1	STUART F. DELERY			
2	Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General MELINDA HAAG			
3	United States Attorney ELIZABETH J. SHAPIRO			
4	Deputy Branch Director			
5	STEVEN Y. BRESSLER D.C. Bar No. 482492 Senior Counsel			
6	United States Department of Justice			
7	Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch			
	P.O. Box 883 Washington, D.C. 20044			
8	Washington, D.C. 20044 Telephone: (202) 305-0167			
9	Facsimile: (202) 616-8470 Email: Steven.Bressler@usdoj.gov			
10				
11	Attorneys for the United States Department of Justice			
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
13	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
14	OAKLANI	DIVISION		
15				
16 17	ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,)	Case No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR		
	Plaintiff,	REPLY MEMORANDUM IN FURTHER		
18	v.)	RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER		
19 20	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF)	RE: FURTHER SUBMISSION ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY		
	JUSTICE,)	JUDGMENT		
21	Defendant.			
22)			
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
	Case No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Response to the Cour	t's Order (ECF No. 49)		
	The sponse to the confi			

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT	1
I. The Government's Vaughn Index and Declaration Meet Ninth Circuit Requirements and Establish Defendant's Entitlement to Summary Judgment	1
II. The Government Has Established That No Portions of the NSD Documents Withheld in Full Can Be Segregated From Exempt Material and Released	5
III. The Court Need Not and Should Not Resort to In Camera Review of Hundreds of Pages of Withheld Documents	8
IV. CONCLUSION	10

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES	PAGE(S)
Amnesty Int'l v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)	
Berman v. CIA, 501 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007)	2
Campbell v. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1998)	9
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 445 U.S. 375 (1980)	
Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1982)	
Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978)	
Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980)	
Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979)	5
Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1992)	2, 4
Lewis v. IRS, 823 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1987)	2
Lion Raisins v. Dep't of Agriculture, 354 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004)	9
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4 th Cir. 1972)	5, 7
McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983)	5, 7
Mobley v. Department of Justice, 870 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.D.C. 2012)	5
Casa No. 4:11 cv. 05221 VCP	

1	In re Mot. for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISC 2007)	
2		
3	N.Y. Times Co. v. Dep't of Justice, F.Supp.2d 2013 WL. 50209 (S.D.N.Y. January 02, 2013)	
4	Pollard v. FBI, 705 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1983)	
5		
6	Quiñon v. FBI,	
7	86 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1996)	
8	Stillman v. CIA, 319 F 3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2003)	
9	319 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2003)	
10	Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973)	
11	Weiner v. FBI,	
12	943 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991)	
13		
14	STATUTES	
15	5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)	
16		
17	FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE	
18	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)	
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In compliance with this Court's Order (ECF No. 49), defendant, the U.S. Department of Justice, publicly filed further specific information describing documents withheld by its National Security Division ("NSD") as exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. The Government's filing included a *Vaughn* index that lists the page length of each document, the specific category of each document, and the exemption(s) claimed. *See Vaughn* index, Attachment A to Second Supplemental Bradley Declaration (ECF No. 55-1); *Vaughn v. Rosen*, 484 F.2d 820, 823-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The *Vaughn* index also lists the dates of the vast majority of withheld documents and date ranges when specific dates cannot be provided without risking the revelation of classified information. *See Vaughn* index. In his supplemental declaration also submitted to the Court (ECF No. 55-1) ("Supp. Bradley Decl."), senior NSD official and original classification authority Mark A. Bradley explains, to the extent possible without compromising the secrecy of the very information to be withheld, the bases for claiming the cited FOIA exemptions and why there are no reasonably segregable portions of the withheld documents that may be released without compromising national security.

Mr. Bradley's supplemental declaration and the accompanying public *Vaughn* index comply with this Court's Order and establish that defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to the withheld documents. The Government's filing also offers as much detail as can be provided publicly, without compromising the very national security interests that the Government and Exemption 1 of the FOIA seek to protect. Plaintiff's various criticisms of the Government's filing are without merit.

Case No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR

28

I. The Government's Vaughn Index and Declaration Meet Ninth Circuit Requirements and Establish Defendant's Entitlement to Summary Judgment.

When federal agencies assert FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 for national security reasons, the Ninth Circuit has required the Government to "describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemptions, and show that the justifications are not controverted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of CIA bad faith." Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoted in *Berman v. CIA*, 501 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007). Mr. Bradley's public declaration meets those standards. The declaration describes the kind of information at issue and the reasons for nondisclosure in specific detail and makes clear that the information withheld logically falls within the national security exemptions. The declaration notes the importance of keeping secret information concerning the manner and means by which the United States acquires tangible things for certain authorized national security investigations. Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶ 6, 8-9. The declaration also explains how disclosure of the requested information could compromise that secrecy, and details the significant harm that would result if information concerning these highly sensitive intelligence activities, sources, and methods was released to the public, i.e., the use of countermeasures by adversaries of the United States that "may deprive the United States of critical intelligence." *Id.* ¶ 10.

Plaintiff implies (without support) that these legitimate concerns do not apply because, it claims, it has "made clear it does not seek disclosure of *specific* information concerning sources or methods" but only "*generalized* information." Plaintiff's Response Memorandum (ECF No. 55) ("Pl. Response") at 3. But the documents subject to summary judgment and responsive to plaintiff's FOIA request include such specific information, or include other information that would tend to reveal such specific

information. Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9. And as Mr. Bradley also testified, no information in the documents can be segregated and released without revealing classified information that is properly exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Id. ¶¶ 8-11.

Indeed, as plaintiff all but points out, to the extent such "generalized" information can be made public, it has been: the government has published general information concerning the use of Section 215. Pl. Response at 3. Such statistics have been provided to plaintiff in response to plaintiff's FOIA request, and therefore are no longer at issue in this litigation. What remains does not consist of such general (or properly releasable) information. Moreover, plaintiff now seeks documents containing "significant" legal interpretations of the government's Section 215 authority; revealing information about "when" and "how often" the government has employed that authority in a manner that was related to such a "significant legal interpretation" would disclose additional, and damaging, information. *See* Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶ 11 (explaining why legal reasoning cannot be segregated and released "particularly when viewed in the context of this FOIA request," and that revealing such information "would tend to reveal the intelligence capabilities and particular activities far beyond the general notion that the Government may be using Section 215 to collect information").²

¹ Moreover, plaintiff ignores the fact that this Court ordered the Government to provide certain information, *or* to explain why further "information cannot be provided on the public record." Order, ECF No. 49 at 3. As discussed in Mr. Bradley's supplemental declaration and in this memorandum, that is what the Government did.

² Similarly, plaintiff criticizes the Government for allegedly failing to explain why it has revealed the dates of only some of the withheld FISC materials. It bears noting that this Court did not order the Government to provide such dates as part of the supplemental filing, and that the Government has provided dates for the vast majority of withheld documents. *See* Order (ECF No. 49); *Vaughn* index. In any event, Mr. Bradley explains that "providing further information" than defendant has done "concerning the dates of withheld [FISC] records that contain significant legal interpretation or analysis of Section 215 would tend to reveal non-public information about when the government was or was not using those authorities." Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶ 12. Mr. Bradley notes that, when

Plaintiff also asserts that the Government violated the Court's Order because the articulation of harm that would result from releasing the documents is stated once by Mr. Bradley in his declaration, rather than repeated for each document in the index. Pl. Response at 3 n.4. Plaintiff's argument elevates form over substance to no end; as Mr. Bradley testified, "[t]he articulation that I am able to provide publicly for the Exemption 1 withholding of each withheld document is the same in substance." Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶ 5; see id. ¶ 6 (same as to Exemption 3).

In stark contrast to the generalized and unsupported claims of harm that the Court of Appeals found insufficient to support a claimed national security exemption in *Weiner v. FBI*, 943 F.2d 972, 982 (9th Cir. 1991), the public declaration of Mr. Bradley in this case details the harm to intelligence gathering activities that could reasonably be expected to result from release of the withheld documents. *Cf. Lewis v. IRS*, 823 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir. 1987) (declaration "need not specify its objections [to disclosure] in such detail as to compromise the secrecy of the information") (citation omitted). The National Security Division's judgment with respect to the sensitivity of the documents in question, and the harm that could reasonably be expected to result from their release, falls squarely within the area of agency expertise to which this Court must grant substantial deference. *See Hunt*, 981 F.2d at 1119.

combined with information available to enemies of the United States, such information could be used to determine when the Government has used its Section 215 authority "and correlate the use . . . to certain events that may be . . . known to adversaries of the United States." *Id*. In light of that, and the contents of the *Vaughn* index, it is obvious why defendant was able to provide dates for some FISC materials, but not others: the FISC documents noted by plaintiff (Pl. Response at 4) for which defendant provided dates are materials such as briefings and statutorily-required filings of standard minimization procedures that do not directly relate to or coincide with particular applications to the FISC for use of Section 215 authority.

Moreover, it is important to note that defendant's submission is not limited to its public affidavits nor, in a case involving protection of extremely sensitive national security information, is the Government limited to relying only on what it can say publicly. Plaintiff is thus wrong when it implies without foundation that the Government has failed to produce "a properly detailed *Vaughn* Index" because the Government seeks to shirk a "considerable burden." Pl. Response at 2 (citation omitted). Plaintiff ignores the point of the supplemental filing and the fact that defendant has provided a lengthy and detailed classified *Vaughn* index accompanied by a detailed, classified declaration. The Court directed defendant to make its supplemental filing because the Court was "not satisfied that the public record has been made as complete as possible." Order, ECF No. 49 at 2. With its detailed, public *Vaughn* index, the Government has made the public record as complete as possible. *See* Supplemental Bradley Declaration ¶¶ 5, 7, 8-13 (explaining why further detailed information cannot be provided publicly without risking disclosure of properly classified information).

Defendant's public filings establish that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. To the extent the Court agrees with plaintiff that further detail is required, however, the Court may find such detail in the government's classified submission. *E.g.*, *Mobley v. Department of Justice*, 870 F. Supp. 2d 61, 69 (D.D.C. 2012); *Amnesty Int'l v. CIA*, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479, 507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Indeed, when classified national security information is at issue, "in camera review of affidavits, followed if necessary by further judicial inquiry, will be the norm." *Stillman v. CIA*, 319 F.3d 546, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting *McGehee v. Casey*, 718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). *See Pollard v. FBI*, 705 F.2d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1983) (approving of *in camera* consideration of classified affidavit in FOIA case); *Hayden v. NSA*, 608 F.2d 1381, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

(in a FOIA case where "public itemization and detailed justification would compromise legitimate secrecy interests," it is "appropriate to receive affidavits in camera rather than in public."). *See also* Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶ 7.

II. The Government Has Established That No Portions of the NSD Documents Withheld in Full Can Be Segregated From Exempt Material and Released.

In compliance with the Court's Order, in his supplemental public declaration Mr. Bradley explained, in as much detail as possible on the public record, why there are no portions of the withheld records that can be segregated from exempt (*i.e.*, classified and properly withheld pursuant to statute) material and released. Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶¶ 8-13. To the extent NSD found releasable, responsive material, it was released and is no longer at issue in this litigation. Plaintiff's criticisms of the Government's segregability determination amount to sophistry.

First, plaintiff argues, without citation to any legal authority, that there must be something segregable when a document is large. Pl. Response at 4. Plaintiff also asserts without explanation that a segregability analysis cannot apply equally to a long document and a shorter one. *Id.* But this is nonsense: Mr. Bradley has testified and explained that there is no segregable, non-exempt information in the documents withheld in full. Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶¶ 8-13. Where, as here, there is no reasonably segregable information on any page of a document, it is of no moment how long the document may be.

Plaintiff then blatantly misconstrues Mr. Bradley's declaration with repeated assertions that the Government is withholding as classified information that is not classified, *i.e.*, that is "innocuous," "does not fall within Section 1.4 [of E.O. 13526]'s classification categories," or is "mundane." Pl. Resp. 5-6. Of course, this is not the

Government's position nor is it what Mr. Bradley stated in his declaration. Rather, Mr.

Bradley explained that "seemingly innocuous" information, when "juxtaposed with the fact that the document in question contains significant legal analysis of an application of Section 215," or "when combined with other information that might be available to the public . . . can reasonably be expected to reveal . . . classified national security information." Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11 (emphasis added). This is simply a recognition of the well-established proposition that "each individual piece of intelligence information, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may aid in piecing together other bits of information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance itself." *Gardels* v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting *Halperin v. CIA*, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Courts commonly refer to this as the "mosaic theory" of intelligence:

It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of *seemingly innocuous* information can be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate "The courts, of course, are ill-equipped to become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters to serve effectively in the review of secrecy classifications in that area."

Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added); see McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1149. This concept, long-recognized by the courts, is the gravamen of Mr. Bradley's segregability discussion – not plaintiff's straw-man of a "justification for the classification of innocuous information." Pl. Response 5.

The balance of plaintiff's segregability discussion consists of plaintiff's meritless argument that legal analysis cannot be properly classified. As defendant has explained,

plaintiff is mistaken and, in any event, "the legal analysis in the withheld documents

cannot reasonably be segregated and released without risking disclosure of the manner

and means by which the United States Government acquires tangible things for certain

Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment (ECF No.45) at 4-8;

N.Y. Times Co. v. Dep't of Justice, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2013 WL 50209, *20 (S.D.N.Y.

January 02, 2013) (stating there is "no reason why legal analysis cannot be classified

cases that "support the proposition that legal analysis can be withheld as classified

pursuant to E.O. 13526 if it pertains to matters that are themselves classified;" also citing

authorized investigations pursuant to Section 215." Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶ 8. See

III. The Court Need Not and Should Not Resort to *In Camera* Review of Hundreds of Pages of Withheld Documents.

As defendant has explained, the Government has established with its public filings that it is entitled to summary judgment. However, should the Court require a "fuller explanation of the highly significant intelligence sources, methods and activities at issue and the harm to national security that would result from the disclosure of this

pursuant to Exemption 1"). 3

³ In a footnote, plaintiff argues that the Government cannot assert that the FISC rules prohibit release by the Government of FISC materials without an authorizing Order by the FISC. Pl. Response 7-8 n.6. Plaintiff is correct that Mr. Bradley discussed that application of the FISC's rules and procedures in his Second Supplemental Public Declaration, and it was not raised in defendant's earlier memoranda. Suppl. Bradley Decl. ¶ 13. But the FISC procedures present a *jurisdictional* bar to an order for disclosure of FISC materials under FOIA. *See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S.*, 445 U.S. 375, 384, 387 (1980); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). That argument therefore cannot be waived. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). Nor, as plaintiff implies, has the FISC ever held that FISC records are properly disclosable under FOIA; rather, the FISC expressed no view on "whatever remedies may be available" in a district court under FOIA. *In re Mot. for Release of Court Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 496 (FISC 2007). Indeed, plaintiff cites to no case in which a court has ordered release under FOIA of FISC records, particularly those that had not been authorized for release by the FISC itself.

information," the Government urges the Court to view its classified, *ex parte* submission *in camera*. *See* Supp. Bradley Decl. ¶ 7.

Perhaps on the theory that extra time spent by the Court "can't hurt," plaintiff suggests the Court conduct *in camera* review of hundreds of pages of withheld documents. Pl. Response 7. But *in camera* document review burdens the resources of the Court, is contrary to judicial economy, and should not be "resorted to as a matter of course, simply on the theory that 'it can't hurt." *Quiñon v. FBI*, 86 F.3d 1222, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). For that reason, *in camera* inspection of documents withheld under a FOIA exemption should "not be resorted to lightly" and is disfavored where, as here, "the government sustains its burden of proof by way of its testimony or affidavits." *See Lion Raisins v. Dep't of Agriculture*, 354 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004).

Moreover, the relevant "testimony or affidavits" includes the Government's classified submission. Should the Court direct defendant to provide withheld documents for *in camera* review, the Government will, of course, promptly arrange to make the documents in question available consistent with procedures for the handling of classified information. In the interests of judicial economy, however, and consistent with the law of this Circuit, the Government urges the Court to fully consider defendant's *ex parte*, classified submission before resorting to time-consuming *in camera* review of the withheld documents.⁴

⁴ Defendant believes its classified, *ex parte* submission will be of great assistance to the Court should the Court require a fuller explanation, and that it further establishes the Government's entitlement to summary judgment. However, if the Court has further questions after reviewing the classified submission, the Court should direct the Government to supplement that classified submission before resorting to in camera review of withheld documents. *E.g.*, *Campbell v. Dep't of Justice*, 164 F.3d 20, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (the preferred course when agency affidavits are inadequate is to order the agency to submit a new declaration).

1 **CONCLUSION** 2 For all the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in defendant's memorandum and 3 reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment and its earlier response to the 4 5 Court's Order, the Court should grant summary judgment for defendant. 6 Dated: May 23, 2013 Respectfully submitted, 7 STUART F. DELERY 8 Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General 9 MELINDA HAAG United States Attorney 10 11 ELIZABETH J. SHAPIRO Deputy Director, Federal Programs Branch 12 /s/ Steven Y. Bressler_ 13 STEVEN Y. BRESSLER D.C. Bar #482492 14 Senior Counsel U.S. Department of Justice 15 Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch P.O. Box 883 16 Washington, D.C. 20044 17 Telephone: (202) 305-0167 Facsimile: (202) 616-8470 18 Steven.Bressler@usdoj.gov 19 Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28