

February 28, 2007; 9:44 am

<b>IG REPORT ON USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS</b>	
<b>IG FINDING</b>	<b>ACTION TAKEN BY FBI</b>
<i>FBI database contains inaccurate &amp; incomplete NSL data</i>	
FBI does not retain copies of NSLs	Implementing policy requiring retention of signed NSLs
FBI/OGC database understates total # of NSL letters and requests	Already begun (early 2006) development of web-based NSL-generation system to act as central source for all NSL data -- WFO summer 2007; 4 large offices late 2007 -- Short term fix: Changed default settings in current tracking system to reduce or eliminate undercounting
FBI case files contained 17% more NSL letters and 22% more NSL requests than were recorded in the OGC database	See above
FBI database contains inaccurate information re: status of investigative targets (i.e. USPers vs. non-USPers)	See above
<i>Improper or Illegal Use of NSLs</i>	
FBI field offices self-reported 26 possible IOB violations involving NSLs (22 due to FBI errors; 4 were 3 <sup>rd</sup> party)	During period under review, FBI issued multiple guidance memos describing IOB reporting process. FBI requires quarterly reporting certifying that employees contacted about IOB reporting requirements.  All IOB reports go to OGC and INSD. OGC reviews & determines if should be referred to IOB. All IOB referrals also provided to INSD-Internal Investigations for appropriate investigation. Violations rising to misconduct referred to OPR for adjudication. Disciplinary steps include counseling, oral reprimand, censure letters, suspension
IG found 22 add'l possible IOB violations (not identified by FBI) (12 FBI errors; 10 by 3 <sup>rd</sup> party)  FBI errors ranged in seriousness from NSLs with incorrect certifications to NSLs requesting full credit reports in a counterintelligence case  -- 22 % of files sampled contained <u>unreported potential</u> IOB violations	-- Advised field (Nov. 11, 2006) on reporting unauthorized collection of all types and on sequestering of all unauthorized information  -- Directed each field office to inspect its counterintelligence files to identify any improper request for full credit reports (IG found two such instances)  -- Issuing comprehensive NSL guidance highlighting legal differences between certain NSL authorities  -- Requiring all NSLs be reviewed and approved by CDC or OGC  -- Reissuing comprehensive NSL guidance along with IG Report  -- Creating training course on proper use of NSLs; mandating training for all SAC's, ASACs, agents and analysts in CT and CD.

February 28, 2007; 9:44 am

<b>IG REPORT ON USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS</b>	
Use of exigent letters by CAU violated NSL statute, AG Guidelines and FBI policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Director ordered expedited review of CAU practices by Inspection Division for determination of management accountability. Findings due in next few weeks</li> <li>- May 2006, CAU stopped using exigent letters with GJ language</li> <li>- February 2007, issued Bureau-wide directive barring use of exigent letters</li> <li>-- Have ensured NSLs followed receipt of all information obtained via "exigent letter" (as of Dec 2006 all but 9 exigent letters covered)</li> <li>- Referring to IOB any not followed with properly issued NSLs.</li> </ul>
Use of control files instead of investigative files by CTD	Issuing guidance reiterating existing policy that NSLs should be issued only from investigative files and must reference authorized investigation
<b>Other Findings</b>	
Failure to provide guidance on AG Guidelines re: use of least intrusive collection techniques	Providing guidance and training on proper use of NSLs and use of "least intrusive techniques" as required by AG Guidelines
CDCs are reluctant to provide independent review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- February 2006, reiterated to CDCs their role in NSL process</li> <li>- March 2006, Posted information on OGC website about role of CDCs in approving NSLs</li> <li>- General Counsel has advised SACs of CDC obligation to provide accurate, independent legal advice</li> <li>- Issuing guidance to CDCs on legal ethics and professional responsibility</li> <li>- Requiring NSLs be approved by CDC or OGC</li> </ul>
Statutory definition of "telephone toll billing record" results in inappropriate NSL requests	-- Requested that this amendment be included in DOJ 2007 legislative agenda; DOJ working on legislative language
FBI does not track how NSL-derived information is used	-- Exploring ways to identify how NSL information is used while also adhering to ODNI policy of information sharing, balancing operational needs, and privacy concerns. (Note: there is no statutory restriction on use of NSL information)

~~SECRET~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**Precedence:** ROUTINE

**Date:** 08/31/2006

**To:** [redacted] RA

**Attn:** [redacted]  
CDC [redacted]  
SSRA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

Counterterrorism  
Inspection

**Attn:** ITOS I/CONUS IV, UC [redacted]  
**Attn:** IIS, CRS [redacted]

b2  
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**From:** Office of the General Counsel  
NSLB/CILU/Room 7947  
**Contact:** AGC [redacted] 0686

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

**Approved By:** Thomas Julie F [signature]

**Drafted By:** [redacted]

DATE: 07-20-2007  
CLASSIFIED BY: 65179/DMH/KSP/RW  
REASON: 1.4 (c)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-20-2032

(U) **Case ID #:** (S) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO

(U) **Title:** (S) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD  
MATTER 2006 [redacted] b2

(U) **Synopsis:** (S) The [redacted] Field Office, [redacted] RA  
[redacted] requested that the Office of the General Counsel  
(OGC) review several incidents and determine whether they warrant  
reporting to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). It is the  
opinion of OGC that two of the incidents do not need to be  
reported to the IOB. Rather, this EC should be maintained in the  
control file for periodic review by Counsel to the IOB. The  
remaining incidents, however, must be reported to the IOB. OGC  
will prepare and deliver the necessary correspondence to the IOB.  
Our analysis follows.

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(U) ~~Derived From : G-3  
Declassify On: 25X1~~

(U) **Administrative:** (S) This electronic communication (EC) contains  
information from: (1) the ECs dated 05/18/2006 and 06/23/2006  
from [redacted] to OGC reporting a potential IOB matter; and (2)  
automated case support (ACS).

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To: [redacted] From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 08/31/2006

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Reference: (S) [redacted]  
(S) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 1446  
(S) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 1482

(U)

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Details: ~~(S)~~ By ECs dated 05/18/2006 and 06/23/2006, [redacted] requested that OGC review several incidents and determine whether they warrant reporting to the IOB. [redacted] initiated a

(S)

[redacted]  
[redacted] Due to an administrative oversight, however, approval from the Acting Special Agent in Charge was not obtained, and the [redacted]

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(S)

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ On 05/11/2006, the case agent noticed that the [redacted] The case agent immediately reported the issue to the [redacted] SSRA and to the [redacted] Division [redacted] CDC. In addition, the case agent expeditiously contacted OGC to discuss this matter. The case agent also sequestered all of the improperly obtained NSL results, and forwarded them to the [redacted] CDC. Finally, the case agent sought SAC authority to [redacted]

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(S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

(S)

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b7D  
b7A

[redacted]

(S)

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b4  
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To: [redacted] From: Office of the General Counsel b2  
Re: 278-HQ-CI229736-VIO, 08/31/2006 b7E

(S)

[redacted]

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(S)

[redacted]

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(S)

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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(S)

[redacted]

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(U) Section 2.4 of Executive Order (EO) 12863, dated 09/13/1993, mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, INSD, and the General Counsel, OGC, respectively) report to the IOB intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. This language was adopted verbatim from EO 12334, dated 12/04/1981, when the IOB was known as the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB).

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: 278-HQ-CI229736-VIO, 08/31/2006

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(U) This language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with EO 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed to ensure the protection of individual rights. Violations of provisions that merely are administrative in nature and not deemed to have been designed to ensure the protection of individual rights are generally not reported to the IOB. The FBI Inspection Division is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations for three years so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request.

(S) [redacted]

b1

(U) ~~(S)~~ With regard to conducting investigative activities in the absence of a preliminary investigation, section II.A.2 of the NSIG provide in pertinent part:

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The FBI may, without opening [redacted] engage in the following activities to investigate or collect information relating to threats to the national security, including information on individuals, groups, and organization of possible investigative interest, and information concerning possible targets of international terrorism, espionage, foreign computer intrusion, or other threats to national security:

2. [redacted]

b1

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~~SECRET~~

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To: [redacted] From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: 278-HQ-CI229736-VIO, 08/31/2006

[redacted]

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[redacted]

b1  
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[redacted]

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[redacted]

b1

~~SECRET~~

*Recommend  
reissuance  
of WSA's.*

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 08/31/2006

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**LEAD (s) :**

**Set Lead 1: (Action)**

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate. Additionally, INSD should retain a record of the report of the potential IOB matter, as well as a copy of the OGC opinion concluding that IOB notification is not required for certain incidents, for three years for possible review by the Counsel to the IOB.

**Set Lead 2: (Information)**

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information.

**Set Lead 3: (Information)**

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

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(U) As already accomplished, the information that was received in response to the NSLs that were served on 04/28/2006, 05/02/2006, and 05/04/2006 should be sealed and sequestered within the CDC's safe. The information should remain sealed and sequestered in the CDC's safe until further direction from OGC.

**cc:** Ms. Thomas

[redacted]

IOB Library

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~~SECRET~~



[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)

**From:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 01, 2006 1:27 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: IOB Error

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD IOB

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[redacted]  
Thanks for the update. I haven't seen the initial IOB report yet, but will talk with my Unit Chief about it. Don't worry about the delay. Even if you had sent it to me, I would not have had a chance to look at it yet. Good luck with your trial!

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 01, 2006 12:25 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: IOB Error

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~~SECRET~~  
RECORD IOB

DECLASSIFIED BY: 65179/DMH/KSR/RM  
ON: 07-20-2007

H [redacted]

As I told you a while back, I will be supplementing my initial IOB report with one or two more instances where an NSL was served outside of the time parameters. I was on leave all of last week and have been in trial all of this week. I will hopefully be back in the office tomorrow to draft the update and get it to you. Thanks for your help on this. [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 17, 2006 8:15 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: IOB Error

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~~SECRET~~  
RECORD IOB

[redacted] Thank you for handling the IOB paperwork so quickly. Were the NSL results received on 04/28/2006 or was the NSL served on 04/28/2006?

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[Large redacted area]

[Redacted]

b5

I hope that this email is helpful. Thank you again for your prompt attention to this issue.

[Redacted]

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b7C

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 16, 2006 6:14 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Subject:** IOB Error

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

H [Redacted]

I spoke with you earlier about a possible IOB violation - the [Redacted] was not done at the SAC level. You had requested that I send the report form to you. I've sent it to [Redacted] to be signed off on by the CDC and SAC and it should be on its way to you. When we had discussed the case over the phone, I told you that the only activity since the [Redacted] was the return of some NSL results. I noticed on ACS today that one of the results I received were from an NSL served on 04/28/2006 [Redacted]. The NSL and associated EC were, of course, [Redacted]. I hope this doesn't make this an IOB offense. Thanks again for all of your help. [Redacted]

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**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(OGC) (FBI)

From: [Redacted] (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, May 16, 2006 6:14 PM  
To: [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
Subject: IOB Error

b2  
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UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD

Hi [Redacted]

I spoke with you earlier about a possible IOB violation - the [Redacted] was not done at the SAC level. You had requested that I send the report form to you. I've sent it to [Redacted] to be signed off on by the CDC and SAC and it should be on its way to you. When we had discussed the case over the phone, I told you that the only activity since the [Redacted] was the return of some NSL results. I noticed on ACS today that one of the results I received were from an NSL served on 04/28/2006 [Redacted]. The NSL and associated EC were, of course, [Redacted]. [Redacted] hope this doesn't make this an IOB offense. Thanks again for all of your help [Redacted].


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UNCLASSIFIED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 07-20-2007 BY 65179/DMH/KSE/RW

Valid investigation. If  
~~no~~ no valid [ ] was  
open, the NSL issued  
(date of service controls)  
in violation of a statute.  
This is reportable regardless  
of USPER status.

b2  
b7E



When  
were NSL's the  
the? That is the  
issued? controls whether  
date that controls  
violation of the  
statute occurred,  
believe NSL's  
require a

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 07-20-2007 BY 65179/PHH/KSP/RM

Are  
you  
making  
any changes  
to the  
confused  
Julie

~~SECRET~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**Precedence:** ROUTINE

**Date:** 07/11/2006

**To:** [redacted] RA

**Attn:** SA [redacted]  
CDC

Counterterrorism

**Attn:** ITOS 1/CONUS 4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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**From:** Office of the General Counsel  
NSLB/CTLU 1, LX-1 3S-100  
**Contact:** [redacted]

**Approved By:** Thomas Julie F. [redacted]  
**Drafted By:** [redacted]

DATE: 07-20-2007  
CLASSIFIED BY: 65179/DMH/KSP/RE  
REASON: 1.4 (c)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-20-2032

(U) **Case ID #:** ~~(S)~~ 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO-1446 (Pending)  
(S) [redacted] (Pending)

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(U) **Title:** ~~(S)~~ POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD  
MATTER 2006-[redacted]

**Synopsis:** (U) It is the opinion of the Office of General Counsel (OGC) that the above referenced matter is not a violation and need not be reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB).

(U) ~~(S)~~ ~~Derived From: G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) **Reference:** ~~(S)~~ 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 1446

**Administrative:** (U) This communication contains one or more footnotes. To read the footnotes, download and print the document in WordPerfect.

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**Details:** ~~(S)~~ By electronic communication ("EC") dated May 18, 2006, the [redacted] Field Office, [redacted] Resident Agency, (hereinafter referred to as [redacted]) reported a potential IOB error in conjunction with its ongoing counterterrorism

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] RA From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: ~~(S)~~ 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 07/11/2006

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(U)

States Person as that term is defined in The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection ("NSIG" or "the Guidelines"). In this regard, [redacted] reported that it

(S)

[redacted]  
[redacted] SA [redacted] had included only his Supervisory Special Agent (SSRA) for the Resident Agency, [redacted] on the approval line. Consequently, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge did not provide authority for an [redacted]  
[redacted]. SA [redacted] noticed the error on May 11, 2006 and immediately reported it to SSRA [redacted] and the [redacted] CDC. On May 15, 2006 the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) approved [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] and [redacted] Divisions pursuant to leads sent by [redacted] before the [redacted] Only the [redacted] issued NSL produced subscriber information which was eventually sent to [redacted] Out of an abundance of caution the subscriber information was sealed and sent to the [redacted] CDC; the information was not analyzed, copied, nor entered into any database.

~~(S)~~ As required by Executive Order (E.O.) 12863 and Section 2-56 of the National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual ("NEIPM") OGC was tasked to determine whether

(S)

[redacted] which might have resulted in continued investigative activity, is a matter which must be reported to the IOB. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case there is no violaton.

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(U) Section 2.4 of E.O. 12863, dated 09/13/1993, mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community Components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, INSD, and the General Counsel, OGC, respectively) report to the IOB "concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to

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To: [redacted] RA From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: ~~(S)~~ 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 07/11/2006

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(U)

Executive Order or Presidential Directive." This language was adopted verbatim from E.O. 12334, dated 12/04/1981, when the IOB was known as the President's Intelligence Oversight Board ("PIOB"). By longstanding agreement between the FBI and the IOB (and its predecessor, the PIOB), this language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of the NSIGs, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with E.O. 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed in full or in part to ensure the protection of the individual rights of U.S. persons. Violations of provisions that are essentially administrative in nature need not be reported to the IOB. The FBI is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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
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~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] RA From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: ~~(S)~~ 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 07/11/2006

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To: [redacted] RA From: Office of the General Counsel

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(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 07/11/2006

**LEAD(s):**

**Set Lead 1: (Action)**

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

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(U) For appropriate action

**Set Lead 2: (Info)**

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT AT ITOS 1/CONUS 4

(U) Read and clear.

**Set Lead 3: (Discretionary)**

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate.

1 - Ms. Thomas

1 - [redacted]

1 - IOB file

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~~SECRET~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/02/2006

To: [redacted] RA

Attn: SA [redacted]  
CDC

Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS 1/CONUS 4

From: Office of the General Counsel  
NSLB/CTLU 1, LX-1 3S-100  
Contact: [redacted]

DATE: 07-24-2007  
CLASSIFIED BY: 65179/DMH/KSI  
REASON: 1.4 (c)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-24-2032

Approved By: Thomas Julie F  
[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Drafted By: [redacted]

(U) Case ID #: (S) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO-1446 (Pending)  
(S) [redacted] (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD  
MATTER 2006-[redacted]

Synopsis: (U) It is the opinion of the Office of General Counsel (OGC) that the above referenced matter is not a violation and need not be reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB).

*spacing*

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Reference: (S) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 1446

Administrative: (U) This communication contains one or more footnotes. To read the footnotes, download and print the document in WordPerfect.

(U) Details: (S) By electronic communication ("EC") dated May 18, 2006, the [redacted] Field Office, [redacted] Resident Agency, (hereinafter referred to as [redacted]), reported a potential IOB error in conjunction with its ongoing counterterrorism

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(S) [redacted] States Person as that term is defined in The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: [redacted] RA From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: (S) 278-HQ-CI229736-VIO, 06/02/2006

b2  
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(S) Intelligence Collection ("NSIG" or "the Guidelines") In this regard [redacted] reported that it [redacted]

SA [redacted] had included only his Supervisory Special Agent (SSRA) for the [redacted] Resident Agency, [redacted] on the approval line. Consequently, the Assistant Supervisory Agent in Charge did not provide authority for [redacted]

*Special*

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[redacted] SA [redacted] noticed the error on May 11, 2006 and immediately reported it to SSRA [redacted] and the [redacted] CDC. On May 15, 2006 the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) approved the [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] and [redacted] Divisions pursuant to leads sent by [redacted] before the [redacted] Only the [redacted] issued NSL produced subscriber information which was eventually sent to [redacted] Out of an abundance of caution the subscriber information was sealed and sent to the [redacted] CDC; the information was not analyzed, copied, nor entered into any database.

(S) As required by Executive Order (E.O.) 12863 and Section 2-56 of the National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual ("NFIPM"), OGC was tasked to determine [redacted]

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b7E

[redacted] which might have resulted in continued investigative activity, is a matter which must be reported to the IOB. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case there is no violation.

(U) Section 2.4 of E.O. 12863, dated 09/13/1993, mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community Components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, INSD, and the General Counsel, OGC, respectively) report to the IOB "concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive." This language was adopted verbatim from E.O. 12334, dated 12/04/1981, when the IOB was known as the President's Intelligence Oversight Board ("PIOB"). By longstanding agreement between the FBI and the IOB (and its predecessor, the PIOB), this language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of the

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To: [redacted] RA From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: ~~(S)~~ 278-HQ-CI229736-VIO, 06/02/2006

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(U)

NSIGs, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with E.O. 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed in full or in part to ensure the protection of the individual rights of U.S. persons. Violations of provisions that are essentially administrative in nature need not be reported to the IOB. The FBI is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

✓ b1  
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[redacted]

✓  
Spacy

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~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] RA From: Office of the General Counsel  
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 06/02/2006

b2  
b7E

[redacted]

b1

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~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] RA From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: (S) 278-HQ-Cl229736-VIO, 06/02/2006

b2  
b7E

(U)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

[redacted]

AT [redacted] RA

b2  
b7E

(U) Implement procedures to ensure that investigations are extended or converted in compliance with the NSIG. // In addition, ensure that communications with FBIHQ are sent to the proper unit. *// delete last sentence*

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT AT ITOS 1/CONUS 2 TEAM 8

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Discretionary)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate.

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~~SECRET~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/06/2006

To: [Redacted]

Attn: SAC [Redacted]  
CDC [Redacted]  
SSA [Redacted]  
SA [Redacted]

Counterintelligence

Attn: CD-1A, A/UC [Redacted]  
CD-1D, UC [Redacted]

Inspection

Attn: IIS, CRS [Redacted]

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From: Office of the General Counsel  
NSLB/CILU/Room 7947  
Contact: AGC [Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Approved By: Thomas Julie F. [Signature]  
[Redacted]

Drafted By: [Redacted]

DATE: 07-20-2007  
CLASSIFIED BY: 69179/DMH/KSR/RU  
REASON: 1.4 (c)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-20-3032

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO (Pending) *1636*

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD  
MATTER 2006-[Redacted]

b2

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ It is the opinion of the Office of the General  
Counsel (OGC) that this matter is not reportable to the  
Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). Rather, it should be  
maintained in the control file for periodic review by Counsel to  
the IOB. Our analysis follows.

(U) ~~Derived From : G-1~~  
~~Declassify On: 25X1~~

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(U) Administrative: ~~(S)~~ This electronic communication (EC) contains  
information from: (1) the EC dated 07/03/2006 from the  
[Redacted] Field Office [Redacted] to OGC reporting a potential  
IOB matter; (2) automated case support (ACS); and (3) email  
communications between Sacramento and OGC dated 08/30/2006;  
08/31/2006; and 09/05/2006.

Reference: (S) [Redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 09/06/2006

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(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ By EC dated 07/03/2006, [redacted] requested that OGC review the facts of the captioned matter and determine whether it warrants reporting to the IOB. As explained below, in our opinion, the FBI is not required to report this matter to the IOB.

[redacted]  
(S) [redacted]  
[redacted] following the initiation of the [redacted]  
[redacted] conducted a pretext contact [redacted]  
[redacted]

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(S) During the pretext contact, the case agent wrote down the telephone number as follows: [redacted]

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b6  
b7C

~~(S)~~ Based upon the telephone number written down during the pretext contact, pursuant to 18 U.S. C. § 2709(c), [redacted] served a National Security Letter (NSL) dated 04/27/2006 requesting the name, address, length of service and local and long distance toll billing records for telephone number [redacted]

(S) Upon receipt of the telephone records, it was determined that they were unlikely associated with the subject.

~~(S)~~ After it was determined that the telephone records were not associated with the target, [redacted] compared the telephone number in the NSL with the telephone number that had been written on a piece of paper during the pretext contact. The telephone number obtained during the pretext contact was the same as the telephone number in the NSL. [redacted] does not know whether the wrong telephone number was given to the FBI, or whether the case agent wrote the incorrect telephone number on the piece of paper during the pretext contact. A subsequent pretext contact with the subject established that the correct telephone number of the subject is [redacted]

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(S) (U) Section 2.4 of Executive Order (EO) 12863, dated 09/13/1993, mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, INSD, and the General Counsel, OGC, respectively) report to the IOB intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. This language was adopted verbatim from EO 12334, dated 12/04/1981, when the IOB was known as the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB).

(U) This language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of The Attorney



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To: [REDACTED] From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: 278-HQ-CI229736-VIO, 09/06/2006

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General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with EO 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed to ensure the protection of individual rights. Violations of provisions that merely are administrative in nature and not deemed to have been designed to ensure the protection of individual rights are generally not reported to the IOB. The FBI Inspection Division is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations for three years so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The standard for issuing an NSL is relevance to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The subject of the NSL does not need to be the target of the investigation, provided that the information is relevant to an authorized investigation.

(U) ~~(S)~~ NSLs are a specific type of investigative tool that allows the FBI to obtain certain limited types of information without court intervention: (1) telephone and email communication records from telephone companies and internet service providers (Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709); (2) records of financial institutions (which is very broadly defined) (Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A)); (3) a list of financial institutions and consumer identifying information from a credit reporting company (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a) and (b)); and (4) full credit report in an international terrorism case (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681v).

(U) ~~(S)~~ ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, provides that the FBI may seek toll billing information from telephone carriers that is relevant to an authorized national security investigation. Section V.12., Investigative Techniques, of the AG Guidelines provides that NSLs may be issued in conformity with statutory requirements, including 18 U.S.C. § 2709.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Here, during an authorized investigation, the FBI obtained a telephone number during a pretext contact that was believed to be the telephone number of the target. In other words, the telephone number received was believed to be relevant to an authorized preliminary investigation. Based upon the information obtained during the pretext contact, the FBI served

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To: [REDACTED] From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 09/06/2006

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an NSL requesting information about such telephone number. At the time that the NSL was served, the FBI believed that it was seeking information that was relevant to an authorized investigation. Upon receipt of the telephone records, the FBI learned that it received information unlikely associated with the subject.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Although the FBI learned that the telephone number was not associated with the target, the FBI had, in fact, requested information through an NSL that was believed to be relevant to an authorized investigation based upon information received during a lawful pretext contact. Although lawfully obtained, because the information obtained through the NSL is not associated with the target, if not already accomplished, the information should be sequestered to protect the potential privacy interests of United States persons.

(U) Based upon these facts, in accordance with the terms implementing the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of EO 12863, it is our opinion that this error need not be reported to the IOB. A record of this decision should be maintained in the control file for future review by the Counsel to the IOB.

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To: [redacted] From: Office of the General Counsel  
Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 09/06/2006

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) INSD should retain a record of the report of the potential IOB matter, as well as a copy of the OGC opinion concluding that IOB notification is not required, for three years for possible review by the Counsel to the IOB.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

b2  
b7E

(U) With respect to the information obtained through the NSL that is not associated with the target, if not already accomplished, please seal the information and sequester it within the CDC's safe. The information should continue to remain sealed and sequestered in the CDC's safe until further direction from OGC.

cc: Ms. Thomas

[redacted]

IOB Library

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♦♦

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[Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)

**From:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 05, 2006 6:54 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: IOB Issue

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~~SECRET~~  
RECORD 278-HQ-C1229736

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) The first work done was an ec to [Redacted] I extended it once. There was no gap in between [Redacted]

b1  
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-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 05, 2006 11:14 AM  
**To:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: IOB Issue

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DATE: 07-24-2007  
CLASSIFIED BY: 65179/DNH/KSP/RW  
REASON: 1.4 (c)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-24-2032

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD 278-HQ-C1229736

[Redacted]

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Thanks again for your help.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 31, 2006 2:48 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: IOB Issue

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~~SECRET~~  
RECORD 278-HQ-C1229736

[Redacted]

b5

The ec documenting the first pretext contains the wrong number (serial 25).

The ec documenting the second pretext contains the correct number (serial 41).

Do need to be given access to the case file?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 30, 2006 11:40 AM  
**To:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: IOB Issue

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD 278-HQ-C1229736

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Thank you again for you help with this.

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b7C  
b5

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 30, 2006 11:14 AM  
**To:** [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: IOB Issue

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD 278-HQ-C1229736

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5  
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Let me know if you need anything further.

[Redacted]

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b7C

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 29, 2006 12:46 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Subject:** IOB Issue

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD 278-HQ-C1229736

[Redacted]

I am an attorney in the National Security Law Branch of the Office of the General Counsel and have been assigned to work on a ~~potential IOB matter~~ that you submitted to our office on July 3, 2006 (in connection with Case ID No. [Redacted] in the EC, it was stated that an incorrect telephone number was obtained during a pretext contact [Redacted]. After reviewing the incorrect NSL results, a subsequent pretext contact with the subject revealed the correct telephone number. I have several questions about this matter.

(S)

[Redacted]

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Thank you for your assistance with these questions. Please contact me if you would like to discuss

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

this matter

[redacted]  
National Security Law Branch  
Office of the General Counsel  
[redacted]

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DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
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The recent passage of the USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act focused a great deal of attention upon the FBI's use of NSLs. These are investigative tools that can be highly intrusive so they need to be used judiciously. The new law provides for an audit of the FBI's use of NSLs, and an audit by DOJ is currently taking place. Therefore, the FBI must assure that all NSLs that are issued meet the requisite statutory standards -- they are relevant to an authorized national security investigation that is not based solely on the exercise of First Amendment rights - and that the need for the NSL is clearly articulated in the approving EC. Further, the FBI must assure that when requesting a non-disclosure provision in an NSL, there is a genuine need for non-disclosure that is also articulated in the approving EC.

The standard for issuing an NSL is relevance to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. (The 1681v NSL standard is slightly different to reflect that it applies only to international terrorism investigations.) Prior to the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, the standard for issuance of an NSL was that the target or the communication was tied to a foreign power. That is no longer the case. (See explanation of changes, per EC dated 10/26/2001.) Further, an NSL may be obtained in a [redacted] [redacted] The subject of the NSL does not need to be the target of the investigation, provided that the information is relevant to an authorized investigation. The recent PATRIOT Act reauthorization did not change the standard for issuing an NSL.

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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/30/2006

To: General Counsel Attn: Julie Thomas  
Deputy General Counsel  
NSLB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Counterintelligence Attn: CD-1A

[redacted]

Attn: [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

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b6  
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From [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]  
[redacted]

DATE: 07-20-2007  
CLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/KSR/RM  
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-20-2032

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Drafted By: [redacted]

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Case ID #: (S) [redacted] Pending)

(U)

~~(S) 66F-HQ-C1303375 (Pending)~~

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~~(S) 66F [redacted] B5611 (Pending)~~

Title: (S) [redacted]

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(U)

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Approves the issuance of an ECPA National Security Letter (NSL) for subscriber and toll billing records; provides reporting data; and, if necessary, transmits the NSL for ~~SECRET~~ delivery to the wire communications service provider.

(U)

~~(S) Derived From: G-3  
Declassify On: X1~~

(S)

~~(U)~~ [redacted]

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Enclosures: (U) Enclosed for [redacted] is an NSL dated 06/30/2006, addressed to [redacted] [redacted] requesting name, address, length of service and local and long distance toll billing records for the

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(S)

phone number [redacted]

Details: (S) [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~



(S)


~~SECRET~~



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(U)

~~(S)~~ ~~SECRET~~ This electronic communication documents the SAC's approval and certification of the enclosed NSL. For mandatory reporting purposes, the enclosed NSL seeks subscriber information, local and long distance toll billing records for one phone number.

(U) Arrangements should be made with the institution receiving the enclosed letter to produce the records personally to an employee of the  Division within 30 business days of receipt of this request. The wire communications service provider should neither send the records through routine mail service nor utilize the name of the subject in any telephone calls to the FBI.

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~~SECRET~~

(U) If possible, it is requested that the records be produced in an electronic format on a compact disk(s) (preferred) or floppy disk(s). The preferable file format, if possible, is delimited ASCII text, compatible with MS Excel and/or MS Access.

(U) In accordance with 18 U.S.C. 2709(c) I, the senior official approving this EC, certify that a disclosure of the fact that the FBI has sought or obtained access to the information sought by this letter may endanger the national security of the United States, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical

~~SECRET~~

safety of a person.

(U)

~~(S)~~ Disclosure of information regarding captioned case could compromise an extremely sensitive national security investigation and extremely sensitive investigative techniques.

(U) Information received from a wire communication service provider may be disseminated to an agency of the United States only if such information is clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency.

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(U) Any questions regarding the above can be directed  
to SA [redacted]

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Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1

Type: INVA-NSL (ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS RECORDS)

ITU: CI PROGRAM

Claimed By:

b2

SSN: [redacted]

b6

Name: [redacted]

b7C

Squad: [redacted]

GENERAL COUNSEL

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) NSLU is requested to record the appropriate information needed to fulfill the Congressional reporting requirements for NSLs.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) Deliver the enclosed NSL as indicated above. Upon receipt of the requested information, please submit results to

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted] Attn: SA [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

AT [Redacted]

(U) Deliver the enclosed NSL as indicated above. Upon receipt of the requested information, please submit results to

[Redacted] Attn: SA [Redacted]

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b7E  
b6  
b7C

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/27/2006

To: General Counsel Attn: Julie Thomas  
Deputy General Counsel  
NSLB

Counterintelligence Attn: CD-1D

[Redacted] Attn: [Redacted]  
SA [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b2  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

From: [Redacted]

[Redacted]  
Contact: SA [Redacted]

Approved By: [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

Drafted By: [Redacted]  
Case ID #: (S) [Redacted] (Pending)

b1  
b2  
b7E

(S) 66F-HQ-C1303375 (Pending)  
(S) 66F- [Redacted] 35611 (Pending)

(U)

Title: ([Redacted])

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~~SECRET~~

(U)

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Approves the issuance of an ECPA National Security Letter (NSL) for subscriber and toll billing records; provides reporting data; and, if necessary, transmits the NSL for delivery to the wire communications service provider.

(U)

~~(S)~~ Derived From: G-3  
Declassify On: X1

(S)

~~(U)~~ [Redacted]

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Enclosures: (U) Enclosed for [Redacted] is an NSL dated 04/27/2006, addressed to [Redacted]

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b7C

requesting name, address, length of service and local and long distance toll billing records for the phone number [Redacted]

(S)

SECRET

Details: (S) [Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

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(U)

~~(S)~~ This electronic communication documents the SAC's approval and certification of the enclosed NSL. For mandatory reporting purposes, the enclosed NSL seeks subscriber information, local and long distance toll billing records for one phone number.

(U) Arrangements should be made with the institution receiving the enclosed letter to produce the records personally to an employee of the [Redacted] Division within 30 business days of receipt of this request. The wire communications service provider should neither send the records through routine mail service nor utilize the name of the subject in any telephone

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calls to the FBI.

(U) If possible, it is requested that the records be produced in an electronic format on a compact disk(s) (preferred) or floppy disk(s). The preferable file format, if possible, is delimited ASCII text, compatible with MS Excel and/or MS Access.

(U) In accordance with 18 U.S.C. 2709(c) I, the senior official approving this EC, certify that a disclosure of the fact that the FBI has sought or obtained access to the information sought by this letter may endanger the national security of the United States, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical safety of a person.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Disclosure of information regarding captioned case could compromise an extremely sensitive national security investigation and extremely sensitive investigative techniques.

(U) Information received from a wire communication service provider may be disseminated to an agency of the United States only if such information is clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency.

(U) Any questions regarding the above can be directed to SA

b2  
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b7C

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1

Type: INVA-NSL (ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS RECORDS)

ITU: CI PROGRAM

Claimed By:

SSN:

Name:

Squad

b2  
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b7C

LEAD(s):

~~SECRET~~

7

NSL VIO-24513

~~SECRET~~

Set Lead 1: (Action)  
GENERAL COUNSEL

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) NSLU is requested to record the appropriate information needed to fulfill the Congressional reporting requirements for NSLs.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
SECRET  
AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

[Redacted]

AT [Redacted]

(U) Deliver the enclosed NSL as indicated above. Upon receipt of the requested information, please submit results to

[Redacted] Attn: SA [Redacted]

b2  
b7E  
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b7C

[Redacted]

AT [Redacted]

(U) Deliver the enclosed NSL as indicated above. Upon receipt of the requested information, please submit results to

[Redacted] Attn: SA [Redacted]

b2  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

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Actions: A=Attrib P=Prt/Dnld R=Resp T=Text

Date Serial Type To From Resp T

~~SECRET~~

8

NSL VIO-24514

~~SECRET~~

. 02/10/06 9 FD677 [redacted] Y  
(U) TO REQUEST AUTHORITY FOR [redacted]  
. 02/09/06 8 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Y

b2  
b7E

XX  
XXXXXX  
. 02/09/06 7 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Y

XX  
XXXXXX

b1  
b2  
b7E  
b4  
b7D  
b6  
b7C

02/07/06 11 EC COUNTERINTELLIGE \* [redacted] 1 Y  
(S) APPROVES THE ISSUANCE OF AN ECPA NATIONAL SECURITY

. 02/07/06 10 OUTLET [redacted] Y  
(S) ISSUANCE OF NSL TO [redacted] RE: [redacted]

. 01/25/06 6 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Y

XX  
XXXXXX

SECRET

Date Serial Type To From Resp T  
. 04/28/06 26 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Y

XX  
XXXXXX

b2  
b7E  
b4  
b7D

(U) . 04/27/06 31 EC [redacted] \* [redacted] Y  
(S/OC/NF) PROVIDES [redacted] SAC CONCURRENCE

. 04/27/06 29 EC COUNTERINTELLIGE \* [redacted] 1 Y  
(S) APPROVES THE ISSUANCE OF AN ECPA NATIONAL

(U) . 04/27/06 28 OUTLET GERNERAL COUNSEL [redacted] Y  
ISSUANCE OF NSL FOR SUBSCRIBER RECORDS FROM [redacted]

. 04/24/06 25 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Y

XX  
XXXXXX

. 04/17/06 23 EC [redacted] Y  
REQUEST FOR SURVEILLANCE.

b2  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

9

~~SECRET~~

Date Serial Type To From Resp  
. 06/29/06 42 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XX  
XXXXXX  
. 06/26/06 41 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XX  
XXXXXX

. 06/16/06 40 EC COUNTERINTELLIGE \* [REDACTED] b1  
(S) APPROVES THE ISSUANCE OF AN ECPA NATIONAL b2  
. 06/16/06 39 OUTLET [REDACTED] b7E  
REQUEST OF RECORDS FROM [REDACTED] RE: [REDACTED] b4  
(S) . 06/16/06 37 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX b7D  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX b6  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX b7C

XX  
XXXXXX

(S) . 06/14/06 49 FD302 [REDACTED] b2  
OBSERVATION LOG RE: [REDACTED] b7E  
[REDACTED] b1

Date Serial Type To From Resp  
. 07/19/06 52 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX b6  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX b7C

XX  
XXXXXX

. 06/30/06 46 EC COUNTERINTELLIGE \* [REDACTED] b2  
(S) APPROVES THE ISSUANCE OF AN ECPA NATIONAL b7E  
. 06/30/06 45 OUTLET [REDACTED] b4  
SUBPOENA RE: PHONE [REDACTED] b7D  
(S) . 06/29/06 47 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX b1  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX b6  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX b7C

XX  
XXXXXX

. 06/29/06 42 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XX

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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