



~~SECRET//NOFORN//XI~~
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

S-0157/IG

29 May 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 31 March 2001

- References:
- a. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities."
 - b. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Components that Affect U.S. Persons."
 - c. (U) DIAR 60-4, "Procedures Governing DIA Intelligence Activities That Affect U.S. Persons."
 - d. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities."
 - e. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board."

(U) As required by references above, the Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Defense Intelligence Agency for the period 1 January through 31 March 2001 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General at [redacted].

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

1 Enclosure
Quarterly Intelligence Oversight
Report, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 01
(S//NF), 1 cy

Thomas R. Wilson
THOMAS R. WILSON
Vice Admiral, USN
Director

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

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(U) QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

1 January through 31 March 2001

1. (U) The Office of the Inspector General (IG) conducted the following intelligence oversight (IO) activities:

a. (U) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) message 231449Z MAR 01, subject IG IO Brief 2-01, (enclosure 1) was dispatched to all DIA field elements.

b. (U) The IO Coordinating Committee held its quarterly meeting on 12 January 2001.

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG provided briefings on its role and the application of IO in a [redacted] on 5 February 2001 and to the [redacted] on 19 March 2001. (b)(1), 1.4 (c), 1.4 (d)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

e. (U//FOUO) IG and General Counsel (GC) conducted IO training for employees of the [redacted] on 10 January 2001. (b)(3):10 USC 424

f. (U//FOUO) IG conducted an IO inspection of [redacted]. Both organizations were performing their operational activities in a satisfactory manner and were in compliance with IO procedures. There were no findings.

g. (U//FOUO) IG conducted a follow-up IO inspection at [redacted] based on deficiencies noted in a general inspection conducted during the 1st quarter, fiscal year 2001. The follow up inspection found that corrective actions had been taken to train assigned personnel. No questionable activities were found.

h. (U//FOUO) IG conducted general inspections of the [redacted]. Minor IO deficiencies were identified at three locations, which were corrected through training. No questionable activities were found.

Derived From: DHS SCG
Declassify On: X1
Date of Source: October 1997

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i. (S//NF) IG memorandum S-0073/IG, 12 March 2001, subject: Possible Violation of Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that a civilian assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence Operations (DO) may have violated Procedure 15 through the unauthorized funding of a federal law enforcement project. An IO investigation has been initiated. (IG Project No. 01-1935-MA-056)

j. (S//NF) IG memorandum S-0045/IG, 8 February 2000, subject: Possible Violation of Executive Order (E.O. 12333) and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that an [redacted] may have violated DIA procedures through the [redacted]. An IO investigation has been initiated. (IG Project No. 01-1934-MA-056)

(b)(1),(b)(3):1
0 USC
424,1.4 (c)

k. (U//FOUO) IG memorandum U-0444/IG, 7 December 2000, subject: Possible Violation of Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that a civilian assigned to the Directorate for Analysis and Production (DI) may have violated [redacted]. An IO investigation found that the subject had not violated IO procedures. A report of investigation was published on 6 March 2001; the DIA case is closed. (IG Project No. 01-1923-MA-056)

(b)(2),(b)(6)

l. (S//NF) IG memorandum S-0441/IG, 17 November 2000, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that a [redacted] may have violated Procedure 15 through failure to identify himself to a U.S. person. An IO investigation has been initiated. No change from last report. (IG Project No. 01-1922-MA-056)

(b)(1),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

m. (S//NF) IG memorandum S-0429/IG, 17 November 2000, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that the [redacted] Directorate for Information Systems and Services (DS), may have violated Procedure 12 through the unauthorized provision of intelligence support to a federal law enforcement agency. An IO investigation has been initiated. No change from last report. (IG Project No. 01-1919-MA-056)

(b)(3):10
USC 424

n. (S//NF) [redacted] and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(3):1
0 USC
424,(b)(3):50
USC 403,1.4

o. (S//NF) IG memorandum S-0178/IG, 26 April 2000, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that an [redacted] may have violated Procedure 15 by failing to forward an allegation of IO violations to the IG. An IO investigation is in progress. No change since last report. (IG Project No. 00-1891-MA-056)

(c)
(b)(1),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

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d. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403,1.4 (c)

q. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum S-0102/IG, 17 March 2000, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that an [redacted] may have violated [redacted]

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

The [redacted] has the matter under investigation in concert with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the [redacted]

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

The subject has been returned to his parent service and the investigation continues. (IG Project No. 00-1884-MA-056)

r. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum C-0029/IG, 28 January 2000, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that an [redacted] have violated [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

The subject officer has been returned to service and the results of our preliminary investigation have been provided to the [redacted]. The case remains open pending response from the [redacted] (IG Project No. 00-5060-MA-056)

(b)(2)

s. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum S-0421/IG, 4 November 1999, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that [redacted] may have violated [redacted] in connection with [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424

The matter has been referred to the IG investigations unit. No change since last report. (IG Project No. 00-1864-MA-056)

t. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403,1.4 (c)

u. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum S-0344/IG, 13 September 1999, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

[redacted] may have violated Procedures 12 and 15 through the unauthorized collection of law enforcement information and the possible compromise of operational activities. [redacted] has opened an investigation into the security issues and is cooperating with the IG on the IO issues. No change since last report. (IG Project No. 99-1854-MA-056)

v. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC
424,(b)(3) 50
USC 403,1.4 (c)

w. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum U-0022/IG, 26 January 1998, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that [redacted] might have resulted in questionable activities. The IG initiated an investigation and the Department of Justice (DoJ) has accepted the case for prosecution. No change from last report. (IG Project No. 98-1731-HQ-056)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

x. ~~(S)~~ IG memorandum S-0412/IGH, 11 August 1997, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R reported that a civilian [redacted] violated Procedure 15 through questionable activities in connection with [redacted]. The IG investigations unit completed its investigation and referred the case to DoJ for prosecution. The subject entered a plea of guilty and has been sentenced. The investigation remains open pending receipt of final case documentation from DoJ. (IG Project No. 97-4695-OI-050)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,1.4 (c)

y. ~~(S)~~ An investigation into criminal misconduct by several current and former DIA personnel continues as reported in IG memorandum U-7641-95/IGI, 3 October 1995, subject: Referral of Allegation Against [redacted]. Agencies involved in the investigation are the Defense Criminal Investigative Service; the U.S. Customs Service under the supervision of the Eastern District of Virginia, DoJ; and the Program Integrity Office, DoD IG. The investigation is still in progress. No change from last report. (IG Project No. 96-4289-OI-064)

(b)(2),(b)(6)

2. (U) Within GC [redacted] attorneys, a secretary, a staff assistant, and a paralegal specialist review GC files on a continuing basis as they are used in day-to-day operations. All files are reviewed for regulatory compliance when they are periodically considered for destruction, retention, or storage. The following specific actions were taken:

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

a. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Three attorneys reviewed ongoing [redacted] to assure compliance with oversight responsibilities. One attorney assures compliance for other DIA elements.

(b)(2)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ GC lectured at the Military Officer Familiarization Course and the [redacted] regarding legal aspects of intelligence; presented IO tutorials at the [redacted] made a presentation to [redacted] and made an IO presentation to a [redacted] visiting [redacted]. An attorney taught IO implications at the [redacted] IO reviews and consultations were conducted in support of DIA headquarters elements and [redacted] personnel.

(b)(3):10
USC 424
(b)(1),1.4
(c),1.4 (c)
(b)(1),(b)(2),1.4 (c)

c. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Two attorneys addressed [redacted]

(b)(2)

d. (U//FOUO) GC reported no incidents of criminal activity to DoJ during the quarter.


3. (U) The Directorate for Administration was involved in the following oversight activities:

a. (U) IO reviews were conducted in each of the major elements to ensure that prohibited material was not retained in files. During this quarter, [redacted] personnel reviewed IO procedures. Additionally, [redacted] students, [redacted] DIA and [redacted] non-DIA received IO instruction as part of the following [redacted] courses:

(b),(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

NUMBER COURSE



- National Intelligence Course
- Collection Management for Analysts Course
- Intelligence Collection Manager Course
- Sensitive Compartmented Information Control Officer Course
- Counterintelligence Special Course
- Defense Community Counterintelligence Course

b. (U) The Office for Procurement did not initiate any contract actions that fell under Procedure 11, DoD 5240.1-R, during this reporting period. There were no contracts which required contractor performance under DIAR 60-4.

c. (U) The Office for Human Resources briefed [redacted] new civilian and military employees. Each new employee was: 1) specifically informed in writing of the existence and importance of DIAR 60-4; 2) provided copies of the documents cited in paragraph 7.c.(2), DIAR 60-4; 3) advised to review DIAR 60-4 for information which may pertain to their specific duty assignments; and 4) informed of their responsibilities to report questionable activities to GC or IG.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

d. (U) [redacted] took immediate action to provide IO training to the uniformed guard force based on deficiencies noted in an ongoing IG evaluation of the organization.

4. (U//FOUO) The Directorate for Policy Support reviewed all files during the reporting period and found no prohibited material. Specific actions follow:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

a. (U//FOUO) The [redacted] conducted one [redacted] site close inspection, presented a [redacted] security briefing to the Director Military Intelligence Staff (DM), and prepared and submitted to the [redacted] program oversight committee an approval package for two new DIA programs. There was no [redacted] training bulletin for this quarter.

(b)(2)

b. (U//FOUO) A total of [redacted] personnel assigned to [redacted] received IO refresher training.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

5. (U) DI reported that [redacted] personnel assigned to its command element and the [redacted] [redacted] received refresher training. All DI organizations reviewed files during the quarter and no prohibited material was found.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

6. (U) The Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff, reported that [redacted] personnel received IO training during this quarter.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

7. (U) The Joint Military Intelligence College provided IO instruction to [redacted] personnel in its courses this quarter and [redacted] faculty members reviewed IO directives.

NUMBER COURSE

[redacted]

- The National Foreign Intelligence Community
- Espionage, Intelligence and International Politics
- National Security Structure and Policy
- Information Technologies in the Cyber Era
- Ethics of Intelligence
- Leadership, Management, and Coordination in the Intelligence Community

8. (S//NF) DO reported that [redacted] personnel received IO training and [redacted] were involved in files review for this quarter. Two prohibited documents were identified and corrective action was taken. In March, DO established an IO web page on the [redacted] which is accessible by headquarters personnel, [redacted] and other [redacted] of the [redacted]. In February, the DO IO officer participated with GC in training [redacted]. The [redacted] provided newcomer briefings to newly assigned personnel in accordance with DIAR 60-4.

(b)(1),1,4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC
424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

9. (U) The [redacted] reported that [redacted] personnel and contractors received IO training during the quarter and [redacted] persons were involved in reviewing files for IO compliance.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

10. (U//FOUO) DS reported that [redacted] personnel reviewed IO procedures this quarter. The materials reviewed included E.O. 12333, DoD 5240.1-R, and DIAR 60-4. Additionally, the [redacted] issued its quarterly review of U.S. persons information contained in IIRs.

11. (U) The Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity Office did not conduct IO related training this quarter.

12. (U) The Office of the Comptroller reported that [redacted] persons participated in IO review this quarter.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

13. (U) The [redacted] reported that [redacted] personnel received IO training this quarter. Additionally, a file review was conducted, and no prohibited material was found.

14. (U) DM reported that [redacted] personnel participated in IO files review during this reporting period. Additionally, DM conducted a review of hardcopy and softcopy files to ensure compliance with IO regulations.


(b)(3):10
USC 424

15. (U) The [redacted] reviewed holdings for compliance. No violations were noted. Copies of IO regulations were disseminated to all subordinate offices.

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

16. ~~(C)~~ DIA management continued to emphasize the importance of personnel being familiar with IO regulations. A total of [redacted] personnel were reported to have received training in DIAR 60-4 and DoD 5240.1-R and/or reviewed files for IO content during the period 1 January through 31 March 2001.

1 Enclosure
DIA msg 231449Z MAR 01,
subject: IG Intelligence
Oversight Brief 2-01, (U), 1 cy



(b)(3):10
USC 424

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DTG: 231449Z MAR 01

PAGE 01 of 03

Drafter's Name :
Office/Phone :

[REDACTED]

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

Releaser's Info :

Action Prec : ROUTINE
Info Prec : ROUTINE
Specat :

From: DIA WASHINGTON DC//DIA-IG//
To:

[REDACTED]

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI/
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL/
USCINCTrans SCOTT AFB IL/
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL/
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO/

USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE/
USCINCSO MIAMI FL

CINCUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA/

Info: SAFE WASH DC

TEXT FOLLOWS

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SUBJ: IG INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BRIEF 2-01

1. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO ENSURE THAT ALL UNIT PERSONNEL ARE INFORMED OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE.

2. INTERNET POLICY CLARIFICATION: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GENERAL COUNSEL (DOD GC) ISSUED A MEMORANDUM, 6 FEB 01, THAT CLARIFIES PRINCIPLES GOVERNING

[REDACTED] THIS MEMORANDUM CLARIFIES CERTAIN POINTS REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) PROCEDURES TO THE INTERNET. HOWEVER, GUIDANCE IN THE MEMORANDUM DOES NOT PROVIDE A SUBSTITUTE FOR CONDUCTING A CASE BY CASE ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC ACTIONS. THE KEY PRINCIPLES ARE:

(b)(2)


A. IP ADDRESSES. AN IP ADDRESS IS A NUMERIC STRING THAT IDENTIFIES A HARDWARE CONNECTION ON A NETWORK. THIS STRING CONTAINS INFORMATION ABOUT THE OWNER, OPERATOR, OR USER OF THE HARDWARE

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UNCLASSIFIED

DTG: 231449Z MAR 01

PAGE 02 of 03



(b)(2)

D. AS IS THE CASE WITH ALL IO CONSIDERATIONS THE FIRST TEST IS

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DTG: 231449Z MAR 01

PAGE 03 of 03

MISSION AUTHORITY TO PERFORM THE COLLECTION FUNCTION. IF AN INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT PERFORMS A COLLECTION FUNCTION WITHOUT MISSION AUTHORITY THEN THAT, IN ITSELF, MAY CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF IO PROCEDURES.

3. NON-DIA INSPECTIONS: DIA COMPONENTS ARE COMMONLY VISITED BY INSPECTION TEAMS FROM SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AS DOD IG, UNIFIED COMMAND IG, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE IG, OR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT). DIAR 40-5, INSPECTOR GENERAL, ASSIGNS TO THE IG RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPRESENTING THE AGENCY AND COORDINATING IG ACTIVITIES WITH THE NON-DIA IG COMMUNITY.

A. FOR KEY COMPONENTS: NON-DIA INSPECTION ORGANIZATIONS ENTER THE AGENCY THROUGH THE [REDACTED] WHICH WILL NOTIFY APPROPRIATE STAFF ORGANIZATIONS.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

B. FOR [REDACTED] SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATING NON-DIA INSPECTIONS OF [REDACTED] ARE CONTAINED IN DIAM 100-1 FOR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM AND IN DIAM 100-2 FOR NON-EMBASSY BASED [REDACTED] ELEMENTS. NON DIA INSPECTORS ENTER THE AGENCY AT THE OFFICE OF THE IG, WHICH WILL, IN TURN, INITIATE THE NECESSARY TASKING FOR DIA SUPPORT. REQUESTS FOR DIA DOCUMENTS AND/OR REPORTS SHOULD BE MADE BY THE NON-DIA INSPECTORS TO THE IG, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS. PROVISION OF DOCUMENTS BY A [REDACTED] ELEMENT DIRECTLY TO A NON-DIA INSPECTOR IS NOT AUTHORIZED. ADDITIONALLY, [REDACTED] ELEMENTS ARE INSTRUCTED TO FORWARD AFTER-ACTION REPORTS OF NON-DIA INSPECTIONS THROUGH THE IG TO [REDACTED] MANAGEMENT. THESE AFTER ACTION REPORTS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED NOT LATER THAN 72 HOURS AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE INSPECTION.

(b)(2)

4. OTHER IG ISSUE: THE IG CURRENTLY HAS AN [REDACTED] VACANCY IN THE [REDACTED] IF ANY [REDACTED] ROTATING IN THE NEAR FUTURE ARE INTERESTED IN AN [REDACTED] OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE IN THE IG, PLEASE CONTACT [REDACTED]

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



S-0188/IG

3 June 2002

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence Oversight
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 31 March 2002

- References:
- a. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities"
 - b. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Components that Affect U.S. Persons"
 - c. (U) DIAR 60-4, "Procedures Governing DIA Intelligence Activities that Affect U.S. Persons"
 - d. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities"
 - e. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board"

(U) As required by references above, the Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Defense Intelligence Agency for the period 1 January through 31 March 2002 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General at [redacted].

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

1 enclosure
Quarterly Intelligence Oversight
Report, 1 Jan through 31 Mar 02
~~(S//NF)~~, 1 cy

Thomas R. Wilson
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director

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FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

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(U) QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

1 January through 31 March 2002

1. (U) The Office of the Inspector General (IG) conducted the following intelligence oversight (IO) activities:

b. (U) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) message 121600Z MAR 02, subject: IG IO Brief 2-02, (enclosure 1) was dispatched to all DIA field elements.

(b)(3):10 USC 424 c. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The IG conducted an inspection of [redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424
[redacted] No questionable activities were found.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) d. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

e. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum S-0112/IG, 13 March 2002, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that a [redacted] (b)(1),1.4 (c)
[redacted] may have conducted questionable activities by engaging in [redacted]
[redacted] A crimes report was filed with the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the IG investigations unit has opened a case on the issue. (IG Project No. 02-1985-MA-056)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) f. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum S-0069/IG, 15 February 2002, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that the [redacted] (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC
[redacted] may have violated [redacted]
[redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) message 121600Z MAR 02, subject: IG IO Brief 2-02
An IO investigation has been initiated. (IG Project No. 02-1977-MA-008) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

g. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum S-0276/IG, 27 July 2001, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that the [redacted] (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424
[redacted] may have violated [redacted]
[redacted] An IO investigation was initiated and field work commenced in November 2001. The project is ongoing. No change from last report. (IG Project No. 01-1954-MA-056)

Derived From: DHS SCG
Declassify On: X1
Date of Source: October 1997

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h. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum S-0073/IG, 12 March 2001, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that a civilian assigned to DO may have violated Procedure 15 through the unauthorized funding of a federal law enforcement project. An IO investigation has been initiated. No change from last report. (IG Project No. 01-1935-MA-056)

i. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum S-0429/IG, 17 November 2000, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that the [REDACTED] Directorate for Information Systems and Services (DS), may have violated Procedure 12 through the unauthorized provision of intelligence support to a federal law enforcement agency. An IO investigation has been initiated. No change from last report. (IG Project No. 01-1919-MA-056)

(b)(3):10
USC 424

j. ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC
424,(b)(3):50 USC
403,1.4 (c)

k. ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC
424,(b)(3):50
USC 403,1.4(c)

l. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum S-0102/IG, 17 March 2000, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that an [REDACTED] may have violated [REDACTED] Directorate for Information Systems and Services. The [REDACTED] has the matter under investigation in concert with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the [REDACTED]. The subject has been returned to his parent service and the investigation continues. No change since last report. (IG Project No. 00-1884-MA-056)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(2)
(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(2)

m. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum S-0421/IG, 4 November 1999, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that [REDACTED] may have violated [REDACTED] in connection with [REDACTED]. The matter has been referred to the IG investigations unit. No change since last report. (IG Project No. 00-1864-MA-056)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

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(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC
424,(b)(3):50
USC 403, 1.4 (c)

o. ~~(S//NF)~~ IG memorandum U-0022/IG, 26 January 1998, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, reported that a [Redacted] might have resulted in questionable activities. The IG initiated an investigation and DoJ has accepted the case for prosecution. No change from last report. (IG Project No. 98-1731-HQ-056)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

p. ~~(S)~~ An investigation into criminal misconduct by several current and former DIA personnel continues as reported in IG memorandum U-7641-95/IGI, 3 October 1995, subject: Referral of Allegation Against [Redacted] DoJ has declined to prosecute. The DIA case is closed. (IG Project No. 96-4289-OI-064)

(b)(2),(b)(6)

2. (U) Within the Office of the General Counsel (GC) [Redacted] attorneys, a secretary, a staff assistant, and a paralegal specialist review GC files on a continuing basis as they are used in day-to-day operations. All files are reviewed for regulatory compliance when they are periodically considered for destruction, retention, or storage. The following specific actions were taken:

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

a. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ [Redacted] attorneys review ongoing [Redacted] [Redacted] assure compliance with oversight responsibilities. One attorney assures compliance for corporate DIA activities not involving DHS. One attorney made presentations to the [Redacted] the Air Force Office of Special Investigations; the U.S. Southern Command, J2; [Redacted] Another attorney briefed IO issues with DIA personnel across several directorates. One attorney addressed oversight issues with [Redacted] elements of the [Redacted] agency and provided advice on [Redacted] An attorney participated in a [Redacted] at the Military Officer Familiarization Course.

(b)(2)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424
(b)(2)

b. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ GC reported one incident of criminal activity to DoJ during the quarter.

3. (U) The Directorate for Administration was involved in the following oversight activities:

a. (U) IO reviews were conducted in each of the major elements to ensure that prohibited material was not retained in files. During this quarter, [redacted] personnel reviewed IO procedures. Additionally, [redacted] students, [redacted] DIA and [redacted] non-DIA) received IO instruction as part of the following [redacted] courses:

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

NUMBER	COURSE
[redacted]	National Intelligence Course
[redacted]	Collection Management for Analysts Course
[redacted]	Intelligence Collection Manager Course
[redacted]	Sensitive Compartmented Information Control Officer Course
[redacted]	Mobile Collection Managers Course
[redacted]	Mobile SCI Security Officers Course
[redacted]	Counterintelligence Support Course

b. (U) The Office for Procurement did not initiate any contract actions that fell under Procedure 11, DoD 5240.1-R, during this reporting period. There were no contracts that required contractor performance under DIAR 60-4.

c. (U) The Office for Human Resources briefed [redacted] new civilian and military employees. Each new employee was:

- Informed in writing of the existence and importance of DIAR 60-4
- Provided copies of the documents cited in paragraph 7.c.(2), DIAR 60-4
- Advised to review DIAR 60-4 for information which may pertain to their specific duty assignments
- Informed of their responsibilities to report questionable activities to GC or IG

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

4. (U//FOUO) The Directorate for Policy Support reviewed all files during the reporting period and found no prohibited material. Specific actions follow:

a. (U//FOUO) The [redacted] conducted [redacted] oversight inspections at [redacted] different sites and included [redacted] contractors. [redacted] submitted the final annual report for all DIA [redacted] to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There was no [redacted] training bulletin this quarter. (b)(2)

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

b. (U//FOUO) A total of [redacted] personnel assigned to [redacted] were confirmed to be in receipt of IO regulations and guidance.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424 5. (U) The Directorate for Analysis and Production (DI) reported that [redacted] personnel assigned to the DI Command Element and the [redacted] completed IO training this quarter. (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(2) 6. (U) The Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff, reported that [redacted] personnel received IO training during this quarter. The training emphasized who may or may not [redacted] and the restrictions contained in DoD 5240.1-R. (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

7. (U) The Joint Military Intelligence College provided IO instruction to personnel in the courses noted below. Additionally, [redacted] faculty members reviewed IO directives.

NUMBER COURSE

[redacted]

- National Security Structure and Policy
- Information Technologies in the Cyber Era
- Leadership, Management and Coordination in the Intelligence Community
- The National Foreign Intelligence Community
- The Law and Intelligence
- Congress and U.S. Intelligence
- Intelligence Relations and Allied Nations

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c) 8. (S//NF) DO reported that [redacted] personnel received IO training, including new personnel processed by the [redacted]. Additionally, [redacted] personnel performed files review during the quarter.

(b)(3):10 USC 424 9. (U) The [redacted] reported that [redacted] persons participated in a files review this quarter. (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

10. (U//FOUO) DS reported that [redacted] personnel reviewed IO procedures and received IO training this quarter. The materials reviewed included E.O. 12333, DoD 5240.1-R, and DIAR 60-4.

11. (U) The Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity Office did not conduct IO related training this quarter.

12. (U) The Office of the Comptroller did not conduct IO training this quarter.

13. (U) The Plans, Programs, and Operations Staff (PO) reported that [redacted] personnel received IO training this quarter and conducted a review of PO files. No prohibited material was found.

14. (U) The Directorate for Military Intelligence (DM) reported that it has issued an IO training package to all assigned personnel via e-mail with read receipts to verify training completion.


(b)(3):10 USC 424 15. (U) The [redacted] reviewed holdings for compliance. No violations were noted. Copies of IO regulations were disseminated to all subordinate offices.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~

16. (C) DIA management continued to emphasize the importance of personnel being familiar with IO regulations. Training was provided to [redacted] personnel that addressed DIAR 60-4 and DoD 5240.1-R and/or reviewed files for IO content during the period 1 January through 31 March 2002.

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

1 Enclosure
DIA msg 121600Z MAR 02,
Subj: IG Intelligence Oversight
Brief 2-02, (S//NF), 1 cy



(b)(3):10
USC 424

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R 121600Z MAR 02
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//IG//

[Redacted] (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

RUPGCIN/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GS
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI/
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL/
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA/
RHCQAAA/USCINCTrans SCOTT AFB IL/
RUCJBBB/USCINCSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL/
RUPBUNA/USCINSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
RUCUSTR/HQ USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE

[Redacted] (b)(2)

[Redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

RUEALGX/SAFE WASHINGTON DC

BT
CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN~~

SECTION 1 OF 2

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY
SUBJ: IG INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BRIEF 2-02 (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN~~

1. (U) ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO ENSURE THAT ALL UNIT PERSONNEL ARE INFORMED OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE.
2. (U) IG FEEDBACK. COMMENCING WITH THIS NUMBER OF THE IG INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BRIEF WE HAVE ADDED A PARAGRAPH TITLED "IG FEEDBACK." THIS IS A FORUM TO COMMUNICATE IG ISSUES OF INTEREST WHICH EXTEND BEYOND THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND MAY BE OF VALUE TO DIA EMPLOYEES WORLDWIDE. THIS SECTION WILL ALSO BE PUBLISHED IN OTHER COMMUNICATION CHANNELS AND WILL BE POSTED ON THE DIA IG WEBSITE.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted] IN THE POST 9/11 ENVIRONMENT. SINCE THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND PENTAGON AND THE ENSUING COMBAT OPERATIONS [Redacted] WE HAVE RECEIVED SEVERAL QUERIES ON THE APPLICABILITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 AND THE DERIVATIVE DOD 5240.1-R. THE SHORT ANSWER IS THAT THERE IS NO

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PAGE:0002

CHANGE. DOD 5240.1-R CONTAINS SUFFICIENTLY BROAD AUTHORITIES FOR

[REDACTED] WITHOUT FURTHER MODIFICATION. IF THERE EXISTS REASONABLE BELIEF (A TERM DEFINED IN DOD 5240.1-R) THAT A U.S. PERSON MEETS THE CRITERIA CONTAINED IN PROCEDURE 2 THEN [REDACTED] MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGULATION.

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) OF [REDACTED] IN EARLIER MESSAGES IN THIS SERIES WE CLARIFIED THAT DIA ELEMENTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE IO TRAINING FOR [REDACTED] PERSONNEL EXCEPT IN THOSE FEW CASES WHERE THEY HAVE A DEFINED [REDACTED] FUNCTION. HOWEVER, THIS PROVISION DOES NOT NEGATE THE REQUIREMENT TO REVIEW THE FILES OF [REDACTED] PERSONNEL PERIODICALLY TO ENSURE THAT ANY INFORMATION ON U.S. PERSONS IS APPROPRIATELY MAINTAINED. FOR EXAMPLE, [REDACTED] UTILIZE [REDACTED] TO MAINTAIN GUEST LISTS FOR REPRESENTATIONAL FUNCTIONS OR TO REFERENCE U.S. CORPORATIONS WHO HAVE MILITARY RELATED COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH THE [REDACTED] TO FACILITATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE RESPONSIBILITIES. SUCH INFORMATION MEETS THE CRITERIA OF DOD 5240.1-R, PROCEDURE 2, CATEGORY 13, "ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES." SIMILARLY, [REDACTED] EMPLOYEES MAY BE [REDACTED] WHICH CONTAIN INFORMATION ON U.S. PERSONS. THIS FUNCTION FALLS WITHIN THE AUTHORITIES OF PROCEDURE 2, CATEGORY 2, "PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION." [REDACTED] FILES SHOULD BE REVIEWED AS PART OF THE OFFICE ANNUAL FILES REVIEW TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO PROHIBITED MATERIAL.

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT (IIR) REVIEW. YOUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO A MESSAGE FROM DIA WASHINGTON DC [REDACTED] DIG 071342Z FEB 02, WHICH ANNOUNCED THAT THE [REDACTED] HAS BEEN RENAMED AS THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THIS OFFICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR REVIEWING INCOMING IIRS TO ENSURE THAT THE REPORTS CORRECTLY CITE THE APPROPRIATE CATEGORY FOR U.S. PERSONS.

6. (U) IG FEEDBACK: THE IG WORKFORCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. MANY DIA EMPLOYEES ARE AWARE THAT ONE OF THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN IG IS TO PROVIDE EMPLOYEE OR WORKFORCE ASSISTANCE - WHICH INCLUDES EVERYTHING FROM PROVIDING GUIDANCE/ADVICE, TO ASSESSING GRIEVANCES, TO RESPONDING TO ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT. FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD WE RECEIVE A STEADY FLOW OF LETTERS, E-MAILS, PHONE CALLS, AND IN-PERSON VISITS FROM AGENCY EMPLOYEES (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN). SOMETIMES THE COMMUNICATIONS ARE ANONYMOUS, SOME COME WITH A REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIALITY, AND STILL OTHERS ARE EXPRESSED OPENLY, OCCASIONALLY WITH THE SUPPORT OF MANAGEMENT. REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, UNLESS THE REQUEST, COMPLAINT, OR ALLEGATION IS SO LUDICROUS AS TO BE IMPLAUSIBLE ON ITS FACE, WE ARE OBLIGED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER. EMPLOYEE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE IG INCLUDE JUST ABOUT EVERY TOPIC IMAGINABLE: QUESTIONS RESULTING FROM IG AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS, REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION OF REGULATIONS, REQUESTS FOR HELP IN RESOLVING A SITUATION WITH PAY OR TRAVEL, FORMAL COMPLAINTS OF ALLEGATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE MISCONDUCT BY AN INDIVIDUAL OR AN ELEMENT, AND ALLEGATIONS OF SERIOUS FELONY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

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(b)(2)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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~~REPORT~~

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MANY TIMES EMPLOYEES COME TO THE IG BECAUSE THEY HAVE A SENSE OF DUTY TO REPORT, AND OTHER TIMES BECAUSE THEY FEEL THEY HAVE NO WHERE ELSE TO GO. WE ALWAYS ENCOURAGE EMPLOYEES FIRST TO FULLY UTILIZE THEIR FORMAL AND INFORMAL MANAGEMENT/AGENCY COMMUNICATION OR GRIEVANCE PROCESS -- UNLESS IT INVOLVES A VIOLATION OF LAW, SERIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE MISCONDUCT, OR WHEN WE FORESEE POTENTIAL ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES. MANY ISSUES PRESENTED TO THE IG ARE RESOLVED THROUGH INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH IG AUDITORS, INSPECTORS, AND/OR INVESTIGATORS. OTHERS ARE CONCLUDED BY PROVIDING INFORMATION OR BY PUTTING EMPLOYEES IN CONTACT WITH APPROPRIATE EXPERTS IN THE AGENCY OR ELSEWHERE. HOWEVER, THE DECISION WHETHER TO EMPLOY OTHER CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION/RESOLUTION FIRST LIES STRICTLY WITH THE EMPLOYEE, EXCEPT IN ONE AREA. THE IG IS GENERALLY NOT AN APPROPRIATE VENUE FOR MOST PERSONNEL ISSUES. BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES WITH PERSONNEL GRIEVANCES ARE REQUIRED TO ENGAGE THEIR SUPERVISORY CHAIN OR THEIR SERVICING PERSONNEL OFFICE FIRST. OF COURSE, IF OTHER ALLEGATIONS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH A GRIEVANCE, THIS OBLIGATION MAY NOT BE APPLICABLE. IN ADDITION, WE GENERALLY DO NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN SECURITY RELATED ISSUES, UNLESS THERE IS AN ASSOCIATED CRIMINAL ASPECT AS WELL. IN ALL CASES OF COMPLAINTS THE IG STAFF REVIEWS CAREFULLY THE INFORMATION PROVIDED FOR FACTUAL CONTENT, AND FOR APPLICABILITY TO LAW, DIRECTIVE, POLICY, ETC. SOME ISSUES ARE EASILY RESOLVED THROUGH EDUCATION OR MINIMUM RESEARCH. OTHERS ARE MORE COMPLEX, RESOURCE-INTENSIVE, AND VERY TIME CONSUMING. OFTEN WE CAN CONCLUDE THAT AN ISSUE IS PRIMARILY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF MANAGEMENT. EXCEPT FOR VERY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WILL THEN REFER THE CASE TO THE APPROPRIATE KEY COMPONENT (KC) TO CONDUCT A FORMAL INQUIRY IAW DIAM 60-1. THE KC IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE INQUIRY RESULTS TO THE IG FOR REVIEW. WHEN ALLEGATIONS INCLUDE BOTH SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE MISCONDUCT, AN IG INVESTIGATOR AND THE INQUIRY OFFICER MAY CONDUCT COLLABORATIVE, PARALLEL ASSESSMENTS. IF THE ALLEGATIONS ARE OF A SERIOUS NATURE, THE IG WILL UNDERTAKE AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION. ON OCCASION THE IG WILL WORK SOME CASES JOINTLY WITH AN APPROPRIATE OUTSIDE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY SUCH AS THE DEFENSE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, ONE OF THE MILITARY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ORGANIZATIONS, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ETC. A RELATIVELY SMALL PERCENTAGE OF IG COMPLAINTS ARE UNFOUNDED OR WITHOUT SUBSTANCE. WHEN THIS OCCURS, HOWEVER, WE FIND MOST OFTEN THE COMPLAINANT SIMPLY MISUNDERSTOOD THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WHERE ALLEGATIONS ARE SUBSTANTIATED, THE IG WILL ISSUE AN EVIDENCE-BASED REPORT. FURTHER, IN CASES OF SUBSTANTIATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT, IG CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS WILL PRESENT CASES TO FEDERAL AND MILITARY PROSECUTORS. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIST THE PROSECUTORS AS MAY BE REQUESTED, TO INCLUDE TESTIFYING BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES AND IN OTHER COURT PROCEEDINGS. IN ALL CASES WHERE ALLEGATIONS ARE SUBSTANTIATED, THE INVESTIGATION REPORT IS SENT TO THE KC CONCERNED FOR APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, CONSISTENT WITH ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

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FINAL SECTION OF 2
TAKEN BY THE SERVICE COMMAND AUTHORITY OR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
IT IS IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF DIA
EMPLOYEES PERFORM THEIR DUTIES WITH INTEGRITY, STRIVING ALWAYS TO
DO WHAT IS RIGHT AND FAIR. SADLY, THERE ARE A FEW WHO DO NOT. BUT
WE ALL CAN COUNT ON ONE ASPECT OF HUMAN NATURE: HONEST PEOPLE WILL
PUT UP WITH IMPROPER BEHAVIOR BY OTHERS ONLY SO LONG. THEN, SOONER
OR LATER THEY GET FED UP AND REPORT IT TO THEIR MANAGEMENT AND/OR
THE IG. WE ALWAYS ENCOURAGE "SOONER." (WRITTEN BY [REDACTED])

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DERIVED FROM: DHS SCG

ADMIN

DECLASSIFY ON: ~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE OF SOURCE: OCTOBER 1997

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20310-5101



S-06-0089/IG

24 March 2006

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200


Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for 1 October to 31 December 2005

- References:
- a. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - b. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - c. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - d. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982
 - e. (U) DIAR 60-4, "Procedures Governing DIA Intelligence Activities That Affect U.S. Persons," 3 December 1997

(U) As required by above references, the Defense Intelligence Agency Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the period 1 October through 31 December 2005 is enclosed. For further information, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General at [redacted].

(b)(2), (b)(3):
10 USC 424

Enclosure
Quarterly Intelligence Oversight
Report, 1 Oct through 31 Dec 05
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(b)(2), (b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

cc:
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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20310228~~

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(U) QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

1 October through 31 December 2005

1. (U) The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported the following intelligence oversight (IO) activities:

(b)(2), (b)(3):10 USC 424

a. (U//FOUO) OIG conducted a general inspection of [redacted] and found no questionable activities.

b. (U//FOUO) OIG provided extensive support to investigations and inquiries by the Department of Defense (DoD) OIG pertaining to detainee/prisoner abuse allegations, Iraqi National Congress, and [redacted]. These are ongoing projects.

(b)(2)

c. (U//FOUO) OIG provided IO consultations for outbound defense attachés to [redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC 424

d. (U//FOUO) OIG provided IO training to the Today's Intelligence Professionals Course; the Staff Operations Course-Operating Base; and DIA 101; totaling [redacted] persons.

(b)(2), (b)(3):10 USC 424

e. (U) OIG disseminated the IO quarterly brief to all DIA field activities (enclosure 1).

f. (S//NF) OIG memorandum S-0235/IG, subject: "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 13 May 2005, reported that the office of the [redacted] Office of Operations (OP), might have engaged in questionable activities consisting of an [redacted]

(b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

g. (S//NF) OIG memorandum S-0172/IG, subject: "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 7 April 2005, reported that a [redacted] assigned to the Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH), [redacted] allegedly committed two incidents of prisoner abuse. The OIG substantiated the allegations and the subject resigned from DIA employment. (Project 05-2566-MA-056).

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

2. (U) Within the Office of the General Counsel (GC) [redacted] attorneys, a paralegal, a secretary, an administrative officer, and an executive officer, review active files on a continuing basis as referenced in day-to-day work. Compliance with oversight requirements was a regular item of consideration. All [redacted] GC files were reviewed and brought into compliance with oversight guidance, in contemplation of the office's move to Bolling Air Force Base.

(b)(2), (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(2), (b)(3):10 USC 424

Derived from: DIA HUMINT SCG
Declassify on: 20310228
Date of source: 1 October 2004

a. (U) An attorney continued to monitor activities and conduct oversight instruction required of [redacted] and participated in several oversight classes. An attorney reviewed contractual matters advising on correction, amendments, and modifications. [redacted] attorneys reviewed and counseled with regard to: (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

- (U) human intelligence (HUMINT) operational matters
- (U) [redacted] (b)(2)
- (U) security issues
- (U) counterterrorist
- (U) [redacted] (b)(2)
- (U) joint operations
- (U) assistance to law enforcement, to assure compliance with oversight responsibilities.

b. (U//FOUO) One attorney reviewed several [redacted] oversight and security due process activities and instructed [redacted] contractor personnel. (b)(3):10 USC 424

c. (U//FOUO) An attorney lectured on oversight subjects to DH contractors, other agency cover support elements, the [redacted] and the Military Officer Familiarization Course. He continues to work with the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) revising collection procedures. (b)(3):10 USC 424

d. (U//FOUO) One attorney has counseled DH personnel regarding Procedure 10 matters and resolved a potentially difficult situation.

e. (U//FOUO) GC reported no incidents of criminal activity to the Department of Justice during the quarter.

3. (U) Directorate for Administration (DA) was involved in the following oversight activities:

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

a. (U//FOUO) Of [redacted] personnel assigned, [redacted] employees participated in quarterly reviews, and were made aware of IO responsibilities through distributed copies of appropriate sections of DoD regulations placed in their in-processing packets. (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

b. (U//FOUO) A 100 percent verification of entries in DA's automated databases was conducted to ensure no individual names or corporations/organizations were inadvertently entered into the database, except as provided for in DoD 5240.1-R.

c. (U//FOUO) The administrative supervisors presented a reminder briefing to assigned data handling personnel, regarding prescribed and authorized materials and procedures.

4. (U) During this period [redacted] personnel trained by the Directorate for Human Capital received IO instruction in the courses noted below: (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

NUMBER	COURSE
[redacted]	Intelligence Collection Managers Course (ICMC)
[redacted]	Intelligence Collection Course
[redacted]	Tomorrows Intelligence Professionals
[redacted]	National Intelligence Course-(NIC)
[redacted]	Intelligence Oversight Course
[redacted]	Attaché Training Program
[redacted]	Attaché Staff Operations Course
[redacted]	Total (185 DIA employees; 155 students)

5. (U) The Joint Military Intelligence College (MC) provided IO instruction to personnel in the courses noted below:

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

NUMBER	COURSE
[redacted]	Intelligence Collection: Evidence for Analysis
[redacted]	HUMINT
[redacted]	United States Intelligence Organizations
[redacted]	Intelligence in US History Military History
[redacted]	National Security Structure and Policy
[redacted]	Leadership, Mgmt, and Coordination in the Intelligence Community
[redacted]	Total

(U) MC also provided refresher training for [redacted] civilian, military, and contract employees.

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

6. (U) The Directorate for Analysis (DI) reported that of the [redacted] personnel assigned, [redacted] participated in training this quarter. In addition, DI reported that files reviewed during this reporting period revealed no prohibited material.
7. (U) The Directorate for Intelligence (J2) reported that [redacted] personnel participated in the file review. J2 disseminated information concerning IO responsibilities and interactive training discs to all subordinate elements during this quarter, and procured additional IO videos for elements to watch. Additionally, J2 conducted a review of IO officers to ensure all were still active employees of DIA and fulfilling their duties as IO officers. Numerous J2 elements continue periodic file reviews to ensure compliance with all IO issuances. J2 also assisted DI with its IO program.
8. ~~(S//NF)~~ DH reported that [redacted] personnel received IO training. Additionally, [redacted] personnel performed file reviews during the quarter. In addition, newcomers received initial IO training at DIA 101 and the [redacted] newcomer's training. Training videos were provided to the forward support offices and liaison offices that are external to [redacted]. The [redacted] also stressed IO responsibilities during in processing.

9. (U) The Directorate for Measurement and Signature Intelligence and Technical Collection reported that [redacted] personnel participated in review and oversight training. (b)(2),(b)(3): 10 USC 424
10. (U) The Directorate for Information Management and Chief Information Officer reported that [redacted] personnel reviewed IO procedures and received IO training this quarter.
11. (U) The Office of Equal Opportunity and Equal Employment Opportunity did not report any IO training for this quarter. They did not report any incidents.
12. (U) The Chief Financial Executive (FE) reported that no employees participated in IO training this quarter. The office developed a cover sheet explaining IO application to the FE community, which will be incorporated into training during the next quarter. There were no reports of activities believed to be illegal, contrary to executive order or applicable DoD policy.
13. (U) The Chief of Staff (CS) reported [redacted] personnel participated in a files review and found no IO relevant information. Additionally, IO responsibility information was disseminated to all CS personnel.
14. (U) OP reported no assigned personnel trained on IO during this quarter.
15. (U) The Office of International Engagement reported 100 percent of assigned personnel [redacted] received IO training.
16. (U) The Chief Acquisition Executive (AE) reported that [redacted] personnel participated in files review during this quarter. Further, the AE staff has increased personnel assigned to various locations in support of [redacted] activities in the Central Command area of operations. In addition, AE stated that the staff follows DIA Manual (DIA) [redacted] ensure compliance with paragraph 7 d DIA Regulation (D AR) 60 4
17. (U) The [redacted] reported [redacted] personnel participated in IO training. Procedures 1 2 3 4 12 and [redacted] were covered with special emphasis placed on procedures [redacted] and [redacted] concerning the collection of information of U S persons)
18. (U) Office of Operations and Public Affairs reported 100 percent of assigned personnel [redacted] received IO training
19. (U) DIA management continued to emphasize the importance of personnel being familiar with IO regulations. Training was provided to [redacted] personnel addressing EJAR 60 4 and DoD 5240 I R during the period 1 October through 31 December 2005

1 Enclosure
OIG message 091500 Dec 05
sub IG IO Brief F 06 DL (U)
1 copy

R 091500Z DEC 05
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//IG//

(b)(2)

RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAHINGEN GE//ECIG
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL//TCIG
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J004/IG
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J004/IG
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CIG
RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SCIG
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//IG
RUCBACM/CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//IG
RHMFISS/CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//IG

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM//IG/DIA REP/J2-JA//
RUCUSTR/CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//CC05/IG
RHMFISS/CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//CC05/IG
BT

(b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: IG INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BRIEF FY 06-01 (U)

1. (U) ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO ENSURE THAT ALL UNIT PERSONNEL ARE INFORMED OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE.

2. (U) USCENTCOM POLICY. YOUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM) POLICY MEMORANDUM, SUBJECT: USCENTCOM POLICY PROHIBITING PHOTOGRAPHING OR FILMING DETAINEES OF HUMAN CASUALTIES OR POSSESSING, DISTRIBUTING, OR POSTING VISUAL IMAGES DEPICTING HUMAN CASUALTIES, 21 OCTOBER 2005. THE POLICY AFFIRMS THE NEED TO ENSURE DETAINEES AND HUMAN CASUALTIES ARE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE LAWS AND REGULATIONS, AND UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECTING THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN LIFE. THE POLICY PERTAINS NOT ONLY TO FOREIGN DETAINEES AND CASUALTIES, BUT ALSO TO UNITED STATES (U.S.) PERSONNEL. THIS IS A PUNITIVE POLICY. ALL DIA SUPERVISORS RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THE USCENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY SHOULD ENSURE THAT ASSIGNED PERSONNEL ARE FAMILIAR WITH ITS CONTENT. A COPY OF THE POLICY MEMORANDUM HAS BEEN POSTED ON THE IG WEBSITE ON BOTH JWICS AND SIPRNET SYSTEMS.

3. (U) DOD INTELLIGENCE POLICY ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE. THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE) ISSUED A POLICY MEMORANDUM, 18 OCTOBER 2005, SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT AND DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. THE POLICY MEMORANDUM EMPHASIZES THAT, QUOTE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS), DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND OUR OTHER PARTNERS IN HOMELAND DEFENSE HAVE ACCESS TO APPROPRIATE INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS OF THE DEPARTMENT THAT ARE RELEVANT TO THE HOMELAND DEFENSE EFFORT. END QUOTE. THE MEMORANDUM FURTHER STATES, THAT, QUOTE, WE MUST ENSURE THAT OUR ACTIONS DO NOT UNDERMINE THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF U.S. PERSONS. END QUOTE. THE

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INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT POLICIES AND GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1, AND DOD 5240.1-R REMAIN IN EFFECT.

4. (U) OIG ADDRESS TO THE ASSOCIATION OF INSPECTORS GENERAL.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

[REDACTED] IG, PRESENTED COMMENTS TO THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF INSPECTORS GENERAL HELD IN ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 3 NOV 05. THE CONFERENCE THEME WAS THE ROLE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL IN HOMELAND DEFENSE. [REDACTED] PERSENTATION IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE. QUOTE,

(b)(3):10
USC 424

A. (U) THANK YOU FOR THE INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PANEL FOR THIS CONFERENCE. THIS IS A SUBJECT OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR ALL OF US HERE AND THE ORGANIZATIONS WHICH WE SERVE.

B. (U) IN OCTOBER OF 2004 I AND MY COLLEAGUES FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INSPECTORS GENERAL HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM CONSISTING OF GOVERNMENTAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES AND INTELLIGENCE INSPECTORS GENERAL CENTERED ON THE THEME BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES WITHIN A DEMOCRACY. AMONG THE DELEGATES WERE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OVERSIGHT BODIES OF [REDACTED] - NATIONS WHICH HAD EXPERIENCED THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS TO SUPPRESS THE DEMOCRATIC ASPIRATIONS OF ITS POPULACE. THE ISSUES DISCUSSED DURING THAT CONFERENCE HAVE MANY PARALLELS WITH THE CHALLENGES WHICH WE AS INSPECTORS GENERAL ADDRESS ON A DAILY BASIS AS WE ARE ENGAGED IN THE DEFENSE OF OUR HOMELAND. THAT IS, HOW DO WE EXECUTE OUR RESPONSIBILITIES TO ADVANCE THE MISSION IMPERATIVES OF NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH PROCESS IMPROVEMENT AND IMPROVED OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, ENSURING THAT THOSE ACTIVITIES DO NOT ERODE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL GUARANTEES OF OUR CITIZENS.

(b)(2)

C. (U) SUCH CONSIDERATIONS ARE CRITICAL TO THE MISSION PERFORMANCE OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES WHICH WE BRING TO BEAR AGAINST THE THREATS TO THE U.S. OUR [REDACTED] AND ITS DIPLOMATICALLY ASSIGNED [REDACTED] SUBJECT FOR THIS CONFERENCE.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

[REDACTED] AROUND THE WORLD, CONTINUALLY INTERACT WITH COOPERATIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY. [REDACTED]

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

[REDACTED] IN OCTOBER OF 2004 I AND MY COLLEAGUES FROM [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

[REDACTED] BOTH OF THESE HIGHLY COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE INTEGRATED INTO OUR PROCESSES FOR THE VALIDATION AND TASKING OF DEFENSE WIDE [REDACTED] AND OUR HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED CADRE OF [REDACTED] THE DELEGATES ARE SUPPORTED BY ADVANCED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY WITH SEAMLESS LINKS TO THE FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY. ALL THESE TASKS ARE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE STRUCTURE AND MISSION IMPERATIVES WHICH DRIVE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF WELL DEFINED OVERSIGHT PROCESSES.

D. (U) OVERSIGHT OF THESE ACTIVITIES IS CLOSELY INTEGRATED WITH THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S STRATEGIC PLAN WHICH IS, IN TURN,

CLOSELY LINKED TO AND FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY PUBLISHED LAST MONTH BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE STATED IN THE STRATEGY IS THE CHARGE TO: PERFORM OUR DUTIES UNDER LAW IN A MANNER THAT RESPECTS THE CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY OF ALL AMERICANS.

E. (U) THIS CHARGE REITERATES THE OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES STATED IN THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE COMMUNITY DERIVES ITS MISSION AUTHORITIES FROM EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, SIGNED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN 1982. THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER IS AN ENABLING INSTRUMENT WHICH CLEARLY DEFINES THE STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITIES OF THE SEVERAL NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ITS PURPOSE STATEMENT WHICH IS:

(U) TIMELY AND ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES, CAPABILITIES, PLANS, AND INTENTIONS OF FOREIGN POWERS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND PERSONS, AND THEIR AGENTS, IS ESSENTIAL TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. ALL REASONABLE AND LAWFUL MEANS MUST BE USED TO ENSURE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RECEIVE THE BEST INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE.

F. (U) WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THE EXECUTIVE ORDER IS AMPLIFIED BY REGULATION WHICH CONTAINS SPECIFIC CRITERIA BY WHICH WE MAY COLLECT, RETAIN, AND DISSEMINATE INTELLIGENCE PERTAINING TO U.S. PERSONS AND MAKES PROVISION TO COOPERATE WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING OR PREVENTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND PREVENTING, DETECTING OR INVESTIGATING OTHER VIOLATIONS OF LAW. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE REGULATORY AUTHORITIES THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS A LONG HISTORY OF COOPERATING WITH U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES WHEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LIVES OF OUR CITIZENS HAVE BEEN AT RISK.

G. (U) OVERSIGHT OF THESE ACTIVITIES REQUIRES CONTINUING ENGAGEMENT AND VIGILANCE TO ADVANCE THE QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENT FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE AS WELL AS MAINTAIN THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS OF OUR POPULACE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE THERE IS BROAD AUTHORITY TO COLLECT, RETAIN, AND DISSEMINATE INTELLIGENCE PERTAINING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF U.S. PERSONS, THIS AUTHORITY IS LIMITED TO THOSE PERSONS WHO ARE REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH A FOREIGN BASED THREAT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PEOPLE. REASONABLE BELIEF MUST BE BASED ON FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES; WE DO NOT COLLECT ON CLASSES OF PEOPLE BASED ON THEIR RELIGION, ETHNIC ORIGIN, OR EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH. WE HAVE PERFORMED THIS RESPONSIBILITY EFFECTIVELY FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS.

H. (U) PERHAPS THE GREATEST CHALLENGE NOW FACING THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS TO DEVELOP THE TECHNOLOGY AND PROCESSES FOR THE [REDACTED] WITH FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES WHICH REQUIRE ACCESS TO ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION FOR ACTIONS TO DETECT, DETER, AND NULLIFY THREATS FROM A HOSTILE FORCE. AS INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WE HAVE BOTH AN OBLIGATION AND A CHARGE FROM OUR RESPECTIVE DEPARTMENT HEADS AND DIRECTORS TO ENSURE THAT THIS OCCURS IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT MANNER. AT THE SAME TIME WE

(b)(2)

MUST ENSURE THAT SUCH [REDACTED] DOES NOT COMPROMISE THE INTEGRITY OF OUR [REDACTED] AND THEREIN LIES A CHALLENGE.

(b)(2)

I. (U) THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY ARE DISTINGUISHED NOT ONLY BY DIFFERENT NEEDS AND PROCESSES, BUT BY DIFFERENT CULTURES. INTELLIGENCE PROVIDED TO NATIONAL LEVEL DECISION-MAKERS AND OUR COMBATANT COMMANDERS ARE FREQUENTLY COMPELLED TO ACT ON INFORMATION WHICH MEETS THE EIGHTY PERCENT SOLUTION STANDARD. INTELLIGENCE MAY BE IN THE FORM OF INFORMED JUDGEMENT BASED ON A SERIES OF INDICATORS DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND SYSTEMS. IT IS RARELY THE SMOKING GUN. SUCH INFORMATION MAY NOT MEET THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD REQUIRED BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. IT CAN, HOWEVER, PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS WHICH CAN DELIVER SUCH EVIDENCE.

J. (U) EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE FOR THE PROTECTION OF [REDACTED] THE COMPROMISE OF TECHNICAL [REDACTED] TYPICALLY ALLOWS AN ADVERSARY TO EXPLOIT SUCH REVELATIONS FOR [REDACTED] OPERATIONS WITH POTENTIAL LONG TERM IMPACTS. WITH [REDACTED] THE EXPOSURE OF A [REDACTED] CAN NOT ONLY NEGATE THE FURTHER EMPLOYMENT OF THAT [REDACTED] BUT MAY ENDANGER OTHERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE [REDACTED] AND DETER [REDACTED] FOR THIS REASON THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT OF 1980 PROVIDES THE STRUCTURE BY WHICH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CAN BE EMPLOYED IN PROSECUTORIAL ACTIONS WITH MINIMAL RISK TO THE NATION'S INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INSPECTORS GENERAL, IN PARTNERSHIP WITH OUR SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS MAINTAIN VIGILANCE OVER THE APPLICATION OF THIS PROCESS.

K. (U) TODAY, IN RESPONSE TO THE DYNAMIC AND INTERLOCKING INTELLIGENCE PROCESSES DEVELOPED TO COUNTER THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST MANIFEST SO DRAMATICALLY MANIFEST IN THE ATTACKS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INSPECTORS GENERAL MUST CONTINUALLY WEIGH APPARENTLY POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES.

L. (U) WE MUST FURTHER THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ENTITIES WHILE MAINTAINING THE SECURITY OF OUR [REDACTED]

M. (U) WE MUST PROVIDE OUR PROFESSIONAL GUIDANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ON THOSE PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS WHO HAVE DECLARED THEIR INTENT TO STRIKE DEEPLY INTO OUR HOMELAND WHILE ENSURING THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF PROTECTION FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF OUR CITIZENRY AS EXPRESSED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BODY OF LAWS WHICH WE HAVE EVOLVED OVER THE PAST TWO CENTURIES.

N. (U) OUR ASSEMBLED PRESENCE HERE, TODAY, TESTIFIES TO OUR COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVE THOSE GOALS. AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CONFERENCE AND I LOOK FORWARD TO

THE MUTUAL ENGAGEMENT WHICH WE WILL EXPERIENCE OVER THE NEXT THREE DAYS. END QUOTE.

5. (U) RECENT IO ISSUES FROM DIA ELEMENTS.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

A ~~TOP SECRET~~ THE OIG RECENTLY RECEIVED A QUERY PERTAINING TO A [REDACTED] WHICH IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AN [REDACTED] WAS [REDACTED] SUBMITTED WHICH CONTAINED [REDACTED]

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

[REDACTED] THE REPORT WAS CAVEATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIAM 58-12; ENCLOSURE 7-8 TO REFLECT U.S. PERSONS INFORMATION AND THE EXEMPTION CATEGORY WAS THE DESIGNATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY. INCLUDED IN THE DATA WERE REFERENCES TO THREE U.S. PERSONS.

(1) (U) TWO OF THE INDIVIDUALS WERE IDENTIFIED AS HAVING DUAL U.S. AND FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP AND WERE OFFICIALS IN A FOREIGN POLITICAL PARTY. REPORTING ON THESE U.S. PERSONS WAS FULLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN DOD 5240.1-R AND AS REPEATED IN DIAM 58-12.

(2) (U) THE THIRD U.S. PERSON IDENTIFIED IN THE IIR BY NAME WAS STATED TO BE A RELATIVE OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL AND GAVE THE U.S. CITY OF HIS RESIDENCE. A SUBSEQUENT REVIEW OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD U.S. CITIZENSHIP. IN THIS CASE COLLECTION AGAINST THE U.S. PERSON WAS NOT AUTHORIZED AS THERE WAS NO STATEMENT OF REASONABLE BELIEF THAT HE MET ANY OF THE CRITERIA.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



S-0392/IG

3 October 2005

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 30 June 2005


- References:
- a. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - b. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - c. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - d. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982
 - e. (U) DIAR 60-4, "Procedures Governing DIA Intelligence Activities That Affect U.S. Persons," 3 December 1997

(U) As required by references above, the Defense Intelligence Agency Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the period 1 April through 30 June 2005 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General at [redacted]

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

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USC 424

Enclosure
Quarterly Intelligence Oversight
Report, 1 Apr through 30 Jun 05
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USC 424

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//20300923~~

(U) QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

1 April through 30 June 2005

1. (U) The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported the following intelligence oversight (IO) activities:

a. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The OIG conducted general inspections of [redacted]

(b)(3):10
USC 424

b. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The OIG provided extensive support to investigations and inquiries by the Department of Defense (DoD) OIG pertaining to detainee/prisoner abuse allegations. This is an ongoing project.

c. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The OIG provided IO consultations for the outbound [redacted]

(b)(3):10
USC 424

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ OIG memorandum S-0110/IG, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, 1 March 2004, reported that a [redacted] assigned to [redacted] might have violated [redacted]

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

[redacted] without complying with [redacted]. The investigation is complete and the report is being prepared. (Project Number 04-2310-MA-056)

e. ~~(S//NF)~~ OIG memorandum S-0172/IG, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, 7 April 2005, reported that [redacted] assigned to the Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH), [redacted] allegedly committed two incidents of prisoner abuse. The OIG has conducted several interviews and the investigation is ongoing. (Project Number 05-2566-MA-056)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

f. ~~(S//NF)~~ OIG memorandum S-0174/IG, subject: Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, 13 May 2005, reported that a DIA civilian employee assigned to the Directorate for Analysis (DI) might have engaged in an unauthorized [redacted] [redacted] with the use of a contractor. The OIG has conducted interviews and the investigation is ongoing. (Project Number 05-2560-MA-056)

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

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Date of source: 1 October 2004

- b. (U//FOUO) A 100 percent verification of entries in the DA's automated databases during this timeframe was conducted to ensure no individual names, corporations, or organizations were inadvertently entered, except as provided for in DoD 5240.1-R.
- c. (U//FOUO) Assigned personnel involved in data handling were given a quarterly reminder briefing by the administrative supervisor concerned, regarding prescribed and authorized materials and procedures.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

4. (U) The [redacted] provided IO instruction to personnel in the courses noted below:

NUMBER	COURSE
[redacted]	Asymmetric Warfare Intelligence Analysis Course -- MTT
[redacted]	SCI Security Officials Course -- Mobile Training Team
[redacted]	National Intelligence Course
[redacted]	Intelligence Analyst Course
[redacted]	Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program
[redacted]	Counterintelligence Analytic Methods (CAM)
[redacted]	Intelligence Collection Managers Course (ICMC)
[redacted]	Intelligence Collection Course
[redacted]	SCI Security Officials Course
[redacted]	National Intelligence Course
Total	[redacted] DIA Employees; [redacted] students)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

5. (U) DI reported that [redacted] assigned personnel conducted refresher training this quarter. In addition, DI reported that files reviewed during this reporting period revealed no prohibited material. Number of personnel conducting file review was [redacted]

6. (U) The Directorate for Intelligence (J2) reported that [redacted] personnel participated in file review. J2 disseminated information concerning IO responsibilities and interactive training discs to all personnel during this quarter and procured additional IO videos for elements to watch. Additionally, J2 conducted a review of IO officers to ensure all were still active employees of DIA and fulfilling their duties as IO officers. [redacted]

(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

[redacted] continues to review U.S. person's issues as necessary, to ensure compliance with IO requirements and to develop additional policy for IO concerns. J2, in coordination with other J2 elements, is working on developing an online tracking system for IO training to ensure higher fidelity of training members.

7. (U) DH reported that [redacted] personnel received IO training. Additionally, [redacted] personnel performed file reviews during the quarter. Also, newcomers were provided initial IO training at DIA 101 and the [redacted] newcomers training. Training videos were provided to the forward support offices and liaison offices that are external to [redacted] IO responsibilities were also stressed by the [redacted] security officer during in processing.

(b)(3):10 USC
424

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

8. (U) The Joint Military Intelligence College provided IO instruction to personnel in the courses noted below:

NUMBER COURSE



Survey of Intelligence Collection
Basic Intelligence Collection
HUMINT
IMINT
SIGINT
Congressional Oversight of Intelligence
Ethics in Intelligence
Industry and Intelligence
History of U.S. Intelligence
IT Management for Intelligence Professionals
Future of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community
Congress and U.S. Intelligence
Financial Management of Intelligence
Leadership, Management and Coordination in the Intelligence Community
Intelligence Relations with Allied Nations

Total

Additionally, [redacted] faculty members reviewed IO directives.

9. (U) The Directorate for Measurement and Signature Intelligence and Technical Collection reported that [redacted] military and civilian personnel participated in file reviews. No prohibited material was found during the review.
10. (U) The Directorate for Information Management reported that [redacted] personnel reviewed IO procedures and received IO training this quarter.
11. (U) The Office of Diversity Management (MD) trained [redacted] personnel this quarter.
12. (U) The Chief Financial Executive (FE) reported that [redacted] employees participated in IO training this quarter. FE was implementing procedures to achieve and maintain 100 percent participation in the reviews during the next two quarters of the fiscal year. There were no reports of activities that are believed to be illegal, contrary to executive order, or applicable DoD policy.
13. (U) The Chief of Staff (CS) reported that [redacted] personnel participated in a files review and found no IO relevant information. Additionally, information about IO responsibilities was disseminated to all CS personnel.
14. (U) OP reported that [redacted] personnel reviewed files to ensure that prohibited material was not retained, and [redacted] newly assigned personnel were trained on IO and their responsibilities.

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

15. (U) The Directorate for External Relations reported that [redacted] personnel received IO training via electronic mail this quarter and 98 conducted a review of files. No prohibited material was found.
16. (U) The Chief Acquisition Executive (AE) reported [redacted] personnel participated in files review during this quarter. AE did not initiate any contract actions that fell under Procedure 11.b., DoD 5240.1-R, during this reporting period. No contracts required contractor performance under DIAR 60-4.
17. (U//FOUO) DIA management continued to emphasize the importance of personnel being familiar with IO regulations. Training was provided to [redacted] personnel addressing DIAR 60-4 and DoD 5240.1-R during the period 1 April through 30 June 2005.

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424



~~SECRET//NOFORN//20301118~~
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

S-0459/IG

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 30 September 2005


- References:
- a. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - b. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - c. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - d. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982
 - e. (U) DIAR 60-4, "Procedures Governing DIA Intelligence Activities That Affect U.S. Persons," 3 December 1997

(U) As required by references above, the Defense Intelligence Agency Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the period 1 July through 30 September 2005 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General at [redacted]

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USC 424

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USC 424

Enclosure
Quarterly Intelligence Oversight
Report, 1 Jul through 30 Sep 05
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10 USC 424

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//20301118~~

(U) QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

1 July through 30 September 2005

1. (U) The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported the following intelligence oversight (IO) activities:

a. (U//FOUO) OIG conducted general inspections of [redacted]

[redacted]

No questionable activities were found.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

b. (U//FOUO) OIG provided extensive support to investigations and inquiries by the Department of Defense (DoD) OIG pertaining to detainee/prisoner abuse allegations. This is an ongoing project.

c. (U//FOUO) OIG provided IO consultations for outbound [redacted]

[redacted]

d. (U//FOUO) OIG provided IO training to Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff (J2); the Today's Intelligence Professionals Course; and the Staff Operations Course-Operating Base; totaling [redacted] persons.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

e. (U) OIG disseminated the IO quarterly brief to all DIA field activities (enclosure 1).

f. (S//NF) OIG memorandum S-0242/IG, subject: "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 19 May 2005, reported that individuals assigned to DH might have engaged in questionable activities by [redacted]

[redacted] prior to receipt of coordination by the Department of State, as required by DoD Directive 5530.3. This investigation is pending administrative closure, but will be reviewed in conjunction with an inspection of [redacted] (Project 05-2577-MA-056).

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

g. (S//NF) OIG memorandum S-0235/IG, subject: "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 13 May 2005, reported that the office of the [redacted]

[redacted] Office of Operations (OP), might have engaged in questionable activities consisting of an [redacted]

[redacted] The investigation is ongoing (Project 05-2555-MA-056).

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424, 1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424, 1.4 (c)

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

Derived from: DIA HUMINT SCG
Declassify on: 20301118
Date of source: 1 October 2004

h. ~~(S//NF)~~ OIG memorandum S-0172/IG, subject: "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 7 April 2005, reported that a [redacted] assigned to the Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH), [redacted] allegedly committed two incidents of prisoner abuse. OIG has completed all investigative work and the report is being prepared (Project 05-2566-MA-056).

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

i. ~~(S//NF)~~ OIG memorandum S-0110/IG, subject: "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 1 March 2004, reported that a [redacted] assigned to [redacted] might have violated [redacted] without complying with [redacted]. An IO investigation substantiated the allegation and has been closed (Project 04-2310-MA-056).

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

2. (U) Within the Office of the General Counsel (GC) [redacted] attorneys, a paralegal, a secretary, an administrative officer, and an executive officer, reviewed active files on a continuing basis as referenced in day-to-day work. Compliance with oversight requirements was a regular item of consideration.

(b)(2),(b)(3): 10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ An attorney continued to monitor activities and conducted oversight instruction required of [redacted] and participated in several oversight classes. An attorney reviewed contractual matters advising on correction, amendments, and modifications. [redacted] attorneys reviewed and counseled with regard to [redacted] and assistance to law enforcement, to assure compliance with oversight responsibilities.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(b)(2),(b)(3): 10 USC 424

(b)(2)

b. (U//FOUO) One attorney conducted weekly presentations for deploying DH personnel to assure compliance with [redacted]. An attorney reviewed several oversight and security due process activities and instructed contractor personnel assigned to [redacted] and security duties.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

c. (U//FOUO) An attorney lectured on oversight subjects to DH contractors, other agency [redacted] and the Military Officer Familiarization Course. He continues to work with the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) revising collection procedures.

d. (U//FOUO) GC reported no incidents of criminal activity to the Department of Justice during the quarter.

3. (U) Directorate for Administration (DA) was involved in the following oversight activities:


(b)(2),(b)(3): 10 USC 424

a. (U//FOUO) Of [redacted] personnel assigned [redacted] employees participated in quarterly reviews, and were made aware of IO responsibilities by receiving copies of appropriate sections of DoD regulations in their in-processing packets.

- b. (U//FOUO) A 100 percent verification of entries in DA's automated databases was conducted to ensure no individual names or corporations/organizations were inadvertently entered into the database, except as provided for in DoD 5240.1-R.
 - c. (U//FOUO) Assigned personnel involved in data handling were given a quarterly reminder briefing by the administrative supervisor concerned regarding prescribed and authorized materials and procedures.
4. (U) The Office of the Chief Training Executive (TE) provided IO instruction to personnel in the courses noted below:

NUMBER COURSE

(b)(2),(b)(3)
:10 USC
424



Intelligence Collection Course – MTT
 Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program (CSTIP)
 Intelligence Collection Managers Course (ICMC)
 Intelligence Collection Course
 National Senior Intelligence Course
 Tomorrows Intelligence Professionals
 National Intelligence Course (NIC)

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

Total [] DIA Employees; [] students)

5. (U) The Joint Military Intelligence College (MC) provided IO instruction to personnel in the courses noted below:

NUMBER COURSE

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424



MASINT
 Ethics in Intelligence
 The Law and Intelligence
 Leadership, Management and Coordination in the Intelligence Community

Total

(U) MC's entire faculty and staff, including approximately [] civilian, military, and contract employees, received the DIA IG IO briefing during the week of 4 August 2005.

6. (U) DI reported that of the [] personnel assigned, [] participated in training this quarter. In addition, DI reported that files reviewed during this reporting period revealed no prohibited material.
7. (U) J2 reported that [] personnel participated in files review. J2 disseminated information concerning IO responsibilities and interactive training discs to all subordinate elements during this quarter, and procured additional IO videos for elements to watch. Additionally, J2 conducted a review of IO officers to ensure all were still active employees of DIA and

fulfilling their duties as IO officers. Numerous J2 elements continue periodic file reviews to ensure compliance with all IO issuance. On 25 August 2005, J2 received a memorandum from the General Counsel titled, "Collection of Intelligence Affecting U.S. Persons" that answered questions which had arisen in that area. As of 1 July 2005, J2's personnel numbers significantly decreased due to a functional realignment to DI. Additionally, the [redacted] [redacted] are in the midst of a transition to DI.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

8. (U) DH reported that [redacted] personnel received IO training. Additionally, [redacted] personnel performed file reviews during the quarter. Also, newcomers were provided initial IO training at DIA 101 and the [redacted] newcomers training. Training videos were provided to the forward support offices and liaison offices that are external to [redacted] IO responsibilities were also stressed by the [redacted] security officer during in-processing.
9. (U) The Directorate for Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) and Technical Collection (DT) reported that [redacted] personnel participated in review and oversight training.
10. (U) The Directorate for Information Management and Chief Information Officer (DS) reported that [redacted] personnel reviewed IO procedures and received IO training this quarter.
11. (U) The Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (MD) provided training for [redacted] personnel this quarter, which required review of DIAR 60-4, DoD Directive 5240.1, and DoD 5240.1-R. Additionally, all personnel were required to conduct file reviews to ensure compliance with the cited directives.
12. (U) The Chief Financial Executive (FE) reported that [redacted] employees participated in IO training this quarter. They are implementing procedures to achieve and maintain 100 percent participation in the reviews during the next two quarters of the fiscal year. There were no reports of activities that were believed to be illegal, contrary to executive order or applicable DoD policy.
13. (U) The Chief of Staff reported that [redacted] personnel participated in a files review and found no IO relevant information. Additionally, information about IO responsibilities was disseminated to all CS personnel.
14. (U) OP reported that [redacted] personnel reviewed files to ensure that prohibited material was not retained, and that assigned personnel were trained on IO and their responsibilities.
15. (U) The Office of International Engagement (IE) reported 100 percent of assigned personnel received IO training.
16. (U) The Chief Acquisition Executive (AE) reported that [redacted] personnel participated in files review during this quarter. Further, the AE staff has increased with personnel assigned to various locations in support of [redacted] activities in the Central Command area of operations. In addition, AE stated that DIA Manual (DIAM) 44-2 is followed to ensure compliance with paragraph 7.d., DIA Regulation (DIAR) 60-4.

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

17. (U) The [redacted] reported [redacted] personnel participated in IO training. Procedures 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, and 15, were covered with special emphasis placed on procedures 2, 3, and 4, concerning the collection of information of U.S. person(s).

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

18. (U) DIA management continued to emphasize the importance of personnel being familiar with IO regulations. Training was provided to [redacted] personnel addressing DIAR 60-4 and DoD 5240.1-R during the period 1 July through 30 September 2005.


(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20310511~~



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



S-06-0199/AG

11 May 2006

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Procedure 15 - Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R,
Project 06-2812-MA-056

Reference: (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence
Components that Affect United States Persons"

1. (U//FOUO) This memorandum constitutes notification, in accordance with reference
above, of a possible violation of Procedure 15 by a civilian employee of the Defense
Intelligence Agency.

2. ~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1), 1.4
(c), 1.4 (d)

3. (U) The point of contact for this action is [Redacted]

(b)(2), (b)(3); 1
0 USC 424

[Redacted]

(b)(3); 10
USC 424

cc:
DR
DD
GC
DI
IE

Derived from: DIAR 60 - 28
Declassify on: 28310511
Date of source: 9 April 1999

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20310511~~

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
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



S-06-0198/IG

30 May 2006

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 31 March 2006


- References:
- a. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - b. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - c. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - d. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982
 - e. (U) DIAD 5100.200, "Office of the Inspector General Policies and Responsibilities," 17 February 2006

(U) As required by references above, the Defense Intelligence Agency Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the period 1 January through 31 March 2006 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General at [redacted].

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

1 Enclosure
Quarterly Intelligence Oversight
Report, 1 Jan through 31 Mar 06
~~(S//NF)~~ 1 cy



(b)(3):10
USC 424

cc:
DR
DD

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20310524~~

(U) QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

1 January through 31 March 2006

1. (U) The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported the following intelligence oversight (IO) activities:

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ The Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the OIG, 23 January 2006, to monitor agency wide IO training and report compliance to the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). Specifically, of [redacted] employees [redacted] were trained. DIA organizations were instructed to complete the required training as soon as absent personnel return.

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

(b)(2)

b. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ OIG provided continued support to investigations and inquiries by the Department of Defense (DoD) OIG pertaining to detainee/prisoner abuse allegations, Iraqi National Congress, and [redacted]. These are ongoing projects.

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

c. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ OIG provided IO training to four iterations of the Tomorrow's Intelligence Professionals Course; one class of DIA 101; and one class of the Staff Operations Course-Operating Base; totaling [redacted] persons.

d. (U) OIG disseminated the IO quarterly brief to all DIA field activities (enclosure 1).

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,1.4 (c)
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

e. ~~(S//NF)~~ OIG memorandum S-0235/IG, "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 13 May 2005, reported that the office of the [redacted] Office of Operations (OP), might have engaged in questionable activities consisting of an [redacted]. Report is being written. (Project 05-2555-MA-056).

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

f. ~~(S//NF)~~ OIG memorandum U-06-0067/IG, "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333, and DoD 5420.1-R," 3 February 2006, reported that a member of the [redacted] may have engaged in questionable activities consisting of [redacted].

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,1.4 (c)

[redacted] The Department of State, in collaboration with the Army Criminal Investigation Command is investigating this matter and has coordinated with an assistant U.S. attorney who has accepted prosecutorial responsibility. The OIG will not initiate a separate investigation. (Project 06-2739-MA-056).

g. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The OIG provided IO briefings to defense attachés en route [redacted].

(b)(3):10
USC 424

h. (U) The OIG responded to five requests for assistance from headquarters staff and field units on matters of IO guidance and interpretation.

Derived from: DIA HUMINT SCG
Declassify on: 28310524
Date of source: 1 October 2004

i. ~~(S//NF)~~ The OIG conducted an IO staff assistance visit to the [redacted] and at the invitation of [redacted] provided [redacted] guidance during participation in a planning session for [redacted]

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10
USC 424

j. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ OIG conducted general inspections of [redacted] and found no questionable activities.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

2. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The General Counsel (GC) reported that its staff reviews active files on a continuing basis as they are referenced in day-to-day work. Compliance with oversight requirements is a regular item of consideration.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

a. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Attorneys supervised the legal activities of [redacted] reviewed contractual matters advising on correction, amendments, potential oversight matters and modifications.

(b)(3) 10
USC 424

b. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Additionally attorneys lectured weekly to deploying Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH) personnel concerning oversight-reporting requirements. Attorneys also reviewed and counseled with regard to [redacted] to law enforcement to assure compliance with oversight responsibilities.

(b)(2)

c. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Attorneys reviewed several [redacted] oversight and security due process activities and instructed [redacted] contractor personnel.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(2)

d. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ A GC member lectured on oversight subjects to DH contractors, National Security Agency [redacted] and [redacted] and continued to work with the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) revising collection procedures (b)(2)

(b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(2)

e. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ GC has reported no incidents of criminal activity to the Department of Justice during the quarter.

3. (U) Directorate for Administration (DA) was involved in the following oversight activities:

a. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ A 100 percent verification of entries in DA's automated databases was conducted to ensure no individual names or corporations/organizations were inadvertently entered into the database, except as provided for in DoD 5240.1-R.

b. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Assigned personnel involved in data handling were given a quarterly reminder briefing by the administrative supervisor concerned regarding prescribed and authorized materials and procedures.

- c. There were no special access program bulletins issued during this reporting period.
- d. Newly assigned members were briefed on applicable provisions of E.O. 12333, and Procedure 15, DoD 5240.1-R.
4. (U) Directorate for Human Capital (HC) reported [redacted] personnel assigned participated in document review. HC stated division security officers periodically queried respective personnel to review files to ensure compliance with DoD 5240.1-R and DIAR 60-4; and inappropriate files were not found.
 - a. (U) In addition, [redacted] new employees (military and civilian) received IO responsibility training as a part of their in-processing indoctrination in DIA 101 and DIA 201.
 - b. (U) HC provided IO instruction in [redacted] courses and through the Joint Intelligence Virtual University.
5. (U) The Joint Military Intelligence College (MC) provided IO instruction to [redacted] students; [redacted] of the trainees were DIA personnel, which include full-time students. Additionally, [redacted] MC staff and faculty participated in annual IO refresher instruction.
6. (U) Directorate for Intelligence (J2) reported that [redacted] personnel participated in files review. J2 disseminated information concerning IO responsibilities and interactive training discs to all subordinate directorates during quarter, and they procured additional IO videos for elements to watch. Additionally, J2 conducted a review of IO officers to ensure all were still active employees of DIA and fulfilling their duties as IO officers. Numerous J2 elements continue periodic file reviews to ensure compliance with all IO issuances.
7. (U) DH reported that [redacted] personnel performed file reviews during the quarter. In addition, initial IO training was provided at DIA 101 and [redacted] newcomer's training. Training videos were provided to the forward support offices and liaison offices that are external to [redacted]. The [redacted] also stressed IO responsibilities during in processing.
8. (U) The Directorate for Measurement and Signature Intelligence and Technical Collection reported [redacted] personnel participated in review.
9. (U) The Office of Equal Opportunity and Equal Employment Opportunity (EO) required all personnel to conduct file reviews to ensure compliance with the appropriate directives. EO has gone through extensive records review and closing of office files/regulations in order to comply with applicable IO directives.
10. (U) The Chief Financial Executive (FE) stated that there were no reports of activities that employees believe to be illegal or contrary to executive order, presidential directive, or applicable DoD policy.

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

11. (U) The Chief of Staff reported [] personnel participated in a files review and found no IO relevant information. Additionally, IO responsibility information was disseminated to all command element personnel. (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424
12. (U) OP reported that [] personnel reviewed files to ensure that prohibited material was not retained.
13. (U) The Chief Acquisition Executive (AE) reported that [] personnel participated in files review this quarter and all AE personnel are aware and familiar with the applicable IO directives.
- a. (U) In addition, AE stated that contracting officer's representative guidance letters are updated to incorporate guidance to ensure contractors maintain records, and reflect IO training which may be periodically reviewed by the IG or directorate IO office.
 - b. (U) AE stated that they had not initiated any contract actions during subject period that fall under the procedures of 11.b., DoD 5240.1-R, and there were no contracts requiring contractor performance under the criteria of DIAR 60-4, Paragraph 7.d.
14. (U) DIA management continued to emphasize the importance of personnel being familiar with IO regulations during the period 1 January through 31 March 2006.

1 Encl
Intelligence Oversight Brief FY 06-02,
150942Z Mar 06, (S//NF) 2 pages

150942Z Mar 06

Subject: IG Intelligence Oversight Brief FY 06-02 (U)

1. (U) Addressees are requested to ensure that all unit personnel are informed of the contents of this message.

2. (U) U.S. Persons. Recently there has been significant media attention regarding intelligence collection against U.S. persons. For clarification, DIA is authorized to collect against a U.S. person if the subject individual meets the criteria contained in DoD 5240.1-R, procedure 2. Generally, this authorizes collection necessary to accomplish the agency's foreign intelligence and counterintelligence mission areas. The relevant points are:

a. (U) U.S. Persons. U.S. person information may be collected if there is reasonable belief the subject meets at least one of the criteria contained in procedure 2.

b. (U) Reasonable Belief. A reasonable belief arises when the facts and circumstances are such that a person would hold the belief. Reasonable belief is based on experience, training, or knowledge of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence work, applied to facts and circumstances at hand. A trained and experienced intelligence professional might hold a reasonable belief to satisfy this standard. Conversely, a person unfamiliar with intelligence or counterintelligence methodologies might not be able to meet this standard.

c. (U) Retention of U.S. Person Information. DoD 5240.1-R, procedure 3 governs the retention of identifying U.S. person information by all DoD intelligence components. If information was properly collected in accordance with procedure 2, the U.S. person information may be retained indefinitely. If a reasonable belief cannot be established that the information meets the criteria of procedure 2, the information may not be retained beyond 90 days.

d. (U) Example 1: A U.S. corporation executes an agreement to provide sophisticated information technology to the ministry of defense of a foreign country. This clearly meets the criteria of procedure 2.

e. (U) Example 2: A person submits a letter for publication in a U.S. newspaper that is critical of U.S. policy in the Middle East. This falls within the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and does not provide, by itself, the basis for collection activities against the individual.

f. (U) Example 3: A U.S. person of middle east ethnicity regularly attends religious services at a mosque and proclaims a doctrine of literal interpretation of the Koran. This situation does not meet the test of reasonable belief of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence interest.

3. (U) intelligence Oversight (IO) Training Distant Learning. The IO CD-ROM developed by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) has been configured for

Enclosure

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
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(b)(3):10
USC 424

posting with the [redacted] Unit IO officers are encouraged to make use of the [redacted] posting for continuing education of the workforce.

4. (U) Recent IO Issues from DIA Elements.

a. (S//NF) [redacted]



(b)(1),(b)(5),1
4 (c)

5. (U) If you have any IO issues which you would like addressed in future IO briefs please forward them to the Office of the Inspector General, ATTN: Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Oversight. We are also accessible via the DIA IG Hotline. commercial [redacted]

[redacted] You may also submit IG hotline issues via [redacted]

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

Derived from: DIA HUMINT SCG, Oct 04
Declassify on: 20310315

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20310814~~



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



S-06-0299/IG

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 30 June 2006

- References:
- a. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - b. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - c. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - d. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982

(U) As required by references above, the Defense Intelligence Agency Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the period 1 April through 30 June 2006 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General at [redacted]

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

Enclosure
Quarterly Intelligence Oversight
Report, 1 April through 30 June 2006
(S//NF), 1 cy

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

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153

(U) QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

1 April through 30 June 2006

1. (U) The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported the following intelligence oversight (IO) activities:

a. (U//FOUO) (b)(2) OIG provided continued support to investigations and inquiries by the Department of Defense (DoD) IG pertaining to detainee/prisoner abuse allegations, Iraqi National Congress, and [redacted]. These are ongoing projects.

b. (U//FOUO) OIG provided IO training to four iterations of the Tomorrow's Intelligence Professionals Course; one class of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 101; and one class of the Staff Operations Course-Operating Base, totaling [redacted] persons.

c. (U//FOUO) OIG provided focused IO training to the outbound [redacted]

[redacted]

d. (U//FOUO) OIG provided IO briefings to [redacted] and [redacted] at the [redacted] conference held 12 through 16 June 2006.

e. (U) OIG disseminated the IO quarterly brief to all DIA field activities (enclosure 1).

f. (U//FOUO) OIG memorandum S-0235/IG, "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 13 May 2005, reported that the office of the DIA [redacted] Office of Operations (OP), might have engaged in questionable activities consisting of an [redacted]. A written report was completed. (Project 2005-002555-MA).

g. (U) The OIG responded to five requests for assistance from headquarters staff and field units on matters of IO guidance and interpretation.

h. (U//FOUO) OIG conducted inspections of [redacted] and found no questionable activities.

2. (U) The General Counsel (GC) reported that GC attorneys conducted weekly training sessions on Tuesdays for personnel deploying abroad to ensure that all DIA personnel, especially [redacted] and [redacted] are fully aware of the most recent DoD policy on conducting intelligence interrogations and treatment of detainees in U.S.

Derived from: DIA HUMINT SCG
Declassify on: 20310814
Date of source: 1 October 2004

custody. Between [redacted] and [redacted] DIA personnel attended each of these sessions. Additionally, the following groups received IO instruction:

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424
(b)(2),(b)(5)

a. On 16 May [redacted] presented instruction on [redacted] concerning [redacted] and other IO issues to the [redacted] class.

(b)(2)
(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

b. On 8 June, [redacted] and [redacted] OIG, jointly made a two-hour IO presentation to the Directorate for Human Intelligence (DHI) [redacted] who are the designated unit liaisons for IO.

(b)(2)

(b)(3):10
USC 424

c. On 16 June, [redacted] taught a one-hour block on [redacted] as part of the agency's [redacted]

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

3. (U) The Joint Military Intelligence College (MC) provided IO instruction to personnel in the courses noted below:

NUMBER COURSE

[redacted]

- Survey of Intelligence Collection
- Basic Intelligence Collection
- Human Intelligence
- Imagery Intelligence
- Signal Intelligence
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
- Congressional Oversight of Intelligence
- Industry and Intelligence
- National Security Structure and Policy
- History of U.S. Intelligence
- Information Technology for Intelligence Professionals
- Future of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community
- The Law of Intelligence
- Congress and U.S. Intelligence
- Leadership, Management and Coordination in the Intelligence Community
- Intelligence Relations with Allied Nations
- Intelligence and Homeland Security

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

In summary, [redacted] students received oversight instruction; [redacted] were DIA personnel.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

4. (U) The Directorate for Intelligence reported that [redacted] personnel assigned participated in files review, and all are current in IO training. Personnel not trained were either on temporary duty (TDY) or on leave.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

5. (U) The Directorate for Administration (DA) reported [redacted] personnel assigned participated in IO review. Additionally, newly assigned members were briefed on applicable provisions of Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," Procedure 2,

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

Conduct of Intelligence Activities; and DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons" Procedure 15, Identifying, Investigating, and Reporting Questionable Activities. DA was not aware of any activities reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to executive order or presidential directive, or applicable DoD policy. DA also reported conducting 100 percent verification of entries in the office's automated databases during this timeframe to ensure no individual names or corporations/organizations were inadvertently entered into the database, except as provided for in DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (Procedures 2 and 3). Assigned personnel involved in data handling received a quarterly reminder briefing from the administrative supervisor concerned, regarding prescribed and authorized materials and procedures. There were no special access program bulletins issued during this reporting period.

6. (U) The Directorate for Analysis (DI) reported that of the [redacted] personnel assigned, [redacted] participated in quarterly training, [redacted] received training previously, and [redacted] did not participate due to leave, rotation, and TDY. In addition, DI conducted an inspection of the files and work areas of the DI offices. The inspection found that DI had no discrepancies pertaining to information/material that would violate the provisions of the DoD 5240.1-R and DIAR 60-4.
7. (U) DH reported [redacted] personnel assigned, to include military personnel, civilian personnel, contractors, and foreign nationals. Additionally, DH reported training [redacted] personnel, [redacted] personnel conducted file reviews, and no prohibited materials were identified. DH also reported [redacted] provided IO training to [redacted] new DH.
8. (U) The Directorate for Measurement and Signature Intelligence and Technical Collection reported [redacted] personnel assigned, and that [redacted] personnel participated in IO training this quarter; all others were previously trained. Additionally, the review of files found no discrepancies pertaining to information or material that would violate the provisions of DoD 5240.1-R and DIAR 60-4.
9. (U) The Directorate for Information Management and Chief Information Officer reported [redacted] personnel assigned participated in IO training this quarter. Training included review of DoD 5240.1-R, DCID 6/4, DoD 5105.21-M-1, and Overseas Travel Antiterrorism/Force Protection briefing.
10. (U) The Office of Equal Opportunity and Equal Employment Opportunity reported no IO activities this quarter.
11. (U) The Chief Financial Executive (FE) reported [redacted] employees participated in the periodic procedures review of DoD 5240.1-R and DIAR 60-4. FE also stated that there were no reports of activities that employees believe to be illegal or contrary to executive order, presidential directive, or applicable DoD policy.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

12. (U) The Chief of Staff (CS) reported [redacted] personnel assigned to the command element received IO training. During the training process, files were reviewed to determine whether holdings were in accordance with DoD 5240.1-R and DIAR 60-4. No files or briefings were discovered containing IO-relevant information. Additionally, individuals not trained were either on leave or on TDY.
13. (U) The Office of Operations (OP) reported that [redacted] personnel reviewed files to ensure that prohibited material was not retained, and that assigned personnel were trained on IO and their responsibilities.
14. (U) Office for Congressional and Public Affairs reported 100 percent of assigned personnel received IO training.
15. (U) The Office of International Engagement reported 100 percent of assigned personnel received IO training.
16. (U) The Acquisition Executive (AE) reported that [redacted] personnel assigned participated in re-certifying their IO training via the [redacted] all are now compliant. AE stated that all personnel are aware and familiar with the applicable IO directives. In addition, AE stated the update of the contracting officer's representative guidance letters incorporated guidance to ensure that contractors maintain records, which reflect IO training. AE also stated that it would initiate action to ensure that acquisition vehicles include requirements to make contract employees aware of the provisions of DoD 5240.1-R and DIAR 60-4. AE indicated that they had not initiated any contract actions during subject period that fall under the procedures of 11 b., DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, and there were no contracts requiring contractor performance under the criteria contained in DIAR 60-4, Paragraph 7.d.

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

17. (U) The [redacted] reported [redacted] personnel participated in IO training. Personnel not participating were TDY or on leave.

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

18. (U) The [redacted] reported that [redacted] currently has [redacted] government personnel. As a new organization, it is currently developing IO procedures to include file review and quarterly training sessions with all personnel. As part of developing those procedures, it is working with DIA IO officers regarding specific topics to address, and available resources. IO is a primary concern it will ensure activities are in full compliance with federal law, executive order, and DoD directives.

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

19. (U) The Directorate for Human Capital (HC) reported [redacted] personnel assigned participated in document review. HC stated division security officers periodically queried respective personnel to review appropriate files to ensure compliance with DoD 5240.1-R and DIAR 60-4; no inappropriate files were found. In addition, [redacted] new employees (military and civilian) were made aware of the IO responsibilities as a part of their indoctrination during in processing, included in DIA 101 and DIA 201. Further, HC stated the [redacted] provided IO training via 11 courses, to [redacted] students.

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

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(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

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20. (U) DIA management continued to emphasize the importance of personnel being familiar with IO regulations.

1 Enclosure
OIG message 071200Z JUN 06,
subj: IG Intelligence Oversight
Brief FY06-03, (U) 1 copy

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(b)(2)

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FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//IG//

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(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

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- RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL//TCIG
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- RHMFISS/CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//CCO5/IG

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(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

INFO RHEFLGX/SAFE WASHINGTON DC
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CONTROLS

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BODY

SUBJ: IG INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BRIEF FY06-03(U)

1. (U) ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO ENSURE THAT ALL UNIT PERSONNEL ARE INFORMED OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE.
2. (U) NON-DIA INSPECTIONS.
 - A. (U) THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG), IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIAI 5100.200, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL POLICIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR REPRESENTING THE DIRECTOR ON ALL ACTIVITIES REQUIRING COLLABORATION OR COORDINATION WITH THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (IG) COMMUNITY. PERIODICALLY, DIA ORGANIZATIONS MAY BE

(b)(2)

INCLUDED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF NON-DIA INSPECTION ORGANIZATIONS. THE MOST FREQUENTLY ENCOUNTERED ORGANIZATIONS ARE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) IG, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IG, THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT), AND THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE. FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS THE OIG HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE DOD IG ON INVESTIGATIVE ISSUES ARISING FROM ALLEGATIONS OF PRISONER ABUSE AND ISSUES SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY THE CONGRESS. THE AGENCY IS COMMITTED TO FULL AND OPEN DISCLOSURE OF ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY SUCH INVESTIGATIONS AND ALL EMPLOYEES ARE OBLIGATED TO PROVIDE FULL COOPERATION.

(b)(2)

(2) (U) ALL NON-DIA INSPECTOR REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS MUST BE MADE THROUGH THE OIG. THE OIG IS THE CONDUIT FOR PROVIDING COPIES OF DOCUMENTS TO NON-DIA INSPECTORS.

(3) (U) AFTER ACTION REPORTS CONCERNING NON-DIA INSPECTIONS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE OIG AND THE APPROPRIATE CHAIN OF COMMAND WITHIN 72 HOURS OF THE VISIT COMPLETION.

(4) (U) ANY QUESTIONS MAY BE ADDRESSED TO THE OIG VIA THE IG HOTLINE OR, IF URGENT, VIA TELEPHONE.

3. (U) RECENT IO ISSUES FROM DIA ELEMENTS.

A. (U//FOUO) DUAL CITIZENSHIP. DEPARTMENT OF STATE IG, THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT), AND THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE.

(b)(2)

AGENCY IS COMMITTED TO FULL AND OPEN DISCLOSURE OF ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY SUCH INVESTIGATIONS AND ALL EMPLOYEES ARE OBLIGATED TO PROVIDE FULL COOPERATION.

B. (U//FOUO) PERMISSION TO COLLECT ON U.S. PERSONS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IS THE PERCEPTION HELD BY SOME AGENCY EMPLOYEES THAT COLLECTION AGAINST U.S. PERSONS IS NOT AUTHORIZED. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. DOD 5240.1-R, PROCEDURE 2, PROVIDES SEVERAL APPROVED CATEGORIES BY WHICH COLLECTION MAY OCCUR AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS, PERSONS HOLDING U.S. PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS, OR U.S. CORPORATIONS OR ORGANIZATIONS. GENERALLY THESE CRITERIA RELATE TO A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CONNECTION.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

essage Text

(b)(2)

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

(b)(2),
(b)(5)

4. (U) UNIT INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT OFFICERS. DIAR 80-4 IS THE DIA IMPLEMENTING REGULATION FOR DOD 5240.1-R. PARAGRAPH 7.F. REQUIRES THAT ALL

[Redacted] APPOINT AN INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT OFFICER (IOO) AND PROVIDE A COPY OF THAT LETTER TO THE OIG. THE REGULATION ESTABLISHES MINIMUM GRADE CRITERIA FOR THE IOO, BUT DUE TO THE SMALL SIZE OF SOME

(b)(2),(b)(3): O
USC 424

(b)(2)

[Redacted] THE OIG RECOMMENDS THAT AN ALTERNATE IOO ALSO BE APPOINTED WITHOUT GRADE RESTRICTION. ANY QUESTIONS ON THIS MATTER MAY BE ADDRESSED VIA THE IG HOTLINE TO THE ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IO.

(b)(2)

5. (U) USEFUL INFORMATION. THE OIG IS FREQUENTLY ASKED BY DIA FIELD ELEMENTS FOR COPIES OF DOD DIRECTIVES. THE BEST SOURCE FOR THIS INFORMATION IS THE WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES AND CAN BE ACCESSED VIA THE INTERNET AT: WWW.DTIC.MIL/WHS/DIRECTIVES. THE SITE ALSO HAS LINKS TO PUBLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES.

ADMIN

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: 18 July 2006

S-06-0230/IG

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: IG

SUBJECT: (U) FMA Investigation, Project 05-002555-MA

TO: OP DJ
DA DH

- REFERENCES:
- a. (U) DIAI 5100.200, "Office of the Inspector General-Policies and Responsibilities," 17 February 2006
 - b. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons," 11 December 1982
 - c. (U) DIAM 58-4, "Foreign Materiel Program (FMP)," 22 February 2002
 - d. (U) DIAM 58-11, "DoD HUMINT Policies and Procedures," 3 August 1998

c. ~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

1. (U) BACKGROUND

a. ~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1), 1.4
(c), 1.4 (d)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 20310718

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
152

(b)(1), 1.4 (c), 1.4 (d)

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
3. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. (U//FOUO) Recommendation 1: OP and DH should evaluate their current training processes and take appropriate action to properly educate all assigned personnel fully on their personal responsibilities to coordinate acquisition activities in accordance with reference b.



(b)(1),1.4
(c),1.4(d)

4. (U) IMPACT



(b)(1),1.4
(c),1.4(d)

5. (U) RELATED ACTIONS

(U//FOUO) The SAIG is continuing its investigation to determine if changes to Army FMP procedures and regulatory guidance are required.

6. (U) TASKING GUIDANCE

- a. (U) OP, DI and DA reply to the OIG with record of actions taken by 18 August 2006.
- b. (U) Send responses to If submitting a hard copy, also send an electronic copy. If sending an electronic copy only, it must be routed through the directorate head or deputy and must contain either an electronic signature or an electronic concurrence. Responses that have not been properly coordinated and approved cannot be accepted. Requests to close a completed action will not be approved without supporting documentation.


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- c. (U) The directorate's reply will be evaluated for responsiveness to the intent of the required action(s), achievability, and timeliness of completion dates. Ongoing actions will be tasked through ProcessIt.

7. (U) REPORT HANDLING

(U) This report contains the results of an investigation conducted by the OIG. It is a privileged document, not to be shared outside of DIA without command approval.



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USC 424

cc:
DR
DD
GC
DAC

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



S-06-0392/IG

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending
30 September 2006


- References:
- a. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - b. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - c. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - d. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982

(U) As required by references above, the Defense Intelligence Agency Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the period 1 July through 30 September 2006 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General at [redacted]

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

Enclosure
Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report
1 July through 30 September 2006
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(b)(3):10
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cc:
DR
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SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

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(U) QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

1 July through 30 September 2006

1. (U) The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported the following intelligence oversight (IO) activities:
 - a. (U//FOUO) OIG provided continued support to investigations and inquiries by the Department of Defense (DoD) IG pertaining to detainee/prisoner abuse allegations, Iraqi National Congress (INC), [redacted] and the DoD Office of Special Plans. The DoD IG issued reports on detainee/prisoner abuse and a Phase I report on the INC. (b)(2)
 - b. (U//FOUO) OIG provided IO training to one iteration of the Tomorrow's Intelligence Professionals Course with [redacted] attendees. (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424
 - c. (U//FOUO) OIG provided focused IO training to the outbound [redacted] [redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424
 - d. (S//NF) OIG provided tailored IO training to [redacted] assigned to [redacted] [redacted] on 2 August 2006. (b)(1),(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)
 - e. (S//NF) OIG memorandum F-0234/IG, subject: "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 12 June 2006, reported that an individual assigned to the Directorate for Intelligence (J2) may have engaged in questionable [redacted] [redacted] The OIG conducted an investigation and determined that the allegations were substantiated. The OIG recommended management action against the individual. The project is closed. (Project 2005-002721-MA). (b)(1),1.4 (c)
 - f. (U//FOUO) The OIG conducted an IO assessment of DIA deployed forces in [redacted] during the period 20 through 30 August 2006. The OIG team found no IO procedural violations. The appropriate agency directorates received a briefing on management issues now pending their action (Project 2006-002756-MA). (b)(2)
 - g. (U) OIG disseminated the IO quarterly brief to all DIA field activities (enclosure 1).
 - h. (U) The OIG responded to four requests for assistance from headquarters staff and field units on matters of IO guidance and interpretation.

Derived from: DIA HUMINT SCG
Declassify on: 20311026
Date of source: 1 October 2004

2. (U) The General Counsel (GC) reported receiving no reports of questionable intelligence activities during July to September 2006. The following groups received IO instruction:

a. (U) On 15 August and 19 September 2006, GC personnel taught legal aspects of [redacted] (b)(2)

b. (U) On 5 September 2006, one attorney taught the [redacted] class to new [redacted] attending the [redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

c. (U) On 13 September 2006, one attorney taught a class on IO Policies and [redacted] (b)(2)
[redacted] (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

3. (U) Joint Military Intelligence College (MC) reported IO instruction was included in courses during the summer quarter (June through August 2006). The courses with their enrollments are listed below:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>COURSE</u>
[redacted]	History of U.S. Intelligence
[redacted]	The Law and Intelligence
[redacted]	Management of Intelligence
[redacted]	Leadership, Management and Coordination in the Intelligence Community
[redacted]	Intelligence and Homeland Security (Formerly numbered NFL598C)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

(U) In summary, [redacted] students received IO instruction; [redacted] were DIA personnel.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

4. (U) The Directorate for Intelligence (J2) reported [redacted] personnel assigned participated in files review/training this quarter. J2 also reported that [redacted] personnel were unavailable due to temporary duty (TDY) and/or leave. Additionally, J2 reported all personnel assigned are current in IO training.

5. (U) The Directorate for Administration (DA) reported [redacted] personnel assigned participated in IO review. Newly assigned members were briefed on applicable provisions of Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," Procedure 2, Conduct of Intelligence Activities; and DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons" Procedure 15, Identifying, Investigating, and Reporting Questionable Activities. DA was not aware of any activities reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to executive order or presidential directive, or applicable DoD policy. DA also reported conducting 100 percent verification of entries in the office's automated databases during this timeframe to ensure no individual names or corporations/organizations were inadvertently entered into the database, except as provided for in DoD 5240.1-R (Procedures 2 and 3). Assigned personnel involved in data handling received a quarterly reminder briefing from the administrative supervisor, regarding

prescribed and authorized materials and procedures. There were no special access program bulletins issued during this reporting period.

- 6. (U) The Directorate for Analysis (DI) reported [redacted] personnel assigned participated in quarterly review, [redacted] received training previously, and [redacted] did not participate due to leave, rotation, and TDY. In addition, DI conducted an inspection of the files and work areas of the DI offices. The inspection found DI had no discrepancies pertaining to information/material that would violate the provisions of the DoD 5240.1-R and DIAR 60-4. All employees were instructed to review DoD 5240.1-R, DIAR 60-4, and IO related virtual training and websites.
- 7. (U) DH reported [redacted] personnel assigned, to include military personnel, civilian personnel, contractors, and foreign nationals. DH reported [redacted] personnel received training, and [redacted] personnel conducted file reviews. Furthermore, DH reported [redacted] [redacted] provided IO training to [redacted] new DH members, and training videos were provided to the forward support offices and liaison offices that are external to [redacted].
- 8. (U) The Directorate for Measurement and Signature Intelligence and Technical Collection reported 600 personnel assigned, and 30 personnel participated in IO training this quarter; all others were trained previously.
- 9. (U) The Directorate for Information Management and Chief Information Officer reported [redacted] personnel assigned participated in IO training this quarter.
- 10. (U) The Equal Opportunity Office reported [redacted] personnel participated in IO reviews this quarter.
- 11. (U) The Chief Financial Executive (FE) reported [redacted] employees participated in the periodic procedures review of DoD 5240.1-R and DIAR 60-4. FE stated that there were no reports of activities that employees believe to be illegal or contrary to executive order, presidential directive, or applicable DoD policy.
- 12. (U) The Chief of Staff reported [redacted] personnel assigned to the command element received IO training. During the training process, files were reviewed to determine whether holdings were in accordance with DoD 5240.1-R and DIAR 60-4. No files or briefings containing IO-relevant information discovered. Individuals not trained were either on leave or TDY.
- 13. (U) The Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJ) reported that [redacted] personnel assigned completed IO training and reviewed files to ensure no retention of prohibited material. Assigned personnel were trained on IO and their responsibilities. DJ also reported that personnel were informed to access to DIA 60-4 on INTELINK and Joint Intelligence Virtual University (JIVU) Course "Intelligence Oversight" to meet the "2006 4th Qtr" training requirement. Additionally, DJ reported that all of the [redacted] completed IO training.

(b)(2),(b)(3)
10 USC 424

14. (U) Office for Congressional and Public Affairs reported all [redacted] personnel assigned received IO training.

(b)(2),(b)(3) 10
USC 424

15. (U) The Office of International Engagement reported all [redacted] personnel assigned received IO training.

16. (U) The Acquisition Executive (AE) reported that [redacted] newly reported personnel of [redacted] personnel assigned participated in IO training via JIVU. AE stated that all personnel are aware and familiar with the applicable IO directives. In addition, AE stated that action will be initiated to ensure that acquisition vehicles include requirements that contract employees are aware of the provisions of DoD 5240.1R and DIAR 60-4. AE indicated that they had not initiated any contract actions during subject period that fall under the procedures of 11.b., DoD 5240.1-R, and there were no contracts requiring contractor performance under the criteria contained in DIAR 60-4, Paragraph 7.d.

17. (U) The [redacted] reported [redacted] personnel participated in IO training. Personnel deployed did not participate.

18. (U) DIA management continued to emphasize the importance of personnel being familiar with IO regulations.

1 Enclosure
OIG message 261400Z SEP 06,
subj: IG Intelligence Oversight
Brief FY06-04, (U) 1 copy

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[REDACTED]
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RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SCIG [REDACTED]
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//IG [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//IG [REDACTED] PA-RSC//
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//IG [REDACTED] PA-RSC//
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(b)(2),(b)(3):10
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CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

BODY

SUBJ: IG INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BRIEF FY06-04(U)

1. (U) ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO ENSURE THAT ALL UNIT PERSONNEL ARE INFORMED OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE.

2. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) TRAINING OF NON-U.S. PERSONNEL. DOD 5240.1-R, PROCEDURE 14 REQUIRES THAT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS SHALL FAMILIARIZE ITS PERSONNEL WITH THE PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, DOD 5240.1-R, AND AGENCY SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1),(b)(5),1.4 (c)

[REDACTED] THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG) GUIDANCE IS THAT FOREIGN NATIONAL EMPLOYEES ARE TO BE TRAINED IN IO PROCEDURES ONLY.

[REDACTED]

(b)(5)

AND SIMILAR CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL WOULD NOT NORMALLY MEET THE CRITERIA FOR IO TRAINING. HOWEVER, DIA SUPERVISORS SHOULD PERIODICALLY REVIEW THE FILES OF ALL [REDACTED] TO DETERMINE THAT ANY INFORMATION ON U.S. PERSONS IS PROPERLY MAINTAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES 2 AND 3 AND THAT NO PROHIBITED INFORMATION IS BEING RETAINED.

(b)(2),(b)(5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

3. (U) RECENT IO ISSUES FROM DIA ELEMENTS.

A. (U) WHAT A PROCEDURE 15 IS NOT. DURING OUR INSPECTIONS WE CONTINUE TO FIND MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF PROCEDURE 15 NOTIFICATIONS. IN SOME CASES EMPLOYEES HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT "PROCEDURE 15 CHARGES." A PROCEDURE 15 NOTIFICATION IS NOT PUNITIVE, IT IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (IG) TO THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT) REPORTING THAT A QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITY, AS DEFINED BY DOD 5240.1-R, MAY HAVE OCCURRED AND THAT AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MATTER WILL BE CONDUCTED BY THE IG. IN SOME CASES WE ARE ABLE TO INCLUDE A STATEMENT OF HOW DIA CORRECTED THE PROBLEM AT THE TIME OF FILING THE PROCEDURE 15 NOTICE. IN ALL CASES, WE FOLLOW UP WITH A STATEMENT OF CLOSURE ON THE QUARTERLY IO REPORT, IN WHICH WE STATE THAT THE ALLEGATION WAS NOT SUBSTANTIATED OR THAT VIOLATIONS WERE CONFIRMED AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN PUT IN PLACE. ALSO, NOTE THAT, ALTHOUGH THE IG MAY ELECT TO TASK THE RESPECTIVE DIA DIRECTORATE TO CONDUCT AN INTERNAL INQUIRY AND REPORT BACK, THE INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION, TO INCLUDE DETERMINATION OF FACTS, RESIDES WITH THE IG.

4. (U) IG SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ISSUED A MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, COMBATANT COMMANDERS, AND THE SERVICE CHIEFS ON 22 JUNE 2006, SUBJECT: REDUCING PREVENTABLE ACCIDENTS. THE MEMORANDUM IS QUOTED IN FULL FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

A. (U) I HAVE SET SOME VERY SPECIFIC MISHAP REDUCTION GOALS FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO ACHIEVE. MY CONGRATULATIONS TO THOSE WHO ARE PROGRESSING TOWARD THEIR RESPECTIVE GOALS, BUT OTHERS ARE NOT. WE MUST REDEDICATE OURSELVES TO THOSE GOALS - AND ACHIEVE THEM. TOO OFTEN WE EXCUSE MISHAPS BY CITING THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WE OPERATE. WE HAVE TRAINED OUR MEN AND WOMEN TO OPERATE SAFELY IN VERY TRYING CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR LOSING LIVES GIVEN PROPER PLANNING, ATTENTION TO DETAIL, AND THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND.

B. (U) ACCOUNTABILITY IS ESSENTIAL TO EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP. I EXPECT ALL THE DEPARTMENT'S LEADERS, FROM THE COMMANDER TO THE FIRST LINE SUPERVISORS, TO BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR MISHAPS UNDER THEIR WATCH. WE SIMPLY WILL NOT ACCEPT STATUS QUO.

C. (U) IF WE NEED TO CHANGE OUR TRAINING, IMPROVE OUR MATERIAL ACQUISITION, OR ALTER OUR BUSINESS PRACTICES TO SAVE THE PRECIOUS LIVES OF OUR MEN AND WOMEN, WE WILL DO IT. WE WILL FUND AS A FIRST PRIORITY THOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND DEVICES THAT WILL SAVE LIVES AND EQUIPMENT. WE WILL RETROFIT EXISTING SYSTEMS, AND CONSIDER THESE DEVICES AS A MUST FUND PRIORITY FOR ALL NEW SYSTEMS. WE CAN NO LONGER CONSIDER SAFETY AS A NICE THING TO HAVE.

D. (U) I WANT TO HEAR WHAT YOU ARE DOING TO IMPROVE YOUR SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND I WANT TO SEE THE RESULTS OF YOUR ACTIONS. END. QUOTE DONALD RUMSFELD

5. (U) THE OIG, ALONG WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DOD IG COMMUNITY, ACCEPTS THAT ACCIDENT REDUCTION IS A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF SUCCESSFUL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~

MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. WE WILL INCLUDE ACCIDENT PREVENTION AS A SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM IN FUTURE INSPECTIONS. LINE SUPERVISORS SHOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO REVIEW UNIT SAFETY PROCEDURES AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROGRAMS.

6. (U//FOUO) OIG ASSESSMENT

[REDACTED]

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

DURING FY2007 THE OIG WILL FORM A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY TEAM TO PROVIDE A BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF [REDACTED] THESE ASSESSMENTS WILL GAUGE TRANSFORMATIONAL EFFORTS [REDACTED] AND SUSTAINMENT OF IT CAPABILITIES FOR DECISIONS MAKERS, WARFIGHTERS, AND DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS. THE ASSESSMENTS WILL ALSO CONSIDER INTEGRATION OF [REDACTED] ASSETS TO DIA AND IDENTIFY CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES OF NOTE.

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USC 424

7. (U) CHANGES AT THE OIG AS THE DIA IG AFTER 43 YEA

[REDACTED]

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USC 424

DERIVED FROM: DIA HUMINT SCG, OCT 04
DECLASSIFY ON: 20310925

BT


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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



S-07-0028/IG

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 31 December 2006

References: a. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981

b. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993


c. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988

d. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982

1. (U) As required by references, the Defense Intelligence Agency Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the period 1 October through 31 December 2006 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General at [redacted]. (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

2. (S//NF) [redacted]




(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

3. (U) There were no intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated this quarter.

Classified by: DIA HUMINT SCG
Declassify on: 20320208
Date of source: 1 October 2004

4. (U//FOUO) An IO inspection of all DIA directorates and special offices commenced 26 November 2006 and ended 31 January 2007. The purpose of the inspection was to ensure compliance with all Federal and DoD directives, to capture best practices, and to discuss IO issues/concerns. The team composition consisted of a member of the DIA OIG and the U.S. Northern Command IG. OIG did not find any questionable intelligence activities. OIG found most personnel were familiar with IO requirements; however, some offices were not conducting adequate training. The OIG inspection team gave recommendations and outlined best practices for implementing an effective intelligence IO program; report in progress. Additionally, the OIG conducted inspections of [redacted] and found no questionable activities.
5. (U) There were no substantive changes to DIA's IO program.
6. (U) There have been no changes to any published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities.
7. (U) There were no other significant IO activities.
8. (U) DIA does not have any suggestions for program improvements this quarter.

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USC 424



(b)(3):10
USC 424

cc:
DR
DD



COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY

251 18th STREET
CRYSTAL SQUARE 5, SUITE 1200
Arlington, VA 22202-3537



JAN 22 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report

References: (a) DoD Directive 5240.1-R
(b) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense memorandum, Annual IO Report to Congress - New Requirement, December 8, 2006

In accordance with Procedure 15 of references a and b, the following Quarterly IO Report is provided for the period of October to December 2006. The format is patterned by the information provided in reference b:

1. INFORMATION REQUESTED: Description of intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any actions taken as a result of the violations.

CIFA: Although the following information did not arise during this reporting period, it is provided as specifically requested.

In May 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz directed establishing a new reporting mechanism designed to capture open-source, non-validated international terrorist threat information, quickly flow that information to military commanders, and incorporate the information into the DoD terrorism threat-warning process. The reporting system was given the name TALON and CIFA was designated as the database custodian for TALON reports. Essentially, the TALON Reporting System was designed as a neighborhood watch program; a tool for the military commander responsible for force protection.

Through March 2006, more than 13,000 reports were received from a variety of reporting organizations. Most of the reports were initiated by Service members or individuals who observed suspicious activity. Some of the reports were based on e-mail mass mailings received by Service members or their families. Others were initiated by local or state law enforcement organizations. An audit of the database revealed that 186 reports (1.4 percent) did not meet the TALON reporting criteria in that there was no international terrorist nexus in those reports. Furthermore, 113 reports (0.8 percent) contained information relating to U.S. persons that was not maintained in accordance

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with reference a. The reports identified by the audit did not meet the reporting criteria or the requirements of reference a were immediately deleted from the database.

In March 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense England directed several modifications to the TALON Reporting System to ensure that reports posted to the database met reporting criteria (i.e., international terrorist nexus) and conformed to reference a. Sufficient safeguards now exist in the TALON Reporting System for collecting, retaining, and disseminating information. In addition to initial screening for receiving, retaining, and disseminating, the TALON database is periodically audited.

2. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A list of IO inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections.

CIFA: December 2006, CIFA-West (Colorado Springs CI support cell focused on USNORTHCOM issues).

CIFA's IO Board conducted an in-person audit of CIFA-West IO procedures used to oversee data aggregations (defined as databases such as CORNERSTONE that contain the TALON reports and other groupings of information over which CIFA has a corporate—as opposed to an individual worker—interest in overseeing adherence to IO principles and rules) previously identified by CIFA-West. The procedures for all identified data aggregations and documented compliance with those procedures far exceeded what would normally be considered minimum compliance with DoD 5240.1-R and EO 12,333. Each employee and contract worker is required, *inter alia*, to conduct a personal IO review of all data over which the individual has cognizance on a quarterly basis and certify to the IO compliance officer that the review had been completed.

The CIFA-West IO procedures also include reviewing all reports the Military Departments and Defense agencies offer to include in the CORNERSTONE database as TALON reports for compliance with IO requirements and to show an international terrorism nexus as noted above.

3. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A paragraph summarizing any substantive CIFA-wide changes to its IO programs, including changes to supporting training programs and the reason for the changes. (Attach a copy.)

CIFA: NONE

4. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A paragraph summarizing any CIFA-wide changes to published directives or policies concerning intelligence, CI, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes. (Attach a copy.)

CIFA: NONE


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5. INFORMATION REQUESTED: Any other matters pertinent to the CIFA IO program.

CIFA: During this reporting period, a question arose concerning the interpretation of "substantially composed" contained in the definition of "U.S. person" at reference a. In the past, CIFA's analysis focused primarily on either the number of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens who were members of an unincorporated association or their percentage when compared to the entire membership. For example, if that number reached into the tens of thousands or the percentage was relatively large, CIFA concluded that met the criteria of substantially composed. Based on consultations with the ATSD(IO) staff, CIFA now employs a multiple factor rather than a numerical or percentage approach to determine whether an unincorporated association qualifies as a U.S. person. Whether the association is international (location of the headquarters), whether it has a U.S. nexus, the stated purpose of the association and the percentage of members and number of members who are United States citizens or permanent resident aliens are a few of those factors. CIFA will apply these and other factors in future analysis.


James T. Faust
Director

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
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



U-08-0068/IG

14 February 2008

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 31 December 2007

- References:
- a. Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - b. Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - c. DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - d. DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982
 - e. ATSD(IO) memorandum, subject: Required Actions for the CY 2007 Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress, 15 November 2007

1. (U) As required by references, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is submitting the Quarterly Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report for the period 1 October through 31 December 2007. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
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[Redacted], or the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at [Redacted]

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2. (U) The OIG did not open any intelligence oversight investigations this quarter.

3. (U) The following provides the current status of ongoing intelligence oversight investigations:

- a. (S//NF) [Redacted]


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- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Directorate for Human Intelligence, may have engaged in questionable activities involving the establishment of its [redacted]. [redacted] The OIG has initiated an intelligence oversight investigation into the matter. The investigation continues. (Project 2008-003049-MA)
- c. (U) The OIG did not issue any final investigative reports during this period.

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cc:
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DD

~~SECRET//NOFORN 20321029~~



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



U-07-0424/IG

2 November 2007

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 30 September 2007

- References:
- Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982

1. (U) As required by references, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report for the period 1 July through 30 September 2007 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel (GC) at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General at [redacted]

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USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC 424

2. ~~(S//NF)~~ The OIG released a letter, S-07-0364/IG, "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 4 September 2007, which stated that the [redacted] Directorate for Analysis, might have engaged in questionable [redacted] The OIG initiated an IO investigation, and determined that the program complied with existing requirements. (Project 2007-003018-MA)

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(b)(1),1.4 (c)

3. (S//NF) The OIG released a letter, S-07-0339/IG, "Possible Violation of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R," 9 August 2007, which stated that the OIG had received information that a [redacted] might have provided information that violated the Arms Export Control Act. The OIG initiated an IO investigation. (Project 2007-002940-MA)

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4. (U) The DIA made no substantive changes to its IO program.

5. (U) The DIA made no changes to any published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities.

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Declassify on: 20321029


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6. (U) The DIA does not have any suggestions for program improvements for this quarter.



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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY
251 18th STREET
CRYSTAL SQUARE 5, SUITE 1200
Arlington, VA 22202-3537



OCT 22 2007

INFO MEMO

FOR: ATSD(IO)

FROM: JAMES T. FAUST, DIRECTOR, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY (CIFA)

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report (3rd Quarter, CY 07)

1. INFORMATION REQUESTED: Description of intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any actions taken as a result of the violations.

CIFA: NONE

2. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections.

CIFA: Review of training records for IO at the DoD Joint CI Training Academy compelled CIFA Main to perform IO training, which was well attended. Inspected Force Protection Response Group's (FPRG) IO program and found it sufficient. Conducted a pre-inspection of FPRG's records in anticipation of pending ATSD(IO) inspection.

3. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A paragraph summarizing any substantive CIFA-wide changes to intelligence oversight programs, including changes to supporting training programs and the reason for the changes.

CIFA: NONE

4. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A paragraph summarizing any CIFA-wide changes to published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes.

CIFA: NONE

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5. INFORMATION REQUESTED: Any other matters pertinent to the CIFA intelligence oversight program.

CIFA: All TALON reports removed from CORNERSTONE database on September 16, 2007. OGC will retain deleted data on disks for FOIA responses and potential IO issues.

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY
251 18th STREET
CRYSTAL SQUARE 5, SUITE 1200
Arlington, VA 22202-3557



FEB 0 6 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR ATSD(IO)

SUBJECT: DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report (4th Quarter, CY 07)

1. INFORMATION REQUESTED: Description of intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any actions taken as a result of the violations.

CIFA: NONE

2. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections.

CIFA: Conducted top to bottom review of data aggregations (which includes databases) which might or actually do contain US person information in preparation for DoD/IG audit of CIFA intelligence databases.

3. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A paragraph summarizing any substantive CIFA-wide changes to intelligence oversight programs, including changes to supporting training programs and the reason for the changes. (Attach a copy, if any).


CIFA: Created a tracking methodology/process to capture any deletions of databases, to include classification level and description of the database / data aggregation contents. A copy of the blank form, with instructions is included with this report.

4. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A paragraph summarizing any CIFA-wide changes to published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes. (Attach a copy, if any).

CIFA: NONE

5. INFORMATION REQUESTED: Any other matters pertinent to the CIFA intelligence oversight program.

CIFA: NONE


John F. O'Hara
Acting Director

Attachment:
As stated

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CLASSIFICATION: _____

CIFA
DATABASE / DATA AGGREGATION
CLOSE-OUT / DELETION VERIFICATION
(See Form Instructions on page 2)

To: The CIFA Intelligence Oversight Board

From: _____
CIFA Government Employee's Name (Print Legibly)

Employee Title

email address

On the _____ day of _____, 20____, I request that the CIFA IT Directorate to hard-delete the following database (or data aggregation):

1. **TITLE:** _____
2. **DOMAIN:** NIPR _____ (circle one)
3. **DESCRIPTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF CONTENTS:** _____

Signed this _____ day _____

Directorate Certification of Hard Deletion

I, _____ (please print name legibly) hereby certify that the above description of database / data aggregation was hard-deleted from CIFA's servers on the following date:

Signed: _____ Date Signed: _____

extension

CLASSIFICATION: _____

CLASSIFICATION: _____

Form Instructions:

1. Data owners shall complete this form when they desire to remove/delete an entire database or data aggregation from the CIFA enterprise.
2. Completion of this form is required to assist the CIFA Intelligence Oversight Board in carrying out its function to provide adequate oversight of adherence to Intelligence Oversight rules.
3. The Government employee who is responsible for maintaining or deleting the database / data aggregation shall ensure that the Information Technology Directorate person responsible for deleting a database / data aggregation completes the bottom half of this form.
4. This form shall be submitted to the chair of the CIFA Intelligence Oversight board, complete with signatures, within 3 work days of the deletion of the database / data aggregation.
5. Any questions regarding the propriety of deleting a database / data aggregation should be directed to the CIFA Office of General Counsel.

SAMPLE

CLASSIFICATION: _____

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//28330130~~
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



S-08-0221/CE

1 February 2008

Subject: ~~(S//NF)~~ Congressional Notification - DIA Interrogation Recordings of Ali Saleh
Kahlah Al-Marri

1. **Summary:** ~~(S//NF)~~ The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently requested the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assistance in connection with collection of information about Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, a suspected al-Qaida operative arrested in 2001 by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and now held by the Defense Department at the Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. DOJ wanted information concerning the joint DIA-FBI interrogations of Al-Marri that occurred between September 2003 and July 2004. During an inventory in response to the DOJ request, DIA determined that interrogation sessions had been recorded and that the original video recordings of the interrogations were destroyed. However, DIA made copies of some of the sessions to send to other activities. We are in the process of compiling all available copies of these recordings. Due to current Congressional and DOJ interest in destruction of interrogation tapes, DIA has initiated an internal inquiry into the interrogation recordings and the circumstances surrounding their disposition.

2. **Background:**

~~(S//NF)~~ The Director, DIA in August 2003 approved video recording of the interrogations. DIA subsequently recorded all 37 interrogation sessions of Al-Marri, which occurred between 12 September 2003 and 31 July 2004. The sessions were recorded via either VHS tape or DVD.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ The interrogation team considered the recordings as working papers, enabling the interrogators and others to review Al-Marri's comments, demeanor, and to make translations. Detailed situation reports (SITREPs) were prepared as well as intelligence information reports (IIRs). DIA maintains record copies of the SITREPs and IIRs.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ After utilizing information from the recordings, the Interrogation Team Chief and the lead DIA interrogator destroyed the original VHS tapes and DVDs between December 2004 and February 2005. They destroyed the recordings because they regarded them as working papers with no further intelligence value.

~~(S//NF)~~ Due to current Congressional and DOJ interest in destruction of interrogation tapes, DIA initiated an internal, joint Inspector General - General Counsel inquiry into the interrogation recordings and the circumstances surrounding their disposition.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ While the inquiry continues the content of the recordings is being reviewed.

Derived from: DMS 5X10
Perkins on 30136130

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//20330130~~

- ~~(S//NF)~~ DIA has found no evidence that, at the time of the destruction of the recordings, there was any litigation hold, preservation directive, agency issuance, court order, or request by any investigative body expressly requiring preservation of the recordings.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ The DIA General Counsel has imposed a litigation hold requiring continued preservation of all Al-Marni related information, including recordings.

Michael D. Maples


MICHAEL D. MAPLES
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



U-07-0337/IG

AUG 14 2007

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 30 June 2007

- References:
- a. Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - b. Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - c. DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - d. DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982

1. As required by references, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report for the period 1 April through 31 July 2007 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel (GC) at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at [redacted].
2. There were no intelligence oversight investigations opened during this quarter.
3. There were no substantive changes to DIA's IO program.
4. There were no changes to any published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities.
5. DIA does not have any suggestions for program improvements this quarter.

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424




or the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at [redacted]



(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424



(b)(3):10
USC 424

cc:
DR
DD

UNCLASSIFIED


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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



S-07-0173/IG

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 31 March 2007

- References:
- a. (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - b. (U) Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - c. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - d. (U) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982

1. (U) As required by references, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report for the period 1 January through 31 March 2007 is enclosed. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel (GC) at [redacted]

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

[redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at [redacted]

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):1
0 USC 424

2. ~~(S//NF)~~ The OIG released a letter, S-07-0098/IG, subject: Possible Violation of Executive Order (EO) 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, 16 February 2007, that reported [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424, 1.4 (c)

[redacted] may have engaged in questionable collection activities from 2003 to the present. The OIG initiated an investigation into this matter (Project 2006-002940-MA). No further information to report at this time.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ The OIG released a letter, S-07-0110/IG, subject: Possible Violation of Executive Order (EO) 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R, 5 March 2007, that reported that an individual assigned to the Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH) may have engaged in questionable activities consisting of [redacted]

[redacted] through improper coordination. The OIG initiated an investigation into this matter (Project 2007-002947-MA). No further information to report at this time.

(b)(1),(b)(2),
1.4 (c)

Classified by: DIA HUMINT SCG
Declassify on: 20320426
Date of source: 1 October 2004

4. (U) There were no intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated this quarter.

5. (U//FOUO) OIG inspected [redacted] during the period 29 November through 13 December 2006. The purpose of the inspection was to assess and identify any impediments to mission success. OIG did not find any questionable intelligence activities.


(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

6. (U) There were no substantive changes to DIA's IO program.

7. (U) There have been no changes to any published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities.

8. (U) DIA does not have any suggestions for program improvements this quarter.



(b)(3):10
USC 424

cc:
DR
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY

251 18th STREET
CRYSTAL SQUARE 5, SUITE 1200
Arlington, VA 22202-3537



INFO MEMO

FOR: ATSD(IO)

FROM: JAMES T. FAUST, DIRECTOR, CIFA

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report

4/21/67
JTF

- This memo provides CIFA input for the quarterly Intelligence Oversight report.
- **INFORMATION REQUESTED:** Description of intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the year, as well as any actions taken as a result of the violations.

CIFA: NONE

- **INFORMATION REQUESTED:** A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections.

CIFA: NONE

- **INFORMATION REQUESTED:** A paragraph summarizing any substantive CIFA-wide changes to our intelligence oversight programs, including changes to supporting training programs, and the reason for the changes. (Attach a copy, if any).

CIFA: NONE

- **INFORMATION REQUESTED:** A paragraph summarizing any CIFA-wide changes to published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes. (Attach a copy, if any).

CIFA: NONE

- **INFORMATION REQUESTED:** Any other matters pertinent to the CIFA intelligence oversight program.

CIFA: Robust Intelligence Oversight education program continues.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



S-08-0152/IG

24 April 2008

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 31 March 2008

- References:
- Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - Executive Order 13462, "President's Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board," 29 February 2008
 - DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982
 - ATSD(IO) memorandum, subject: Required Actions for the CY 2007 Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress, 15 November 2007

- (U) As required by references, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is submitting the Quarterly Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report for the period 1 January through 31 March 2008. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel at [redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at [redacted]

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

- (U) The following intelligence oversight investigations were opened this period:

- ~~(S//NF)~~ The Director, DIA, directed that the Inspector General and the General Counsel conduct a joint inquiry into the facts and legal considerations surrounding the disposition of video recordings created during the joint Defense Intelligence Agency/Federal Bureau of Investigation (DIA/FBI) interrogation of enemy combatant detainee [redacted]

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

The inquiry determined that the disposal of video recordings was consistent with Department of Defense and DIA information security regulatory guidance on disposition of working papers, and standard interrogation approaches were followed. [redacted] was treated humanely and no extraordinary or enhanced interrogation techniques were employed. The interrogations were conducted in a manner so as not to violate any law, executive order, other presidential directive, or Department of Defense policy. The report was issued after the close of the reporting period. (Project 2008-003059-SA)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 24330418

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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b. ~~(S//NF)~~ A review was initiated about circumstances leading to the [redacted] (b)(1),1.4(c)
[redacted] made of DIA. [redacted]
The DIA [redacted] requested the OIG review all types of media in the
agency's possession involving [redacted]
determine if agency personnel used [redacted]
[redacted] The review determined that standard [redacted] were
followed and no [redacted] were employed. The
report is in final review for release. (Projects 2008-003089/003092/003093-MA)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ The OIG received information that [redacted] assigned to [redacted]
[redacted] may have conducted an [redacted]
[redacted] The OIG initiated an intelligence oversight investigation
into the matter and determined the allegation was not substantiated; case was closed with
no further action. (Project 2008-003090-MA)

3. (U) The following provides the current status of ongoing intelligence oversight investigations:

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Directorate for Human Intelligence, may have
engaged in questionable activities involving the establishment of [redacted]
[redacted] The investigation substantiated violations to Department
of Defense policies for information assurance, webmaster policies, and privacy
requirements and the website was removed from the Internet. The report is in final
review for release. (Project 2008-003049-MA)


4. (U) The following final investigative report was issued during this period:

~~(S)~~ The OIG conducted a review at the [redacted] in response (b)(3):10 USC
to a request for intelligence oversight guidance on using [redacted] 424
[redacted] The review determined that the [redacted] (b)(1),1.4 (c)
[redacted] had a contract with an academic institution and two other contracts (b)(3):10
related to [redacted] The contract activities complied with USC 424
intelligence oversight policies, but the [redacted] did not have
sufficient application controls in place to provide needed IO training. OIG
recommendations were issued to: 1) address training of personnel involved in similar (b)(3):10
research projects; 2) include modification of current contracts to include an IO policy; USC 424

(b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(3):10
USC 424
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

and 3) establish provisions to include IO training responsibilities in future contracts and purchase orders when appropriate. Management is taking corrective action. (Project 2008-003018-MA)



(b)(3):10
USC 424

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY


251 18th STREET
CRYSTAL SQUARE 5, SUITE 1200
Arlington, VA 22202-3537



INFO MEMO

FOR: ATSD(IO)

FROM: JAMES T. FAUST, DIRECTOR, CIFA

 AUG 22 2007

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report

1. **INFORMATION REQUESTED:** Description of intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any actions taken as a result of the violations.

CIFA: NONE

2. **INFORMATION REQUESTED:** A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections.

CIFA: Reviewed a new tools suite (IATS) and its IO procedural safeguards. IATS is a Google-like search tool designed to permit joint, on-line counterintelligence collaboration and population of products on a CIFA-controlled system. Given the desired end-state, IO procedural safeguards are still under development and will be in place before going live.

3. **INFORMATION REQUESTED:** A paragraph summarizing any substantive CIFA-wide changes to intelligence oversight programs, including changes to supporting training programs and the reason for the changes. (Attach a copy, if any).

CIFA: NONE

4. **INFORMATION REQUESTED:** A paragraph summarizing any CIFA-wide changes to published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes. (Attach a copy, if any).

CIFA: NONE

5. **INFORMATION REQUESTED:** Any other matters pertinent to the CIFA intelligence oversight program.

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(b)(5),(b)(6)

EFF 196



COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY
251 16th STREET
CRYSTAL SQUARE 5, SUITE 1200
Arlington, VA 22202-3637



JUN 15 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR ATSD(IO)

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report CY 2008 1st Quarter

1. INFORMATION REQUESTED: Description of intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any actions taken as a result of the violations.

CIFA: NONE

2. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections.

CIFA: Conducted random audit of compliance with CIFA IO training requirements.

3. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A paragraph summarizing any substantive CIFA-wide changes to intelligence oversight programs, including changes to supporting training programs and the reason for the changes. (Attach a copy, if any).


CIFA: NONE

4. INFORMATION REQUESTED: A paragraph summarizing any CIFA-wide changes to published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes. (Attach a copy, if any).

CIFA: Published new internal directive on SAP regarding offensive counterintelligence operations. Published updated internal directive regarding legal review of CIFA work-product, reaffirming that the CIFA OGC shall review, among other things, all analytic products and operational reports - the review of which is primarily designed for intelligence oversight purposes. Reissued internal CIFA policy regarding Collection of Information in Cyberspace, with modest administrative changes and maintaining the requirement that all CIFA employees, contractors (on-site or off-site) are required to take CIFA IO training before engaging in cyber research on CIFA information systems or otherwise in support of CIFA on contract anywhere.

5. INFORMATION REQUESTED: Any other matters pertinent to the CIFA intelligence oversight program.

CIFA: NONE


Scott E. Jacobs
Acting Director

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