, having reviewed them all, all should remain sealed because without specifying details, they are compelling State reasons involving either the safety of individuals or the protection of law enforcement technics and methods all which justify sealing these documents. And there is no legislature remedy available other than to keep them sealed.

With that done my experience in civil cases, as I said, is limited. But I think we need somebody to give notice of this ruling to all parties, do we not? Or will everybody waive notice?

MR. SECORD: Your Honor, James Secord. I would suggest that Mr. Vos give notice to all parties.

THE COURT: Mr. Secord, I don't remember calling

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1
     on you. You are intermeddling.
             MR. SECORD: I am actually citing the rule of
 2
    Hudson case keeping my mouth shut until I absolutely need
 3
     to say something.
 4
             MR. VOS: This is Mark Vos for the D.A. I will
 5
    go ahead at my colleague's suggestion and give notice.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: He's your colleague, not your
 8
     supervisor?
 9
              MR. VOS: No. He is retired.
              THE COURT: For some reason I thought you were
10
     simply saying "me too" to what your boss said.
11
12
             MR. VOS: He never rose above lunch buddy even
13
     when he was on the payroll.
             THE COURT: Even when he did work for a living,
14
    huh?
15
16
              MR. VOS: Right?
             THE COURT: A status which I intend to join
17
18
     shortly.
             All right. Then I will order the District
19
    Attorney to give notice to all parties, do that within 10
20
           Is that acceptable to everybody?
21
    days.
22
              MR. VOS: Yes. Mark Vos.
23
              MR. KOWALSKI: Miles Kowalski. Yes.
24
              THE COURT: And Mr. Risher?
25
             MR. RISHER: Michael Risher. Yes.
26
             Can I ask one other thing or make another
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request?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. RISHER: I'll make one request. I think it is for everybody. So it's not clear to whether the -- I know that the stipulation and order partially unsealing the parts of the warrants where nobody had an objection has been filed -- it's not clear to me whether those partially -- where those partially unsealed warrants exist in the Court files, whether they exist only in the individual criminal cases -- or warrant files rather -- or whether they have also been made a part of this record. And without --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. RISHER: I guess the punchline is I think that they should be a part of the record in this case in the event there is an appeal. I think that just makes it much more convenient for the Appellate Court.

THE COURT: Presently all warrants are maintained in the Court's warrants file under their numbers. What I have in front of me is a series of envelopes in which some of the information from the warrant, that which was released, is attached to the front of a sealed envelope. And the remaining sealed portions are contained within the sealed envelope. And so we have both the sealed and the unsealed portion of each warrant together.

I think it would make sense to maintain that

status as to the warrants. And are you suggesting that we make a second copy of each of the disclosed portions of the warrants to attach as a part of the record in this matter?

MR. RISHER: Yes, I am. And the easiest way to do that may be simply to attach a copy of the documents that I received from Mr. Vos which has a caption and everything and is a copy of either the stipulation or the order and all of that redacted material, all of those partially unredacted warrants. So we already have that document. There wouldn't be a need to go through and make separate copies of them.

THE COURT: Are you sure because I just love making more work for my court staff.

All right. I do have in this file a copy of the order unsealing court records reciting what has been unsealed. The copy I have is signed by me and approved as to form by Mr. Vos, missing Mr. Kowalski's signature but -- well, that ship has sailed.

I don't have in my file a further -- a specific copy of what was released. I appear to have only a copy of the order unsealing the records without all of the attachments of what, in fact, was unsealed. I don't seem to have that.

MR. VOS: Mark Vos, D.A. I have a copy in front of me. It was received, was stamped "Received" August 7

by the Court. And if I recollect correctly, I believe in 1 email correspondence your Honor actually acknowledged 2 3 receipt of it and had had comment concerning it. If you want, I can send a pdf to all the involved parties. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Vos, that was dated when? 5 MR. VOS: The "Received" stamp on the back of my 6 7 copy is August 7. MR. PASCOVER: Your Honor, Steve Pascover. Your 8 Honor, I have a copy of a 63-page document in what we call 9 or used to call laserfiche. I can make it -- it is 10 already a pdf. If you would like that, you know --11 MR. RISHER: This is Michael Risher. 12 Mr. Pascover, is that a caption, "Disclosure of unsealed 13 pages from nine sealed search warrant packets," so we are 14 15 all starting with the same document? MR. PASCOVER: I think so. The date is right. 16 Let me --17 MR. RISHER: I think that is the document that 18 19 Mr. Vos is referring to although correct me if I am wrong. MR. VOS: Yes. That is the correct document. I 20 should have read the caption. 21 22 MR. PASCOVER: Just make sure at this point, disclosure of unsealed pages from nine sealed search 23 warrant packets. We are all talking about the same thing 24 still? 25 MR. RISHER: Yes. 26

1 MR. VOS: Yes. MR. RISHER: This is Michael Risher. I would 2 request or ask for a stipulation, if this is not already 3 part of the record in this case, this entire packet be 4 made part of the record. 5 MR. VOS: The D.A. agrees. This is Mark Vos. 6 7 THE COURT: Mr. Kowalski? MR. KOWALSKI: No objection. 8 THE COURT: What I propose then is that I order 9 Mr. Pascover -- teach him to volunteer information -- to 10 print out a copy of that entire pdf and make it a part of 11 12 the record in our file. 13 Is that agreeable with all parties? 14 Mr. Risher? 15 MR. RISHER: Yes. 16 THE COURT: Mr. Vos? 17 MR. VOS: Yes. THE COURT: Mr. Kowalski? 18 19 MR. KOWALSKI: Yes. 20 THE COURT: Mr. Pascover, you are so ordered. 21 MR. PASCOVER: Yes. THE COURT: Now, I think that is everything. Is 22 there anything else that we need discuss at this point, 23 24 gentlemen? 25 MR. VOS: Mark Vos. No. 26 THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. KOWALSKI: Miles Kowalski, no.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ RISHER: This is Michael Risher. Nothing for the plaintiff. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Then at this point for those of you who I used to see on a regular basis -Mr. Vos, Mr. Secord, Ms. Masonek -- I don't know if I will ever be back in this courthouse. This is my last case.
And so I am done with being a sitting Superior Court judge. I won't retire until March 1. But this -- I have been on vacation since October. I came back today to handle this and another matter. I am having tentative discussions with the court about perhaps volunteering to come back as a retired judge to help cover settlement conferences. I understand there is a bit of a backlog around here. I'm sure you've heard that.

But I do not know how that is going to play out.

So I may or may not ever actually see any of you ever again. If I don't, I have known all of you for many years, Mr. Secord probably the longest. And of course,

Ms. Masonek and I shared a courtroom for a number of years in Fontana where she was a calendar deputy in Fontana when I was a baby judge. I just want to say it has been a pleasure working with all of you.

MS. MASONEK: And a pleasure working with you as well.

THE COURT: I am going to guess that was

Christine Masonek. MR. VOS: Bon voyage. MR. SECORD: I hope you have a wonderful retirement. THE COURT: Thanks, Jim. I may be back. At this point I just don't know. I may do settlement conferences. I may sign up as a retired judge and ride circuit doing, you know, substitute teacher kind of stuff on a very limited basis. Or I may just simply go be retired. I haven't quite decided yet. So maybe this is goodbye. Maybe it is not. I don't know. But if it is, it has been a pleasure. Thank you, everybody. I think we are done. MS. MASONEK: Thank you. MS. VOS: Thank you, your Honor. Enjoy your retirement. (Whereupon, the proceedings were adjourned.)

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
2	COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO		
3	DEPARTMENT S19 HON. DWIGHT W. MOORE, JUDGE		
4	ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,)		
5	Appellant,)		
6	vs.) Case No. CIVDS1930054		
7	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF) E#076778		
8	CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN) BERNARDINO, ET AL.,)		
9	Respondents.)		
10	·		
11			
12	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)) SS.		
13	COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO)		
14			
15	I, CARRIE LANE, Official Reporter of the		
16	Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino, do		
17	hereby certify that the foregoing pages 1 - 39, to the		
18	best of my knowledge and belief, comprise a full, true,		
19	and correct computer-aided transcript of the proceedings		
20	taken in the matter of the above-entitled cause held on		
21	FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 2021.		
22	Dated this 18th day of June, 2021.		
23			
24			
25	aue Zane c.s.R.		
26	Official Court Reporter, C.S.R. No. 8882		

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1	STATE OF CA	
2	COUNTY OF) Case No. CIVDS1930054 SAN BERNARDINO) E#. <u>076778</u>
4		CLERK'S CERTIFICATION SERVICE RE: CIVIL
5		
6 7	I, a sw	orn Deputy Clerk of the Superior Courts, County of San Bernardino, State of California
8	do hereby cert	tify that:
9	1.	Copies of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS/AFFIDAVITS were served on the
10		following parties Appellant Attorney Aaron David Mackey, Electronic Frontier Foundation
11		Respondent's Attorney Mark Allen Vos, Office of The District Attorney
12		IIIN 2.8 2021
13		Appellate Services Unit on the date indicated:
14	2.	The original REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS/AFFIDAVITS on Appeal were certified to
15 16		the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two on
17 18 19	3.	A copy of the REPORTER'S IN-CAMERA TRANSCRIPT for the following date(s) was served to Appellant Respondent's Attorney on:
20 21	4.	The original and copy(ies) of the SEALED REPORTER'S IN-CAMERA TRANSCRIPT for the following detac(s) were confifed to the Court of Appeal
22	1 · ·	TRANSCRIPT for the following dates(s), were certified to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two on:
23		
24	, 1	
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23	Dated:	JUN 2 8 2021 Patricia Ortloff, Deputy Clerk