



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

January 12, 2009

Ms. Marcia Hofmann
Staff Attorney
Electronic Frontier Foundation
454 Shotwell Street
San Francisco, CA 94110

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request F2008-000156

Dear Ms. Hofmann:

This is in further response to your February 25, 2008, request for information that you sent to the US Department of Energy (DOE), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. You asked for all reports submitted since January 1, 2001, by DOE to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) pursuant to Section 2.4 of Executive Order 12863.

In a letter dated August 22, 2008, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) informed you that we had identified 30 documents responsive to your request. We also informed you that these documents were the property of the IOB and were transferred to the IOB for a release determination and a direct response to you.

However, on November 10, 2008, the IOB referred the responsive documents back to the DOE OIG for final processing. The OIG has completed its review of the responsive documents and a determination concerning their release has been made pursuant to the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552. The enclosed documents are released in their entirety.

You may challenge the adequacy of this search for responsive documents by submitting a written appeal to the Director, Office of Hearings and Appeals, HG-1/L'Enfant Plaza Building, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue S.W., Washington, DC 20585-1615. You should submit the appeal within 30 calendar days of receipt of this determination.

The written appeal, including the envelope, must clearly indicate that FOIA appeal is being made. The appeal must contain all the elements required by Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 1004.8 to the extent applicable. Judicial review will



thereafter be available to you (1) in the district where you reside, (2) where you have your principal place of business, (3) where the DOE records are situated or (4) in the District of Columbia.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Elise Ennis".

Elise Ennis
Assistant Inspector General
for Inspections and Special Inquiries
Office of Inspector General

Enclosures

Document Number 1



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Release

January 16, 2001

The Honorable Warren B. Rudman
Acting Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 340, Old Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Senator Rudman:

Pursuant to the responsibilities of the Inspector General stated in Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," I am reporting for the period July 1, 2000, through September 30, 2000. The following occurred during the reporting period.

The Manager of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Nevada Operations Office reported that a Nevada Test Site (NTS) tenant organization authorized the presence of an Intelligence Community collection team on the NTS without proper coordination with the Nevada Intelligence Center Field Intelligence Element (FIE). It was further reported that selected non-field intelligence employees of a DOE Management and Operating contractor have conducted intelligence and intelligence-related activities on the NTS without proper coordination with the Nevada Intelligence Center FIE. According to the Manager, the Nevada Intelligence Center will conduct mandatory training for NTS tenant organizations to ensure that prior coordination of intelligence activities occurs and will monitor tenant organizations to ensure prior coordination occurs.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 2



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Release

March 22, 2001

The Honorable Warren B. Rudman
Acting Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 340, Old Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Senator Rudman:

Pursuant to the responsibilities of the Inspector General stated in Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," I am reporting for the period October 1, 2000, through December 31, 2000. During this period, no new Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Greg Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 3



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

June 19, 2001

Release

The Honorable Warren B. Rudman
Acting Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 340, Old Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Senator Rudman:

Pursuant to the responsibilities of the Inspector General stated in Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," I am reporting for the period January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2001. During this period, no new Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Greg Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 4



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Release

August 21, 2001

The Honorable Warren B. Rudman
Acting Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 340, Old Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Senator Rudman:

Pursuant to the responsibilities of the Inspector General stated in Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," I am reporting for the period April 1, 2001, through June 30, 2001. During this period, no new Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Greg Friedman", is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 5



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

December 17, 2001

Release

The Honorable Warren B. Rudman
Acting Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 340, Old Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Senator Rudman:

Pursuant to the responsibilities of the Inspector General stated in Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," I am reporting for the period July 1, 2001, through September 30, 2001. During this period, no new Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Gregory H. Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 6



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

March 15, 2002

Release

General Brent Scowcroft
Acting Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear General Scowcroft:

Pursuant to the responsibilities of the Inspector General stated in Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," I am reporting for the period October 1, 2001, through December 31, 2001. During this period, no new Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Greg Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 7



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Release

June 17, 2002

General Brent Scowcroft
Acting Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear General Scowcroft:

Pursuant to the responsibilities of the Inspector General stated in Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," I am reporting for the period January 1, 2002, through March 31, 2002. During this period, no new Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gregory H. Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 8



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

September 6, 2002

Release

General Brent Scowcroft
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502


Dear General Scowcroft:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 2002, April 1, 2002, through June 30, 2002, no Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,


Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 9



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Release

December 4, 2002

General Brent Scowcroft
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear General Scowcroft:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2002, July 1, 2002, through September 30, 2002, no Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Gregory H. Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 10



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

February 12, 2003

Release

General Brent Scowcroft
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502


Dear General Scowcroft:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the First Quarter, Fiscal Year 2003, October 1, 2002, through December 31, 2002, no Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,


Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 11



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Release

May 7, 2003

General Brent Scowcroft
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear General Scowcroft:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 2003, January 1, 2003, through March 31, 2003, no Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Greg Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 12



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

August 27, 2003

Release

General Brent Scowcroft
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear General Scowcroft:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 2003, April 1, 2003, through June 30, 2003, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Greg Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 13



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

November 19, 2003

Release

General Brent Scowcroft
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear General Scowcroft:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2003, July 1, 2003, through September 30, 2003, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Gregory H. Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

bcc: General Counsel

Document Number 14



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

March 22, 2004

Release

General Brent Scowcroft
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502


Dear General Scowcroft:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the First Quarter, Fiscal Year 2004, October 1, 2003, through December 31, 2003, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,


Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



bcc: General Counsel

Document Number 15



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

May 19, 2004

Release

General Brent Scowcroft
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear General Scowcroft:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 2004, January 1, 2004, through March 31, 2004, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gregory H. Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

bcc: General Counsel

Document Number 16



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Release

August 11, 2004

General Brent Scowcroft
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear General Scowcroft:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 2004, April 1, 2004, through June 30, 2004, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance..

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Greg Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General



Document Number 17



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

December 22, 2004

Release

General Brent Scowcroft
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 494, Eisenhower Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear General Scowcroft:

Executive Order 12963, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The following is the report on DOE and NNSA intelligence activities for the Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2004, July 1, 2004, through September 30, 2004, that the Inspector General has reason to believe was contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

No DOE or NNSA entity reported any intelligence activity for the Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2004, that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

During the reporting period, the Inspector General received information that DOE Office of Counterintelligence employees may have collected and retained financial information regarding individuals being examined under the Counterintelligence polygraph program. We have initiated a review of this matter to determine the validity of the information and to determine, if accurate, whether the collection and retention of such information was a violation of law or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive. We will keep you informed on the status of our review.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: General Counsel



Document Number 18



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Release

March 24, 2005

The Honorable James Langdon
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. Langdon:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). For the First Quarter, Fiscal Year 2005, October 1, 2004, through December 31, 2004, no DOE or NNSA intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Additionally, as reported in our letter to the Intelligence Oversight Board dated December 22, 2004, we initiated a review to determine if DOE Office of Counterintelligence employees may have collected and retained financial information regarding individuals being examined under the Counterintelligence polygraph program and, if so, whether this was a violation of law or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive. We will keep you informed on the status of the review.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: General Counsel



Document Number 19



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Release

June 28, 2005

The Honorable James Langdon
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 2005; S05IS023)

Dear Chairman Langdon:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). For the Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 2005, January 1, 2005, through March 31, 2005, no DOE or NNSA intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Additionally, as reported in our letter to the Intelligence Oversight Board dated March 24, 2005, we initiated a review to determine if DOE Office of Counterintelligence employees may have collected and retained financial information regarding individuals being examined under the Counterintelligence polygraph program and, if so, whether this was a violation of law or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive. This review is ongoing, and we will inform you when we have completed our review.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we may provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Greg Friedman".

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: General Counsel

Document Number 20



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

September 23, 2005

Release

The Honorable James Langdon
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 2005; S05IS032)

Dear Mr. Langdon:

Executive Order (E.O.) 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). For the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 2005, April 1, 2005, through June 30, 2005, no DOE or NNSA intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to E.O. or Presidential directive.

We previously reported that we had initiated a review to determine if DOE Office of Counterintelligence (CN) officials collected and retained financial information on individuals being examined under CN's polygraph program and, if so, whether this was a violation of E.O. We have completed our review. We determined that CN officials collected and retained financial information on the individuals without a foreign nexus, which may have been a violation of E.O. 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities." Although CN ceased these collection activities about July 2004, CN retained the information. In response to our review, the DOE General Counsel will confer with CN to provide written guidance on information collection and retention requirements in E.O. 12333. We will provide you a copy of our report upon request.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the IOB, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the IOB. This report is not to be disseminated without the IOB's consent. Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: General Counsel

Document Number 21



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

December 20, 2005

Release

The Honorable Stephen Friedman
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2005; S05IS046)

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2005, July 1, 2005, through September 30, 2005, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential directive.

We received information that a contractor employee at an NNSA National Laboratory may have been granted access to sensitive compartmented information without completing all access requirements. Specifically, the individual may not have complied with the requirements in the "Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information" set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 6/4. We have this matter under review and will apprise you of the outcome.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: General Counsel



Document Number 22



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

March 13, 2006

The Honorable Stephen Friedman
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Release

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (First Quarter, Fiscal Year 2006; S06IS010)

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the First Quarter, Fiscal Year 2006, October 1, 2005, through December 31, 2005, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential directive.

We previously reported that a contractor official at an NNSA National Laboratory may have been granted access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI) without completing all access requirements. We completed our review and determined that Office of Intelligence officials did not comply with the documentation requirements set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 6/4 when they granted this individual SCI access. The Intelligence Director indicated that his office made an independent verification that allowed this individual to have SCI access. However, his office did not ensure that the NNSA Service Center, which was processing the access request, received the required documentation. In response to our review, the Intelligence Director stated that when his office grants SCI access based upon its independent verification, his office will ensure that the NNSA Service Center receives copies of all required documentation. We will provide you a copy of our report upon request.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

Document Number 23



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
June 29, 2006

Release

The Honorable Stephen Friedman
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 2006; S06IS022)

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 2006, January 1, 2006, through March 31, 2006, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential directive.

We understand that by letter dated June 22, 2006, the Office of General Counsel advised you that the Department, with the concurrence of the Office of National Intelligence, has combined the Office of Intelligence and the Office of Counterintelligence under the Department's Senior Intelligence Officer. You were also advised that the Secretary submitted proposed legislation to amend the National Nuclear Security Administration Act to abolish the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to allow consolidation of all Departmental counterintelligence functions.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: General Counsel



Document Number 24



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

August 8, 2006

Release

The Honorable Stephen Friedman
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 2006; S06IS036)

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 2006, April 1, 2006, through June 30, 2006, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: General Counsel

Document Number 25



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
December 11, 2006

Release

The Honorable Stephen Friedman
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2006; S06IS044))

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2006, July 1, 2006, through September 30, 2006, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: General Counsel
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board



Document Number 26



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

March 30, 2007

The Honorable Stephen Friedman
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Release

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (First Quarter, Fiscal Year 2007; S07IS008)

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the First Quarter, Fiscal Year 2007, October 1, 2006, through December 31, 2006, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential directive.

Based upon recent discussions that we had with Ms. Darlene Connelly of your office, I have enclosed a copy of a report that we issued on March 28, 2007, regarding "Internal Controls Over Computer Property at the Department's Counterintelligence Directorate." Most significantly, the report finds that the Counterintelligence Directorate at the Department of Energy could not locate 20 desktop computers listed on its property inventory that either processed or may have processed classified information. Please contact us if you want any further information on this matter.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, this quarterly report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

Enclosure

cc: General Counsel






Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

March 28, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM:


Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

SUBJECT:

INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "Internal Controls Over Computer Property at the Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Directorate"

BACKGROUND

The Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Directorate, which is part of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, is responsible for protecting Departmental sensitive data and operations against espionage or other intelligence activities by foreign entities. In support of its mission, Counterintelligence maintained an extensive inventory of computer processing equipment. The objective of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of internal controls over computers and related property entrusted to the Counterintelligence Directorate's Headquarters program office.

RESULTS OF INSPECTION

Despite expending significant effort, the Counterintelligence Directorate was unable to locate 20 desktop computers which were part of its documented property inventory. While any loss of a computer is troubling, this situation was compounded by the fact that at least 14 of the computers were known to have processed classified information. The remaining six computers may have been used to process such data. Further, the inventory records were so imprecise and inaccurate that the Directorate had to resort to extraordinary means to locate an additional 125 computers. Those computers should have been readily accessible, had property record keeping been current and complete. Based on these findings, we concluded that Counterintelligence was unable to assure that the computers for which it is accountable, and, the often highly sensitive and/or classified information they processed, were appropriately controlled or were adequately safeguarded from loss and theft.

In addition, we found that:

1. Fifty-seven computers were not included on the Counterintelligence Directorate's property inventory, as required by the Department's Property Management Standards;
2. The Counterintelligence Directorate had expired loan agreements for 96 Headquarters computers that were located at its field sites; and,



3. Labels indicating the classification level of individual computers were not affixed to 74 of the Counterintelligence Directorate's computers, as required.

Problems with the control and accountability of desktop and laptop computers have plagued the Department for a number of years. As we found in several recent reviews, strict property management procedures need to be consistently applied to ensure the control of sensitive property, such as computers. Moreover, a robust program of review and evaluation needs to be in place to assure that all computers and computer-related resources are accounted for and controlled. It was apparent that the Counterintelligence Directorate did not have procedures and processes in place to achieve this objective.

The report included a series of recommendations to address and resolve these issues. We recommended, as well, that, consistent with Department policy, management report to the Office of Security Operations all the computer property items that had not been located. The primary purpose of this notification is to initiate an inquiry to determine if the computers were lost or stolen and to ensure appropriate follow-up activities. The Counterintelligence Directorate believed, but could not confirm, that the computers had been exsessed at some point in time. The Directorate did not report these items to Security Operations as lost or stolen until after we conducted our inspection.

MANAGEMENT REACTION

Management agreed with our recommendations. However, because the comments did not include planned corrective actions with target completion dates, a Management Decision is required. Management's comments are provided in their entirety in Appendix B of the report.

Attachment

cc: Deputy Secretary
Acting Under Secretary of Energy
Under Secretary for Science
Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Chief of Staff
Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Director, Office of Management
Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer
Director, Office of Internal Review (CF-1.2)
Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management (NA-66)



U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Inspector General
Office of Inspections and Special Inquiries

Inspection Report

Internal Controls Over Computer
Property at the Department's
Counterintelligence Directorate

DOE/IG-0762

March 2007

INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER COMPUTER PROPERTY AT THE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

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Overview

INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE

The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence conducts technical analyses of foreign intelligence for the Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the United States Intelligence Community. The Counterintelligence Directorate (CN), which is part of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, is responsible for protecting DOE information against espionage or other intelligence activities by foreign entities. In support of this mission, CN procures and maintains computer processing equipment such as desktop computers, laptop computers, and computer servers. DOE considers computer property to be "sensitive property," which is required to have specific controls in place. The objective of this inspection was to determine the adequacy of internal controls over computer property maintained by the CN Headquarters program office.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has issued several reports relating to accountability and internal controls over sensitive property. These reports are listed in Appendix B. In March 2006, we issued a report entitled "Internal Controls Over Sensitive Property in the Office of Intelligence," DOE/IG-0722. Officials with the Office of Intelligence informed us that they had improved their property accountability system subsequent to our review. At the time of that review, the Office of Intelligence was separate from what was then called the Office of Counterintelligence. In March 2006, the two offices were consolidated into the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. We have been informed that CN's sensitive property will be consolidated into the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence's property accountability system in the near future.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Internal controls over classified and unclassified computer property at CN were inadequate. Specifically, CN could not locate 20 desktop computers listed on its property inventory that either processed or may have processed classified information. We identified control weaknesses that further undermined confidence in CN's ability to assure that its computers and the information they contain were appropriately controlled; were adequately safeguarded from loss and theft; and, were controlled in accordance with existing security requirements.

We further noted that:

- Fifty-seven computers were not included on CN's property inventory, as required by DOE's Property Management Standards;
- CN had expired loan agreements for 96 Headquarters computers that were located at CN field sites; and,
- Labels indicating the classification level of individual computers were not affixed to 74 CN computers, as required.

Concerns about the complex-wide system of computer controls and accountability have plagued the Department for a number of years. As we found in several recent OIG reviews, strict property procedures need to be consistently applied to classified and unclassified computers and a robust program of review and evaluation needs to be in place to assure that all computer resources are accounted for and controlled. It was apparent that CN did not have procedures in place to achieve this objective. Considering the sensitivity of the data regularly processed in CN, the shortcomings identified during our review were of major concern.

Details of Findings

PROPERTY NOT LOCATED

We found that CN could not locate 20 desktop computers listed on its property inventory that either processed or may have processed classified information.

During our initial inventory of 618 computers assigned to CN Headquarters, CN was unable to locate 241 computers. Subsequently, CN located all but 20 of these items. CN indicated that 14 of these 20 computers processed classified information at the Secret level and the remaining 6 could have processed classified information. CN concluded it could not find the 20 computers or find appropriate documents that addressed their ultimate disposition.

A "Retirement Work Order" (RWO) was used to remove lost, stolen, or damaged items from an office's inventory. Following inquiries by the OIG, CN submitted RWOs for these 20 computers to the DOE Office of Management, which maintains the database of CN sensitive property at Headquarters. The RWOs for all 20 items indicated that CN believed that these items were excessed at some point in time. For example, there was evidence that at least 2 items were possibly excessed in 2002, although CN did not have confirmatory documentation regarding the disposition of these or any of the 20 computers.

We also noted an anomaly with the RWOs. CN listed one computer on a January 11, 2007, RWO as being excessed at a CN field location, despite the fact that the OIG located the computer in question at CN Headquarters in late December 2006. Once notified that the OIG had previously located this computer, CN conducted a search for the unit and located it in late January 2007. On January 30, 2007, CN informed the Office of Management it had "erroneously" listed this computer on the recent RWO document. We learned that the computer was placed back into CN's inventory.

DOE Manual 470.4-1, "Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management," specifies that any suspected or confirmed loss of classified matter by any "medium, method, or action" be reported as a security incident. Additionally, the DOE Headquarters Personal Property and Supply Management Operating Procedures states that a program office's Accountable Property Representative must report all stolen, lost or damaged property to the Office of Security Operations.

Not until after our inquiries did CN report 11 of these items to the DOE Office of Security Operations. Further, CN took the position

that the remaining nine computers did not need to be similarly reported because CN believed they were excessed by the field sites to which the computers had been loaned. An Office of Security official advised us that the circumstances represented by these nine items is a “gray area” in the reporting requirements and that it is at the discretion of the program office whether to report the items.

We noted that one of the computers reported to the Office of Security Operations as missing was the one that the OIG located in December 2006. As indicated above, this item was listed on an RWO and then later returned to the CN inventory. We also noted that although labeled as an unclassified computer when located by the OIG in December 2006, CN informed the Office of Security Operations that it had processed information at the Secret level.

We believe that because of the potential security implications and the fact that CN does not have definitive information as to the disposition of these items, it should report the circumstances regarding the remaining nine computers to the Office of Security Operations to determine whether an actual loss or theft had taken place.

**PROPERTY
NOT IN INVENTORY**

We found that 57 computers were not included on CN’s property inventory, as required by DOE’s Property Management Standards. DOE Property Management Standards, found in 41 Code of Federal Regulations Part 109, specifies that all sensitive property, including computer property, be controlled and inventoried annually.

During our initial inventory of CN computers, we physically identified 45 that were not in CN’s inventory. We determined that 14 of these 45 computers were from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and were sent to CN Headquarters at various times during the past four years. During our attempts to determine why the PNNL computers were not in CN’s inventory, we also learned that there were 12 additional PNNL computers that had been sent to CN Headquarters without having been entered into CN’s inventory. We determined that these computers had been transferred to another DOE program office during the past two years without proper transfer or accountability documentation. Additionally, we found paperwork that indicated another PNNL computer may have been sent to CN Headquarters. CN informed us that it had no evidence that the computer was ever received or utilized by CN Headquarters. We were unable to resolve this inconsistency.

**EXPIRED LOAN
DOCUMENTATION**

We found that CN had expired loan agreements for 96 Headquarters computers that were located at CN field sites. We determined that 96 of the 241 items that we were unable to locate during our initial inventory were on loan to CN field sites. A loan agreement, which is to be generated by the organization transferring an item to another organization for a maximum of one year, had been prepared for the 96 computers as required. However, the loan agreements had expired in June and July 2006. Following inquiries from the OIG, CN generated new loan agreements for all but ten of these items. Regarding the remaining ten computers, CN disposed of eight of the computers and it advised us that new loan agreements are currently being prepared for the last two.

**COMPUTERS NOT
PROPERLY LABELED**

We found that labels indicating the classification level of individual computers were not affixed to 74 CN computers, as required. Because CN maintains unclassified and classified computers in its offices, CN's Master Security Plan requires that all hardware be properly labeled as processing Unclassified, Confidential, or Secret information, as appropriate. Although not mentioned in the CN Master Security Plan, CN said that Top Secret computers also need to have labels.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the sensitivity of the data regularly processed in CN and the shortcomings identified above, we recommend that the Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence ensure that:

1. Internal controls over Counterintelligence Directorate computer property are strengthened so that it is accounted for in a timely manner;
2. All items previously reported to the Office of Management on Retirement Work Orders are appropriately reported to the Office of Security Operations; and
3. All computer equipment assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate is appropriately marked as processing Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret information.

**MANAGEMENT
COMMENTS**

In comments on our draft report, management agreed with the recommendations. Management's comments are included in their entirety at Appendix C.

**INSPECTOR
COMMENTS**

We found management's comments to be responsive to our recommendations. However, because the comments did not provide an implementation plan with target dates for each recommendation, a management decision is required.

Appendix A

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This review included interviews with Federal and contractor officials with the DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence and the DOE Office of Management. We reviewed applicable policies and procedures pertaining to the management of computer property. We obtained CN's inventory listing from the Office of Management, which conducted an inventory of all CN property in 2006. We used this inventory listing as a baseline to conduct our inventory and evaluate CN's internal controls over computer property. We conducted a physical inventory of all CN computer property at Headquarters locations in Washington, DC, and Germantown, MD.

Also, pursuant to the "Government Performance and Results Act of 1993," we examined performance measurement processes as they related to computer property.

This inspection was conducted in accordance with "Quality Standards for Inspections" issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.

Appendix B

Prior Sensitive Property Reports

- “Excessing of Computers Used for Unclassified Controlled Information at the Idaho National Laboratory,” DOE/IG-0757, February 2007;
- “Destruction of Classified Hard Drives at Sandia National Laboratory-New Mexico,” DOE/IG-0735, August 2006;
- “Internal Controls for Excessing and Surplusing Unclassified Computers at Los Alamos National Laboratory,” DOE/IG-0734, July 2006;
- “Internal Controls Over Sensitive Property in the Office of Intelligence,” DOE/IG-0722, March 2006;
- “Control and Accountability of Emergency Communication Network Equipment,” DOE/IG-0663, September 2004;
- “Internal Controls Over the Accountability of Computers at Sandia National Laboratory, New Mexico,” DOE/IG-0660, August 2004;
- “Internal Controls Over Personal Computers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory,” DOE/IG-0656, August 2004;
- “Internal Controls Over Classified Computers and Classified Removable Media at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,” DOE/IG-0628, December 2003;
- “Internal Controls Over Laptop and Desktop Computers at the Savannah River Site,” INS-L-03-09, July 2003;
- “Management of Sensitive Equipment at Selected Locations,” DOE/IG-0606, June 2003;
- “Inspection of Internal Controls Over Personal Computers at Los Alamos National Laboratory,” DOE/IG-0597, April 2003; and
- “Operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory,” DOE/IG-0584, January 2003.


Appendix C



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

March 15, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTOPHER R. SHARPLEY
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL for
INVESTIGATIONS AND INSPECTIONS

FROM: 
STANLEY J. BORCIA
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Draft Report on "Internal Controls Over Computer Property
at the Department's Counterintelligence Directorate"
(S061S027)


The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence has reviewed the draft report, *Internal Controls Over Computer Property at the Department's Counterintelligence Directorate* and agrees overall with the facts presented, the conclusions reached, and the recommendations addressed in the draft report.

The three recommendations listed in the report are: 1) that internal controls over Counterintelligence Directorate computer property are strengthened so that it is accounted for in a timely manner; 2) all items previously reported to the Office of Management on Retirement Work Orders are appropriately reported to the Office of Security Operations; and 3) all computer equipment assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate is appropriately marked as processing Unclassified, Confidential, Secret or Top Secret information.

As a result of the Inspector General's March 2006 report, *Internal Controls Over Sensitive Property in the Office of Intelligence* (also referenced in the subject report), the now-merged Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence instituted multiple measures to help strengthen its control of accountable property. These measures include the creation of a position for which the principal responsibility is property accountability, and the implementation of policies that require each piece of property be assigned to a specific user in a specific location and that requires the immediate report of the relocation of any accountable property item.

This Office would, however, like to address the following:

It is acknowledged that Retirement Work Orders (RWO) were submitted for 20 computers. However, since documentation exists, albeit not necessarily the proper documentation, that 9 of those 20 were excessed, or, turned in, by CN or Departmental



Appendix C

Field Sites, this Office believes those items should not be considered as missing and did not feel that a report to the Office of Security was necessary. The Office of Management requested that RWOs be submitted for those items so that they could be correctly removed from Department of Energy Headquarters' inventory, not because they were missing. This Office will, nonetheless, notify the Office of Health, Safety and Security regarding these items.

It should also be mentioned that 9 of the 11 computers that were RWO'd and subsequently submitted to security by this Office were legacy items that were procured and in some cases replaced before 2004, the year that CN implemented an automated tracking system for its computers systems and related equipment.

In closing, the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence would like to convey its appreciation for the professionalism of your Office during both computer property inspections over the past two years. We have found your inspectors to be fair and patient with our staff and very helpful in highlighting areas where our property accountability practices needed improvement.

cc: Rolf Mowatt-Larssen

CUSTOMER RESPONSE FORM

The Office of Inspector General has a continuing interest in improving the usefulness of its products. We wish to make our reports as responsive as possible to our customers' requirements, and, therefore, ask that you consider sharing your thoughts with us. On the back of this form, you may suggest improvements to enhance the effectiveness of future reports. Please include answers to the following questions if they are applicable to you:

1. What additional background information about the selection, scheduling, scope, or procedures of the inspection would have been helpful to the reader in understanding this report?
2. What additional information related to findings and recommendations could have been included in the report to assist management in implementing corrective actions?
3. What format, stylistic, or organizational changes might have made this report's overall message clearer to the reader?
4. What additional actions could the Office of Inspector General have taken on the issues discussed in this report which would have been helpful?
5. Please include your name and telephone number so that we may contact you should we have any questions about your comments.

Name _____ Date _____

Telephone _____ Organization _____

When you have completed this form, you may telefax it to the Office of Inspector General at (202) 586-0948, or you may mail it to:

Office of Inspector General (IG-1)
Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

ATTN: Customer Relations

If you wish to discuss this report or your comments with a staff member of the Office of Inspector General, please contact Judy Garland Smith at (202) 586-7828.

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<http://www.ig.energy.gov>

Your comments would be appreciated and can be provided on the Customer Response Form attached to the report.

Document Number 27



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

April 27, 2007

Release

The Honorable Stephen Friedman
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Quarterly Report, January-March 2007; S07IS016)

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the period January 1, 2007, through March 31, 2007, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the Intelligence Oversight Board, this quarterly report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent. Based upon the recent changes to Intelligence Oversight Board reporting criteria, we are providing a copy of this report to the Director of National Intelligence.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: Director of National Intelligence
General Counsel, Intelligence Oversight Board



Document Number 28



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

July 26, 2007

Release

The Honorable Stephen Friedman
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Quarterly Report, April-June 2007; S07IS022)

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the period April 1, 2007, through June 30, 2007, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

Recently, there was media coverage regarding a security incident at the East Tennessee Technology Park. The incident was handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and not by agents at this office. As such, we will not be reporting on this matter.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the Intelligence Oversight Board, this quarterly report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent. Based upon the recent changes to Intelligence Oversight Board reporting criteria, we are providing a copy of this report to the Director of National Intelligence.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: Director of National Intelligence
General Counsel, Intelligence Oversight Board



Document Number 29



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Release

November 1, 2007

The Honorable Stephen Friedman
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20503

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Quarterly Report, July-September 2007; S07IS032)

Dear Mr. Friedman:


Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy, including the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the period July 1, 2007, through September 30, 2007, no Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.

We were advised that the Department of Energy's Office of General Counsel also provides an independent quarterly intelligence report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, as required by Executive Order 12863. Please refer to the Office of General Counsel's report for reportable intelligence activities under its purview.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the Intelligence Oversight Board, this quarterly report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent. Based upon the recent changes to Intelligence Oversight Board reporting criteria, we are providing a copy of this report to the Director of National Intelligence.

Please contact me if we can provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,




Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: Director of National Intelligence
General Counsel, Intelligence Oversight Board



Document Number 30



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

February 4, 2008

Release

The Honorable Stephen Friedman
Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020, New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503

Re: Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Quarterly Report, October-December 2007;
S08IS003)

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," requires the Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis to the Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities at the Department of Energy, including the National Nuclear Security Administration. For the period October 1, 2007, through December 31, 2007, no Department of Energy intelligence activity has come to my attention that I have reason to believe was unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive. However, we currently have a matter under review that involves the possible inappropriate collection of information by Department contractor counterintelligence personnel. We will advise you when we reach a conclusion in this matter.

We were informed that the Department of Energy's Office of the General Counsel also provides an independent quarterly intelligence report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, as required by Executive Order 12863. Please refer to the Office of the General Counsel's report for reportable intelligence activities under its purview.

Pursuant to guidance previously provided by the Intelligence Oversight Board, this quarterly report is not considered an agency record and is the property of the Board. This report is not to be disseminated without the Board's consent. Based upon the recent changes to Intelligence Oversight Board reporting criteria, we are providing a copy of this report to the Director of National Intelligence.

Please contact me if we may provide any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General

cc: Director of National Intelligence
General Counsel, Intelligence Oversight Board

