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		DAIR 11-21-20	07 BY 65179 DMH/K
To: G	ROBERT MUEL	LER III	
FAX#:	324-	PHONE #:	
FROM:	SENATUR ROC	KEFELLER	
	JENGTUR ROC 2/22/2006	·	
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		NSL VIO-28629	
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Request for Information Related to the National Security Letters

- 1. The total number of NSLs issued by year and by type for each of the past five vears.
- 2. A statistical breakdown of the types of investigations (counterintelligence, terrorism, or other) for which NSLs have been used.
- 3. A statistical breakdown of the specific types of records requested.
- 4. What supporting material is available for review by the Committee to determine if the NSLs have been used in accordance with existing statutes and regulations?
- 5. What sort of review does the FBI conduct to verify the compliance with the requirement that the investigation of a U.S. person is not based on First Amendment activities? What have the findings of these reviews been?
- 6. What measures are available to judge the efficacy of the NSL authority and the importance of the records obtained to the intelligence process?
- 7. When information from an NSL is used in disseminated intelligence, what procedures are in place to minimize any U.S. person data?
- What are the criteria for sharing information from NSLs with criminal investigators? How often does this sharing take place?
- 9.] Where are records obtained under NSL authority retained and stored? How long are the records retained? When and how are they destroyed?
- Who has access to these records? IQ.
- 11. Under what circumstances is person specific information obtained using NSLs shared with other agencies?
- What procedures are in place to prevent unauthorized use or disclosure of 12. information from NSLs?
- 13. Are there currently any criminal investigations or IG-related inquiries related to the misuse of NSLs?
- How does the FBI decide to use an NSL rather than another investigative technique, such as a FI\$A warrant or a request that the record holder voluntarily provide access to particular records?
- Does the FBI routinely notify NSL recipients that compliance is voluntary? Does it tell them that recipients are permitted to discuss the letter with an attorney? Have there been any instances in which this notice was not provided? How many?
- How often do the recipients of NSLs decline to comply with them? How often are requests for voluntary access, excluding NSLs, complied with?
- Does the FBI issue NSLs at the request of other IC elements? Which elements? How often?

From: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday. March 22, 2007, 9:20 AM

To: (OGC) (FBI)

FVV: Conyers: 3/20/07 Letter with 13 Qs

UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-27-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB

Lets discuss tasking this.

Julie F. Thomas
DGC, National Security Law Branch
Office of the General Counsel
Room 7975
202-324
(fax)

----Original Message-----

 From:
 CAPRONI, VALERIE E. (OGC) (FBI)

 Sent:
 Wednesday, March 21, 2007 8:17 PM

 To:
 THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI)

 Subject:
 FW: Conyers' 3/20/07 Letter with 13 Qs

UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

Please task out as appropriate.

From: OCA) (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2007 4:01 PM

To: CAPRONI, VALERIE E. (OGC) (FBI)

Cc: BEERS, ELIZABETH RAE (OCA) (FBI)

To: CAPRONI, VALERIE E. (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: BEERS, ELIZABETH RAE (OCA) (FBI)
Subject: Conyers' 3/20/07 Letter with 13 Qs

UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

Valerie:

Beth indicated that she has spoken to you about Chairman Conyers' 3/20/07 letter asking 13 questions relating to the 3/20/07 NSL hearing. As you know, we will be handling those as QFRs.

b2

I've attached the questions in WordPerfect format so you or your folks can fill in the responses.

I'll rely on you to task these out to your folks as appropriate. When you have answers, please forward them to me for provision to the Committee through the normal QFR process.


Thanks. Let me know if you have questions.

Office of Congressional Affairs

JEH Building Room 7252

(Send mail to Room 7240)

b6
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

From: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2007 8:59 AM

To: HQ-Div09-NSLB Subject: FW: Key excerpts

 UNCLASSIFIED
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

 NON-RECORD
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-27-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB

Food for thought

Julie F. Thomas
DGC, National Security Law Branch
Office of the General Counsel
Room 7975
202-324
202-324
[fax]

----Original Message----From: DO) (OGA)
Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2007 8:36 PM

To: PISTOLE, JOHN S. (DO) (FBI); CAPRONI, VALERIE E. (OGC) (FBI); MILLER, JOHN J. (OPA) (FBI);

KORTAN, MICHAEL P. (OPA) (FBI); BEERS, ELIZABETH RAE (OCA) (FBI); KALISCH, ELENI P. (OCA)

(FBI); THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI)

Subject: Key excerpts

UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

All -- attached is a document worked up by Val's folks with a few additions by me with key quotes

b6 b7C

NSL quotes unclass report.wpd ...

from the report. The boss will have it in the a.m.

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED


From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:	THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Wednesdav. March 21, 2007 9:31 AM OGC) (FBI) (OGC) (FBI) (OGC) (FBI) FW: NSL Audit - Manner of Rebuttal for matters characterized as Potential IOBs	b6 b7C
UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-27-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB	
Julie F. Thomas DGC, National Se Office of the Gene Room 7975 202-324 202-324 (fa		
To: CA CC: TH	(INSD) (FBI) Idenesday, March 21, 2007 9:17 AM DOTC PRONI, VALERIE E. (OGC) (FBI) OMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) : NSL Audit - Manner of Rebuttal for matters characterized as Potential IOBs	
NON-RECORD		
You are correct.	gd.	,
Sent: We To: Cc: TH Subject: FW	PRONI, VALERIE E. (OGC) (FBI) Indipedaty, March 21, 2007 8:52 AM INSD) (FBI) OMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) (: NSL Audit - Manner of Rebuttal for matters characterized as Potential IOBs	
UNCLASSIFIE NON-RECORI		
Sent: Tue To: Cc: CA	Do I have this wrong?	

UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

UNCLASSIFIED

You can direct your questions to my attention. Thanks. Julie F. Thomas DGC, National Security Law Branch Office of the General Counsel Room 79<u>75</u> 202-324 **b**2 202-324 -----Original Message-From: Sent: 007 3:35 PM **b**6 (OGC) (FBI) To: Cc: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) b7C Subject: NSL Audit - Manner of Rebuttal for matters characterized as Potential IOBs **b**2 Importance: High b7E **UNCLASSIFIED** NON-RECORD I do not know who the OGC point of contact for the audit is, but if you are not could you please forward this to whoever is as soon as possible. **b**6 b7C Thank you **b**5 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED **UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED**





On Friday, you indicated you were going to send out guidance to the field stating one EC would be used to report those found not to be potential IOBs, one EC to report those previously reported and multiple Ecs to report those the CDC is reporting now as potential IOBs. Could you move this to the top of what I know is an overflowing in-box? If you already sent this out and I missed it from my in-box, I apologize but could you shoot it to me again?

Many thanks!

Julie F. Thomas
DGC, National Security Law Branch
Office of the General Counsel
Room 7975
202-324
(fax)

UNCLASSIFIED

b2





Federal Bureau of Investigation



Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

BY COURIER

Mr. Stephen Friedman Chairman Intelligence Oversight Board Room 50209 New Executive Office Building 725 17th Street, Northwest Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Enclosed for your information is a self-explanatory memory entitled "Intelligence Oversight Board Matter 2006- (U)

The memorandum sets forth details of investigative activity which the FBI has determined was conducted contrary to the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations and/or laws, Executive Orders, or Presidential Directives which govern FBI foreign counterintelligence and international terrorism investigations. This matter has also been referred to our Internal Investigations Section, Inspection Division, for a determination of whether any administrative action is warranted. (U)

Enclosure

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN DETACHED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

Derived From: G-3 Declassify On: X1

DECLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB ON 11-26-2007

SECRET

NSL VIO-28703

b2

SECRET

Mr. Stephen Friedman

Should you or any member of your staff require additional information concerning this matter, an oral briefing will be arranged for you at your convenience. (U)

Sincerely,

Julie F. Thomas Deputy General Counsel

- 1 The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
 Attorney General
 U.S. Department of Justice
 Room 5111
- 1 Mr. James Baker
 Counsel, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
 U.S. Department of Justice
 Room 615)





Federal Bureau of Investigation



Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

BY COURIER

Mr. Stephen Friedman Chairman Intelligence Oversight Board Room 50209 New Executive Office Building 725 17th Street, Northwest Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Enclosed for your information is a self-explanatory ᇽ entitled "Intelligence Oversight Board Matter meme (U) 2007

The memorandum sets forth details of investigative activity which the FBI has determined was conducted contrary to the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations and/or laws, Executive Orders, or Presidential Directives which govern FEI foreign counterintelligence and international terrorism investigations. This matter has also been referred to our Internal Investigations Section, Inspection Division, for a determination of whether any administrative action is warranted. (U)

Enclosure

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN DETACHED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

Derived From: G-3 Declassify On:

DECLASSIFIED BY 65179 DNH/KSR/JB ON 11-28-2007

SECRET

b2

SECRET

Mr. Stephen Friedman

Should you or any member of your staff require additional information concerning this matter, an oral briefing will be arranged for you at your convenience. (U)

Sincerely,

Julie F. Thomas Deputy General Counsel

- 1 The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
 Attorney General
 U.S. Department of Justice
 Room 5111
- 1 Mr. Matt Olsen
 Deputy Assistant Attorney General
 National Security Division
 U.S. Department of Justice
 Room 2200 C

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

March. 28, 2006


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-28-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB

b5

Ms. Kathryn Lotrianti, Counsel
Intelligence Oversight Board
New Executive Office Building - Room 5020
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20503

Dear Ms. Lotrianti:


NSL VIO-28707



Sincerely,

Julie F. Thomas Deputy General Counsel National Security Law Branch Federal Bureau of Investigation

SECRET FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION





b2 b7E

Tr: _____ From: Office of the General Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-V10, 05/05/2006

b2 b7E typographical error, the telephone number on the NSL was erroneously transcribed. On 02/C4/2005, the telephone records were opened and it was determined that they were not the target's records. immediately deased review of the telephone records.

- (U) The President, by Executive Order 12334, dated 12/04/1981, established the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (FIOB). On 09/13/1993, by Executive Order 12863, the President renamed it the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) and established the Board as a standing committee of the President's Fireign Intelligence Advisory Board. Among its responsibilities, the IOB has been given authority to review the FEI's practices and procedures relating to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence collection.
- (U) Section 2.4 of Executive Order 12863 mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, Inspection Division (INSD), and the General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel (OGC), respectively) report to the IOB intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. This language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with EO 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed to ensure the protection of individual rights.
- (U) Violations of provisions that merely are administrative in nature and not deemed to have been designed to ensure the protection of individual rights are generally not reported to the ICB. The FBI Inspection Division is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations

b2 (U) On 03/27/2006, realized that this incident constituted an IOB violation and promptly reported the matter to OGC, the Inspection Division, and the Counterintelligence Division.

SECRET 2

¹ (U) In order to avoid any further dissemination of this incorrect telephone number, the number is not being listed in this document.

b1


(S)

Tr: From: Office of the General Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 05/05/2006

for three years so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request. The determination as to whether a matter is "administrative in nature" must be made by OGC. Therefore, such administrative violations must be reported as potential IOB matters.

- NSLs are a specific type of investigative tool that allows the FBI to obtain certain limited types of information without court intervention: (1) telephone and email communication records from telephone companies and internet service providers (Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709); (2) records of financial institutions (which is very broadly defined) (Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.§ 3414(a)(5)(A)); (3) a list of financial institutions and consumer identifying information from a credit reporting company (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 1681u(a) and (b)); and (4) full credit report in an international terrorism case (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 1681v). NSLs may be issued in conformity with statutory requirements, including 18 U.S.C.§ 2709. NSIG
- In this situation, due to the incorrect number stated in the NSL, the FBI received telephone toll billing records pertaining to a telephone number that was neither under investigation nor related to an investigation. Therefore, the information was improperly collected, although unintentionally so, in violation of the NSIG and ECPA.
- Here, the target's rights were not violated because he was not the subject of the improperly collected information. It is unknown whether the erroneous information received pertained to a United States Person, inasmuch as there has been no review of the information. Nonetheless, based upon the fact that information which may be about a USP was improperly, although inadvertently, collected, and in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of Executive Order 12863, OGC will prepare a cover letter and a memorandum to report this matter to the IOB.





**

IOB Library

b7C

SECRET 4





Federal Bureau of Investigation



Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

BY COURIER

Mr. Stephen Friedman Chairman Intelligence Oversight Board Room 50209 New Executive Office Building 725 17th Street, Northwest Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Enclosed for your information is a self-explanatory memorandum entitled "Intelligence Oversight Board Matter 2006" (U)

The memorandum sets forth details of investigative activity which the FBI has determined was conducted contrary to the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations and/or laws, Executive Orders, or Presidential Directives which govern FBI foreign counterintelligence and international terrorism investigations. This matter has also been referred to our Internal Investigations Section, Inspection Division, for a determination of whether any administrative action is warranted. (U)

Enclosure

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN DETACHED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

Derived From: 6-3 Declassify On: 25X1

DECLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB ON 11-26-2007

SECRET

b2



Mr. Stephen Friedman

Should you or any member of your staff require additional information concerning this matter, an oral briefing will be arranged for you at your convenience. (U)

Sincerely,

Julie F. Thomas Deputy General Counsel

- 1 The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
 Attorney General
 U.S. Department of Justice
 Room 5111
- 1 Mr. James Baker
 Counsel, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
 U.S. Department of Justice
 Room 615)



SECRET

	INTELLI <u>GENCE OVERSIG</u> HT BOARD (IOB) MATTER FIELD OFFICE IOB MATTER 2006- (U)	b2 b7E
(U) ·	By electronic communication dated March 29, 2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Field Office reported that, on November 23, 2004, the FBI submitted a National Security Letter (NSL) seeking telephone toll billing records relating to a certain target to Due to a typographical error, the telephone number on the NSL was erroneously transcribed. On February 4, 2005, the telephone records were opened and it was determined that they were not the target's records. immediately ceased review of the telephone records.	b2 b7E b4 b7D
(U)	Due to the incorrect number stated in the NSL, the FEI received telephone toll billing records pertaining to a telephone number that was neither under investigation nor related to an investigation. The error was discovered upon receipt of the information, and the records were neither reviewed nor used for any investigative purpose. Despite the inadvertent nature of the mistake, the fact remains that information was improperly collected on a telephone number unrelated to an investigation. The overcollection was a violation	b1
/C\	matter is being reported to the IOB.	

(S)



DECLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB ON 11-26-2007

	Precedence: ROUTINE		Date: 06/15/2006
	To: DATE: 11 Lo 2007 CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB REASON: 1.4 (c) DECLASSIFY ON: 11-28-2032	Attn:	SAC CDC SSA SA
b2 b7E b6	Counterintelligence	Attn:	CD-2A, UC SSA
b7c	Inspection	Attn:	IIS, CRS
	From: Office of the General C NSLE/CILU/Room 7947 Contact: AGC	Counsel	
	Approved By: Thomas Julie F Drafted By:		ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
	(U) Case ID #: 278-HQ-C122973	6-VIO Sor	-in- 1404 (Donding)
	(U) Title: MATTER 2006		
	(U) Synopsis: It is the opin Crunsel (OGC) that this matter Intelligence Oversight Board (maintained in the control file the IOB. Our analysis follows	IOB). Ra for peri	ther, it should be
	(U) Derived Fr Declassify		1
b4 b7D b6 b7C	firwarding the NSL to	document dated 01 copy of t Field the EC	s: (1) a c <u>onv of the</u>
		SECRET	

b2

b4 b7D

b7E

b2

b7E



subscribers: the target and another individual. The case agent brought this to the attention of both her supervisor and the Chief Division Counsel (CDC). The case agent also sequestered the telephone records of the individual who was not the subject of the investigation.

- (U) The President, by Executive Order 12334, dated 12/C4/1981, established the President's Intelligence Oversight Brard (PIOR). On 09/13/1993, by Executive Order 12863, the President renamed it the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) and established the Board as a standing committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Among its responsibilities, the IOB has been given authority to review the FBI's practices and procedures relating to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence collection.
- (U) Section 2.4 of Executive Order 12863 mandates that Inspections General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, Inspection Division (INSD), and the General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel (OGC), respectively) report to the IOB intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. This language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Fireign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, or other quidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with EO 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed to ensure the protection of individual rights. Violations of provisions that merely are administrative in nature and not deemed to have been designed to ensure the protection of individual rights are generally not reported to the IOB. The FEI Inspection Division is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations for three years so that the Crunsel to the IOB may review them upon request. The determination as to whether a matter is "administrative in nature" must be made by OGC. Therefore, such administrative violations must be reported as potential IOB matters.

(U)	With respect to this telephone number,	
	received telephone records dated from to	
	that were associated with the target. With respect to this same	b2
,	<u>felephone_rumber</u> also received records dated	b7E
	to that were associated with another	
•	individual unrelated to the investigation.	


SECRET

b2 b7E

NSLs are a specific type of investigative tool that allows the FBT to obtain certain limited types of information without court intervention: (1) telephone and email communication records from telephone companies and internet service providers (Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709); (2) records of financial institutions (which is very broadly defined) (Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.§ 3414(a)(5)(A)); (3) a list of financial institutions and consumer identifying information from a credit reporting company (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 1681u(a) and (b)); and (4) full credit report in an international terrorism case (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 1681v). NSLs may be issued in conformity with statutory requirements, including 18 U.S.C.§ 2709.

b1

Here, during an authorized investigation, the FBI properly served an NSL on a telephone carrier. In response to the properly served NSL, the FBI obtained information regarding another subscriber's records that were not relevant to the






To: From: Office of the General Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C1029736-VIO, 06/15/2006

investigation. It appears that this information, although lawfully obtained, is not relevant to the investigation and should be segregated to protect the potential privacy interests of United States persons. Once information not relevant to an authorized investigation is received, the field should contact the carrier and ask whether the unintentionally acquired information should be returned or destroyed with appropriate documentation to the file.

(U) Based upon these facts, in accordance with the terms implementing the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of EO 10863, it is our opinion that this error is not reportable to the IOB. A record of this decision should be maintained in the control file for future review by the Counsel to the IOB.

The target's rights were not violated because he was not the subject of the improperly collected information. It is unknown, however, whether the information associated with the other subscriber pertained to a United States Ferson inasmuch as there has been no review of the information.



LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) INSD should retain a record of the report of the potential IOB matter, as well as a copy of the OGC opinion concluding that IOB notification is not required, for three years for possible review by the Counsel to the IOB.


Set Lead 2: (Info)


COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information.

Set Lead 3: (Action)






44

b2 b7E

b4

b7D

b6 b7C



DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRETIFORCON, NOFORM

From: Sent:	THOMAS, JULIE Friday, September	F. (OGC) (FBI) er 22, 2006 5:07 PM	
To: Co b6 Ъ7C			
Subject: SECRET#ORCON RECORD XXXXX	IOB internal guida	(OGC) (FBI) ance	
			DECLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JF ON 11-28-2007
	ir	nternaliobJFTchang es.wpd (89	
Attached are my ed Hit document then Julie F. Thomas		C3.Wpu (05	
DGC, National Se	curity Law Branc	ħ	
Office of the Gene Room 7975	eral Counsel		
202-324	(x)	b2	
DERIVED FROM: DECLASSIFICATI	Multiple Sources ON EXEMPTION 1		

SEGRET

09/22/2006


GC Caproni:	
I have reviewed your proposed change to the IOB policy.	
	.b5

DECLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB ON 11-29-2007


Julie F. Thomas

SECRET

	Message.txt MessageFrom: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 5:06 PM
	To: (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FBI);
b6 b7C	(CTD) (FBI) Cc: (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (OGC) (FBI);
b5	Subject: RE: SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD
b6 b7C	I am persuaded by and comments. Likewise, I have the utmost respect for ASACs so let's go with them. JulieOriginal Message From: (OGC) (FBI)
b6 b7C	Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 5:02 pM To: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI): C. (OGC) (FBI); (CTD) (FBI) Cc: (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FBI);
155	(OGC) (OGA); Subject: RE: ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-29-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB
Ъ5	We understand the concerns with using this provision. It is a powerful tool. However.
ъ6 ъ7с ъ5	Original Message From: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday. August 16, 2005 4:47 PM To: (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (OGA); (OGC) (FBI) Subject: RE: (OGC) (FBI)
	SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD
.b5	I think it should be Any problems with that? Julie Original Message
b6 b7c	From: OGC) (FBI) Page 1



Page 2



Message.txt SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD Hi <u>The guv who</u> asked was interested in I did some research **b**5 and he emphasized **b**6 When I told my colleanu that hasically answered his question because b7C Howver, if issues you think I know. Thanks <u>ridinal Messade</u> (OGC) (FBI) **b**5 From: August 16, 2005 7:59 AM Sent **b**6 (CTD) (FBI) To: b7C Subject: RE: SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD **b**6 b7C b5 please clarify. and sorry for taking so long to respond. **b**6 (CTD) (FBI) 10. 2005 10:25 AM From: b7C Sent: Wednesday Augus **b**5 To: (OGC) (FBI) Subject: SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD b2 Hi b7E asked me to see if I could find out A colleague what **b**6 b7C

Page 4

b5

Message.txt

1 have been told that you are the NSL guru. I'd appreciate any feedback you can provide, even if you can just point me in the right direction. I have found plenty of info/guidance regarding NSLs, but much less regarding

1 manks.

202-324

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Key Excerpts from the Unclassified IG Report

The FBI self-identified the inaccurate reporting, and told Congress a year ago

(pg. xvii and 33): In March 2006, the FBI acknowledged to the Attorney General and Congress that NSL data in the semiannual classified reports may not have been accurate and stated that the data entry delays affected an unspecified number of NSL requests. After the FBI became aware of these delays, it took steps to reduce the impact of the delays to negligible levels for the second half of CY 2005.

The IG Found No Criminal Misconduct

(pg. xxviii, fn.26): In this report, we use the terms "improper or illegal use" as contained in the Patriot Reauthorization Act. As noted below, the improper or illegal uses of the national security letter authorities we found in our review did not involve criminal misconduct. However, as also noted below, the improper or illegal uses we found included serious misuses of national security letter authority.

No deliberate or intentional violations; but rather, good faith mistakes; confusion

(pg. xxx): Our examination of the 26 possible IOB violations reported to FBI OGC did not reveal deliberate or intentional violations of NSL statutes, the Attorney General Guidelines or internal FBI policy. Although the majority of the possible violations - 22 of 26 - arose from FBI errors, most of them occurred because of typographical errors or the case agent's good faith but erroneous belief that the information requested related to an investigative subject.

(pg. xxxiii:) Our review did not reveal intentional violations of national security letter authorities, the Attorney General Guidelines or internal FBI policy. Rather, we found confusion about the authorities available under the various NSL statutes.

IG found in most cases we sought information we were entitled to

(pg. xlviii and 124): Finally, in evaluating the FBI's use of national security letters, it is important to note the significant challenges the FBI was facing during the period covered by our review and the major organizational changes it was undergoing. Moreover, it is also important to recognize that in most cases the FBI was seeking to obtain information that it could have obtained properly if it had followed applicable statutes, guidelines, and internal policies. We also did not find any indication that the FBI's misuse of NSL authorities constituted criminal misconduct.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-29-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB

FBI seeking information to which it was entitled

(pg. 67): In evaluating this matters, it is important to recognize that in most cases,

the FBI was seeking to obtain information that it could have obtained properly if it had followed applicable statutes, guidelines, and internal policies. We also did not find any indication that the FBI's misuse of NSL authorities constituted criminal misconduct.

Errors were not deliberate attempts to circumvent statutes

(pg. 77): While the errors resulted in the acquisition of information not relevant to an authorized investigation, they did not manifest deliberate attempts to circumvent statutory limitations or Departmental policies and appropriate remedial action was taken.

(pg. 103) (control file issue) We believe that the CAU officials and the EOPS Unit. Chief concluded in good faith that the FBI had sufficient predication either to connect these national security letters with existing investigations or to open new investigations in compliance with the Attorney General's NSI Guidelines.

FBI has now provided the needed guidance

(pg. 107): Overall, we believe that the FBI has now provided needed guidance and support to field personnel to facilitate production of approval documentation compliant with statutory requirements, Attorney General Guidelines and internal FBI policies. Nonetheless, we believe the FBI should improve its compliance with the internal controls governing its exercise of national security letter authorities...

(pg. 126) We believe that these recommendations, if fully implemented, can improve the accuracy of the reporting of the FBI's use of national security letters and ensure the FBI's compliance with the requirements governing their use.

From: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2007 2:24 PM

To: HQ-Div09-NSLB

Subject: Please await an all CDC email ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

NON-RECORD DATE 11-29-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB

We are getting a tremendous amount of questions from the CDCs reflecting confusion about the ongoing NSL audit in the field offices. I have met with Inspection Division and will shortly send out an all CDC email giving some additional guidance regarding the reporting of potential IOBs. Please wait to read that advice before answering questions that are not clearly set forth in the November 2006 external guidance.


Julie F. Thomas	S
DGC, National	Security Law Branch
Office of the Ge	neral Counsel
Room 79 <u>75</u>	-
202-324	
202-324	^r ax)

b2

b6 b7c	From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:	THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Thursday, March 22, 2007 9:07 AM FRI ALL CDCs: HQ-Div09-NSLB (INSD) (FBI); CAPRON Receipt of Information in Response to N	NI, VALERIE E. (OGC) (FBI) ISLs	
	UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD		ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11 20 2007 BY 25170 DATE 1	sr/je

UNCLASSIFIED


Duplicate 3/22/07 email in volume 1 of this file





As a result of the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General's recent report relating to the FBI's use of National Security Letters, the Inspection Division currently is auditing several field offices regarding the FBI's use of NSLs. The Office of the General Counsel has been receiving many questions regarding whether errors identified during the audit should be reported to OGC as potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) matters. In light of these questions, a copy of the November 16, 2006 "Revised Procedures for the Submission of Reports of Potential Intelligence Oversight Board Matters" is attached to this email for your convenience. Further, additional guidance is listed below.

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The AIIPs are directed by the Inspection Division to note any deviation or error. Then, this information is passed to the CDC to determine if a matter should be reported to OGC as a potential IOB matter. It is expected that the AIIPs will note many more issues than the CDCs will report to OGC for adjudication as potential IOB matters. Even so, OGC is encouraging overreporting of errors as potential IOB matters. If you have any questions about OGC's guidance relating to IOB matters, please contact or	Ъ6 Ъ7С
The following incidents are reportable as potential IOBs matters for adjudication by OGC:	
	b5



b5

<< File: IOB Attachment #1--Nov162006POLICY.wpd >>

DERIVED-FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
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DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
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DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET

ðd.	From: Sent: Thomas, Julie F. (OGC) (FBI) Thursday, March 22, 2007 8:56 AM To: (OGC) (FBI) Cc: Subject: UNCLASSIFIED THOMAS, Julie F. (OGC) (FBI) Thursday, March 22, 2007 8:56 AM COGC) (FBI) RE: IMPORTANT NSL Guidance	
Ъ7С	HEREIN	FORMATION CONTAINED IS UNCLASSIFIED 1-29-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB
	I want the "all CDC emails" to go through me. So I will look at th Julie F. Thomas DGC, National Security Law Branch	is.
	Office of the General Čounsel Room 7975 202-324 202-324 fax)	
Ъ6 Ъ7С	Original Macsage From:	
	I think the below is fine and I was inclined to copy all CDCs I use something worded this well. Any objections? Original Message	because I think all CDCs could
b6 b7C b2 b7E	From: Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 7:38 AM To: DGC) (FBI) Subject: IMPORTANT NSL Guidance	
	Can you take a look at this before I send it to our people? T	ihanks
		.b5


NSL VIO-28908

	b5	
b6	Additional guidance regarding toll record NSLs is likely to be forthcoming questions, please call me.	If you have any
b7C b2		
	UNCLASSIFIED	

b6 b7C	From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Thursdav March 22 2007 8:59 AM (OGC) (OGC) (FBI) RE: IMPORTANT NSL Guidance	(FBI) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-29-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB
	All CDCs and SACs were notified by DD Pistole of the necresponse to NSLs. The Ed is working on says the sact of the subscriber info, I will send out a quick notification for Julie F. Thomas DGC, National Security Law Branch Office of the General Counsel Room 7975 D2 202-324	cessity to review documents received in same thing it will be sent out shortly. n about it.
	202-324 (fax) Duplicate	3/22/07 email this file
b6 b7С	From: Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 8:52 AM To: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Cc: OGC) (FBI) Subject: FW: IMPORTANT NSL Guidance	
b6 b7c b2 b7E	Original Message From: (FBI) Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 7:38 AM To: OGC) (FBI) Subject: IMPORTANT NSL Guidance	

UNCLASSIFIED

Duplicate



As a result of the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General's recent report relating to the FBI's use of National Security Letters, the Inspection Division currently is auditing several field offices regarding the FBI's use of NSLs. The Office of the General Counsel has been receiving many questions regarding whether errors identified during the audit should be reported to OGC as

potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) matters. In light of these questions, a copy of the November 16, 2006 "Revised Procedures for the Submission of Reports of Potential Intelligence Oversight Board Matters" is attached to this email for your convenience. Further, additional guidance is listed below.

The AIIPs are directed by the Inspection Division to note any deviation or error. Then, this information is passed to the CDC to determine if a matter should be reported to OGC as a potential IOB matter. It is expected that the AIIPs will note many more issues than the CDCs will report to OGC for adjudication as potential IOB matters. Even so, OGC is encouraging overreporting of errors as potential IOB matters. If you have any questions about OGC's guidance relating to IOB matters, please contact


In addition to the November 16, 2006 IOB guidance, OGC has highlighted the following issues based upon conversations with CDCs from around the country.

The following incidents are reportable as potential IOBs matters for adjudication by OGC:

NSL VIO-28913

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b6 b7C




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DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET

b6 b7С	From: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Sent: Thursdav. March 22, 2007 4:41 PM To: (OGC) (FBI)
	Cc: (OGC) (FBI) (OGC) (FBI) Subject: UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD (OGC) (FBI)
b5	1. Agree 2. Agree,
	Julie F. Thomas DGC, National Security Law Branch Office of the General Counsel Room 7975 202-324 b2 202-324 (fax)
b6 b7С b5	From: Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 4:14 PM To: (OGC) (FBI); THOMAS THEFF (OGC) (FBI) Cc: (OGC) (FBI) Subject: RE: IOB Issues Relating to the Inspection Division's Audit
b6 b7C	From: (OGC) (FBI) Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 2:40 PM To: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Cc: (OGC) (FBI) Subject: FW: IOB Issues Relating to the Inspection Division's Audit SEGRET RECORD-LOB
	Julie, I realize how busy you are, but wanted to bring two reoccurring issues to your
Ъ6 Ъ7С Ъ5	attention. 1. CDC raised an interesting point as stated below.



As a result of the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General's recent report relating to the FBI's use of National Security Letters, the

Inspection Division currently is auditing several field offices regarding the FBI's use of NSLs. The Office of the General Counsel has been receiving many questions regarding whether errors identified during the audit should be reported to OGC as potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) matters. In light of these questions, a copy of the November 16, 2006 "Revised Procedures for the Submission of Reports of Potential Intelligence Oversight Board Matters" is attached to this email for your convenience. Further, additional guidance is listed below.

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In addition to the November 16, 2006 IOB guidance, OGC has highlighted the following issues based upon conversations with CDCs from around the country.	
The following incidents are reportable as potential IOBs matters for adjudication by OGC:	_
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
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
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
As a result of the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General's recent report relating to the FBI's use of National Security Letters, the Inspection Division currently is auditing several field offices regarding the FBI's use of NSLs. The Office of the General Counsel has been receiving many questions regarding whether errors identified during the audit should be reported to OGC as potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) matters. In light of these questions, a copy of the November 16, 2006 "Revised Procedures for the Submission of Reports of Potential Intelligence Oversight Board Matters" is attached to this email for your convenience. Further, additional guidance is listed below.

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b6 b7C

In addition to the November 16, 2006 IOB guidance, OGC has highlighted

the following issues based upon conversations with CDCs from around the country.




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
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
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DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
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




b6 b7С	Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2007 4:22 PM To: HQ-Div09-NSLB; FBI_ALL CDCs; CAPRONI, VALERIE E. (OGC) (FBI INSD) (FBI) Subject: IOB Issues Relating to the Inspection Division's Audit SECRET RECORD IOB (5)
	As a result of the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General's recent report relating to the FBI's use of National Security Letters, the Inspection Division currently is auditing several field offices regarding the FBI's use of NSLs. The Office of the General Counsel has been receiving many questions regarding whether errors identified during the audit should be reported to OGC as potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) matters. In light of these questions, a copy of the November 16, 2006 "Revised Procedures for the Submission of Reports of Potential Intelligence Oversight Board Matters" is attached to this email for your convenience. Further, additional guidance is listed below.
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The following incidents are reportable as potential IOBs matters for adjudication by OGC:




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
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


Duplicate **b**2 -----Original Mess From: (FBI) b7E sday, March 22, 2007 4:42 PM Sent DGC) (FBI) To: **b**6 Subject: RE: IOB Issues Relating to the Inspection Division's Audit b7C SECREL **RECORD TOB** Duplicate 3/22/07 email this file -----Original Mess OGC) (FBI) b2 From: Wednesday, March 21, 2007 4:22 PM HQ-Div09-NSLB; FBI_ALL CDCs; CAPRONI, VALERIE E. (QGC) (FBI) Sent: b7E To: (INSD) (FBI)
IOB Issues Relating to the Inspection Division's Audit **b**6 Subject: b7C SECRET Duplicate 3/21/07 email this file

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
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
CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1



b7E b1 b5



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






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b6 b7c b2 b7E b1	(S) -	Original Mes From: Sent: Friday March 23 2007 2:46 PM To: (FBI) Cc: 7/ERI\ SUBject: NSL-for
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
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
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
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UNCLASSIFIED









SECRET **b**6 b7C Thank ----Original Mese From: Sent: 6:15 PM (FBI) To: Subject: NSL Results fron SECRET (S) RECORD **b**6 b7C Hi b2 I've attached a copy of the information obtaine b7E following my delivery of your NSL request. I will forward the b4 CD containing this same information with my outgoing FD542 b7D responding to your lead. Please let me know if you need any bl additional information or have any questions. DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations DECLASSIFY ON: 20320320 SECRET DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1797, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations DECLASSIFY ON: 20320320 SECRET DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations DECLASSIFY ON: 20320320 SECRET DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations DECLASSIFY ON: 20320320 SECRET





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
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
DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
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UNCLASSIFIED

b6 b7C	From: Sent:	THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Wednesdav. March 28. 2007 7:49 AM
b2	To: Cc:	(OGC) (FBI) OGC) (FBI)
b7E	Subject: <u>UNCLASSIFIED</u>	RE: Receipt of Information in Response to NSLs
	NON-RECORD	
	Dear	
		comments. I am copying the persons who are working these issues for me.
		report, OGC is being asked to review all quidance in this regard, suggest
1 ₄ 2	etatuton/chances	e atc
b6 b7C		
.b5	FYI	have been very difficult for us in light of
	Please have parie	ence. We are working these issues intently.
	Julie F. Thomas	s Security Law Branch
	DGC, National S Office of the Ger Room 79 <u>75</u>	
	202-324-	b2
	202-324-	(fax) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-30-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB
	Original Max From:	
Ъ6	Sent: M To: T	Monday, March 26, 2007 12:36 PM THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI)
b7c b2	Subject: R	RE: Receipt of Information in Response to NSLs
b7E	UNCLASSIF	
	lutio: Lar	To according this manager to your dispaths on I don't wigh to anguage in an "AII
		m sending this message to you directly as I don't wish to engage in an "ALL but I am curious as to OGC's reasoning in regard to
× -		
b5 b2		
b7E		



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OHOLASSII ILD			
UNCLASSIFIED			
	Dupl	icate	



b6 b7c b2 b7E	FBI) Sent: Monday, March 26, 2007 12:36 PM To: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Subject: RE: Receipt of Information in Response to NSLs
_	<pre>UNCLASSIFIED Duplicate 3/26/07 email this file NON-RECORD</pre>

Duplicate

b6 b7С	Original Message From: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 8:07 AM To: FBI ALL CDCs: HQ-Div09-NSLB Cc: (INSD) (FBI); CAPRONI, VALERIE E. (OGC) (FBI) Subject: Receipt of Information in Response to NSLs UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD Duplicate 3/22/07 email this file
	UNCLASSIFIED
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UI	NCLASSIFIED

From: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 12:27 PM

To: FBI_ALL CDCs

Cc: CAPRONI, VALERIE E. (OGC) (FBI); HQ-Div09-NSLB

Subject: Response to Guidance

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DATE 11-30-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB


Thank you to all for the responses we have been receiving to interim guidance we have been giving. I look forward to those responses but, unfortunately, the press of business will not allow me to respond individually to each. They are being reviewed and will assist us as we craft **permanent** guidance going forward.

I know this is an extremely difficult and uncertain time. OGC/NSLB is doing everything humanly possible to respond to Congress, the OIG, and the field's concerns about the use of NSLs and our other national security tools.

Thank you for your patience.

Julie F. Thomas
DGC, National Security Law Branch
Office of the General Counsel
Room 7975
202-324
202-324
(fax)

b2



NON-RECORD

	Julie - I just approved an attachment, set forth below, for a subscriber NSL. This information is routinely given by the company to whom the NSL was sent.
	Any problem with this as an attachment to a subscriber
b5	
b2 b7E b6 b7C	In preparing your response to this National Security Letter, you should determine whether your company maintains the following types of information which may be considered by you to be subscriber records:
	I am going through the form NSLS for the last time before I relinquish my NSL duties, so I would like to get some of my ideas through before has to deal with these issues. So if you could let me know about this, as well as the RFPA issue that I mentioned to you concerning
	I would appreciate it.
	SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
	SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

From: THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 05, 2006 2:59 PM

To: HQ-Div09-NSLB

Subject: Use of NSLs in Criminal Cases

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NON-RECORD

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DATE 11-30-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JB

The General Counsel has decided

Julie F. Thomas

DGC, National Security Law Branch

Office of the General Counsel

Room 7975

202-324

fax)